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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation proposes a gendered theory of coercive mobility, synthesized 
from the collateral consequences of incarceration, along with coercive mobility theory 
and literature on forms of capital. Previous work has shown that the removal of residents 
due to mass incarceration contributes to disruptions in neighboring relationships and 
therefore, impedes the community’s ability to prevent crime, commonly referred to as 
informal social control. This involuntary mobility due to prison admissions and returns, 
known as coercive mobility, has focused almost entirely on the collateral consequences to 
the incarcerated, a predominantly male population. However, those who remain in the 
community, primarily women, also experience disruptions to their neighboring 
relationships. This disruption leads to reductions in women’s capital due to the 
incarceration of concentrated segments of male residents, including a reduction in social 
capital (e.g., resources that lie within these neighboring relationships), physical capital 
(e.g., income), and human capital (e.g., education). Therefore, women’s capital is 
incorporated as a mechanism to more fully explain the process by which concentrated 
incarceration unfolds and results in reductions in neighborhood social control. 
In addition to incorporating women’s capital as a mechanism in the relationship 
between incarceration and informal social control, the proposed theory fills an evident 
gap in the literature by examining the consequences of incarceration for female residents, 
as well as the gendered or differential effects of incarceration to women and men. Using 
data on Baltimore residents, the dissertation tests the proposed theory by estimating the 
association between incarceration (prison admissions and releases) and women’s and 
men’s capital and social control at the neighborhood-level with the use of ordinary least 
squares regression models, and at the individual-level, while controlling for 
neighborhood characteristics, using hierarchical linear modeling. Furthermore, women’s 
and men’s capital are tested as mediators in the relationship between incarceration and 
social control at both levels. Findings provide support for a gendered theory of coercive 
mobility, advancing our understanding of the community consequences of incarceration 
to female residents, and offer suggestions for future research and policy implications.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Modern trends in mass incarceration have produced levels of incarceration well 
beyond the “tipping points” expected to produce harmful effects (Rose and Clear, 1998). 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the criminal justice system presently 
supervises, jails, incarcerates, and paroles one in every 31 Americans (3.2% of the U.S. 
population) (BJS, 2012). This estimate provides an important picture of incarceration and 
supervision across the United States since this “nontrivial” prevalence speaks to the 
degree of impact to current and formally incarcerated individuals and their families 
(Brown and Manning, 2013). It does not, however, begin to provide an accurate picture 
of the story of how incarceration shapes larger community relationships, which also 
impact families and individuals.  
Incarceration rates are not evenly distributed, but are stratified by residential 
location and highly concentrated among disadvantaged communities (Clear, 2007; 
Lynch, Sabol, Planty, and Shelley, 2002; Maurer, 1999; Petersilia, 2002; Rose and Clear, 
1998). While the prevalence of adults under recent criminal justice supervision (i.e., on 
probation, in jail, or prison within the last 12 months) represents just 1.2% of adults 
(estimated by the national household Survey of Criminal Justice Experience (SCJE)) 
(Brown and Manning, 2013), national estimates of lifetime supervision reveal a much 
larger proportion of adults having ever been under criminal justice supervision, ranging 
from 10.2% (ages 18 and over; supervision measured as probation, jail, or prison) to 
26.5% (ages 18-44; supervision measured as jail, prison, or juvenile detention center) 
(Brown and Manning, 2013). Furthermore, at the neighborhood-level these prevalence 
rates are unevenly distributed. While most neighborhoods have very low incarceration 
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rates, some neighborhoods experience an extreme concentration of incarceration, in 
which as much as 20% of adult men find themselves behind bars on any given day 
(Clear, 2007). In Brooklyn, for example, 11 city blocks make up 20% of the city’s 
population, but contain 50% of the city’s parolees (Petersilia, 2002). Similarly, 60% of 
prison admissions and releases come from and return to the Phoenix-Mesa area in 
Arizona and nearly 50% of prisons admissions in New Haven, Connecticut come from 
just three neighborhoods (Cadora and Swartz, 2006). Sections of Washington, DC, have 
an estimated one in five adult males behind bars (20%) (Clear, 2007) and neighborhoods 
in Cleveland, Ohio are missing up to 18% of the male population due to incarceration 
(Lynch and Sabol, 2001).  
Concentrated rates of prison admissions and releases have also been documented 
within some neighborhoods within the states of New Jersey, Texas, and Louisiana 
(Cadora and Swartz, 2006) and the cites of Tallahassee, Florida (Clear, Rose, Waring, 
and Scully, 2003), Baltimore, Maryland (Lynch and Sabol, 2004a; 2004b; Lynch et al., 
2002), and Wichita, Kansas (Cadora and Swartz, 2006). Furthermore, Lynch and Sabol 
(2001) estimate that the national reentry population to urban centers tripled between 1984 
and 1996, growing from 11,000 to 330,000. The re-entry population, along with the 
impact of removal, is especially important to understand today since there is recent 
evidence that policy may be shifting– if even just slightly–towards decarceration 
strategies (see, for example, Gottschalk, 2014). Therefore, it is crucial to understand how 
communities are impacted by decades-long concentrated incarceration and release trends 
and what impact future release levels may have on communities. 
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Additionally, these estimates only represent a portion of the entire supervision 
story. Taking into consideration the proportion of men who are removed and cycle in and 
out of the correctional system over the course of a year causes estimates to expand 
exponentially, particularly in neighborhoods with the highest incarceration rates (Clear, 
2007). For example, one in three 16–24 year olds in some neighborhoods in Brooklyn is 
sent to prison or jail each year (Cadora, 2001).The remaining neighborhoods are 
distributed widely in terms of the proportion of residents who are removed due to 
incarceration each year. 
Communities with high incarceration rates are characterized by disadvantage, 
stratifying the consequences of incarceration among the nation’s poor and undereducated 
minority groups (Lynch and Sabol, 2004a; 2004b; Rose and Clear, 1998; Western, 2007; 
Wildeman and Muller, 2012). The concentration of imprisonment is highly segregated 
among black and white neighborhoods. For example, in Brooklyn 12.4 per 1,000 
individuals are incarcerated in primarily black neighborhoods, while imprisonment in 
primarily white neighborhoods occurs for only 2.7 per 1,000 residents (Clear, 2007).  
Due to the confluence of incarceration in poor, minority communities, for "young 
black males in large urban centers ... imprisonment ... has come to be a regular 
predictable part of experience" (Garland, 2001: 2; Pettit and Western, 2004). 
Additionally, the high prevalence of prison has become a common life event that may 
rival such prevalent life events as college and military experience (Pettit and Western, 
2004) or marriage and stable employment among black males (Doherty, Cwick, Green, 
and Ensminger, 2015).  
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The concentration of incarceration and overlap among indicators of disadvantage 
(percent of single-parent households, minority concentration, and individuals receiving 
government aid) can be clearly seen in Figure 1, depicting neighborhoods in Brooklyn. 
As shown, neighborhoods in which a large number of residents are admitted to jail and 
prison overlap with neighborhoods in which a large portion of residents receive TANF 
benefits, have large proportions of female headed households, and are largely comprised 
of black residents (Cadora, 2001).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Therefore, the consequences of incarceration are concentrated among those who 
are already experiencing the impact of living within a disadvantaged neighborhood, 
including struggles such as poor schooling, high crime, drug use, gang activity, and poor 
and unsafe living conditions (Wildeman and Western, 2010). Due to the concentration of 
problems associated with living in a disadvantaged neighborhood it becomes a challenge, 
both substantively and methodologically, to distinguish among the effects of 
incarceration from pre-existing consequences of a disadvantaged lifestyle. The additional 
complexity of consequences caused from incarceration can be thought of as further 
“collateral damage” of living in a disadvantaged area (see Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999). 
Citing literature on trauma and the life course (see, for example, Hagan and McCarthy, 
1997a, 1997b), Hagan and Dinovizter (1999: 127) explain that “the imprisonment of a 
parent, [partner, or family member] represents one kind of event that can combine with 
other adverse life experiences in influencing longer-term life outcomes,” leading to “a 
chain reaction” in which incarceration is “one ‘bad’ thing” leading to another in a series 
of other ‘bad’ things. In this way, incarceration will “more often compound than mitigate 
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preexisting family problems” and intensifies pre-existing neighborhood problems (Hagan 
and Dinovitzer, 1999: 125). Furthermore, incarceration policies and other social policies 
have impacted these communities in ways that have added to these damages, making 
them more high-risk, punitive, and unsafe (Hagan and Coleman, 2001; Hagan and 
Dinovitzer, 1999; Wacquant, 1998). Wacquant (1998: 26) argues, for example, that the 
“organizations presumed to provide civic goods and services—physical safety, legal 
protection, welfare, education, housing, health care—which have turned into instruments 
of surveillance, suspicion and exclusion rather than vehicles of social integration and 
trust building” are adding to the problems that they intend to fix. 
The disadvantaged circumstances that residents find themselves in prior to their 
own incarceration or the incarceration of a family member raises an important point 
regarding the “multi-functionality” of the consequences of incarceration, particularly with 
respect to criminality and victimization (Comfort, 2008). At the individual-level, 
incarceration has the potential to elicit positive effects in addition to the elimination of 
the offender’s criminal activity. For example, removing an offender may contribute to a 
reduction in the offending or victimization experiences of their family members and 
friends (i.e., a woman’s victimization experiences may decline if her partner was a 
contributor to abuse). The multi-functionality of consequences is highest at the individual 
and familial-levels. Individual scenarios are often complex and therefore, families and 
friends may experience both positive and negative consequences following the 
incarceration of a family member or friend. However, scholars conclude that the 
consequences of incarceration are generally harmful for most inmates, marriages, and 
families in consideration of the big picture or generalization of effects (Carlson and 
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Cervera, 1992; Comfort, 2008; Fishman, 1990; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999), particularly 
when a male offender is removed (Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). In the aggregate, 
deleterious consequences greatly outweigh positive ones, particularly when incarceration 
is concentrated within a community. As Clear (2002: 193) states: 
 “There are of course families that rally in the face of a loved one being sent to 
prison finding ways to strengthen child-rearing and locating substitute resources 
to replace the lost family member. There are plenty of families, too, that benefit 
from the temporary reprieve from what may well have been a damaging member 
of the household… Yet, these stories are the exception rather than the rule. On 
average, the effects of very high levels of incarceration are destabilizing in the 
aggregate, and they pose a problem even the strongest families must struggle to 
deal with. Too many families and too many neighborhoods fail the challenge.” 
 
 Coercive mobility theory argues that an overreliance on formal social control, 
namely incarceration, can result in deleterious consequences to the social structure, and a 
subsequent weakening of informal social control, referring to the community’s ability to 
react to and prevent crime (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993), at the neighborhood-level (Rose 
and Clear, 1998). According to the theory, neighborhood reductions in informal social 
control occur through consequences to the social capital of the incarcerated, who are 
predominantly men. Social capital refers to the set of resources that lie within neighbor 
relations (Coleman, 1990). However, those who remain in the community, primarily 
women, also experience reductions in capital (i.e., physical, human, and social) due to 
periods of incarceration of male family members and friends, as well as the incarceration 
of concentrated segments of male residents (Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014; Wilson, 
1987). This dissertation presents and tests a theoretical expansion of the theory of 
coercive mobility, which incorporates women's capital as an additional mechanism to 
more fully explain the relationship between incarceration and neighborhood crime 
through informal social control, as well as formal social control. The proposed gendered 
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theory of coercive mobility is extended from coercive mobility theory and the extensive 
body of literature surrounding the collateral consequences of incarceration to women who 
remain in the community. 
COERCIVE MOBILITY THEORY 
Rose and Clear’s (1998) theory of coercive mobility is developed from a social 
disorganization framework and incorporates the effects of incarceration on neighborhood 
crime. The social disorganization framework posits that neighborhood structural 
characteristics, including residential instability, poverty, and racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity (Shaw and McKay, 1942), contribute to neighborhood “disorganization” or 
the failure of a community “to realize the common values of their residents or solve 
commonly experienced problems” (Bursik, 1988: 521; see also Thomas and Znaniecki, 
1920). The systemic reformation of social disorganization (e.g., the systemic model) 
further develops these processes, explaining that disruptions to systemic networks (e.g., 
neighboring relations) interfere with residents’ ability to police themselves and 
effectively reduce crime (i.e., informal social control) (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993).  
 Residential instability disrupts systemic networks by making it difficult for 
residents to maintain relationships (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993). Similarly, poverty 
interferes with residents’ ability to socialize and supervise young children and teens while 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity impedes resident cohesion due to divergent norms and 
traditions. Consequently, both poverty and racial and ethnic heterogeneity lead to 
disruptions in network relations (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993). Without strong systemic 
networks in place, informal social control efforts are inhibited (Bursik and Grasmik, 
1993).  
  
8 
 
Figure 2 (adapted from Rose and Clear, 1998) illustrates the relationships within 
coercive mobility theory. A “feedback loop” is extended from the level of incarceration 
back to the disorganizing neighborhood structural characteristics posited by social 
disorganization theory (e.g., residential instability, poverty, and heterogeneity) (Bursik 
and Grasmik, 1993).  
[Figure 2 about here] 
The level of incarceration also leads to reductions in physical, human, and social 
capital. Physical capital refers to the tangible resources belonging to an individual, 
including money, possessions, and other assets (Coleman, 1990),1 while human capital 
refers to the skills and resources of individuals (Coleman, 1990). The term “social 
capital” has a long history in sociology dating back to the mid-19th century (Portes, 
1998). Ironically, scholars’ frequent attempts to clarify the term have resulted in further 
confusion surrounding the range of processes and constructs to be included (see Portes, 
1998). Coleman’s (1990) definition is clear in its distinction of social capital from other 
types of capital (physical and human) and is the definition adopted by coercive mobility 
theory (Rose and Clear, 1998). Coleman (1990) emphasizes social capital as a product of 
relations among people. It is not in itself a tangible resource, but represents the potential 
to acquire resources from one’s connections and interactions with others. In line with the 
systemic model, Coleman views dense systemic networks as a necessary condition for the 
emergence of social capital (1990; Portes, 1998). Similarly, Rose and Clear (1998: 454) 
describe social capital as “the social skills and resources needed to affect positive change 
in neighborhood life.” Although social capital is the least tangible form of all capital 
                                                          
1Physical capital, although not explicitly described by coercive mobility scholars, has been defined within 
the primary literature encompassing social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putman, 1993). 
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since it refers only to the potential for resources that lie within one’s connections with 
others (Coleman, 1990), more tangible forms of capital are related to one’s social capital 
since those with more resources and skills to exchange are more likely to be sought out 
for relationships by others. Likewise, those with more resource-inherent connections are 
more likely to acquire more tangible forms of capital through those networks. 
The theory posits that coercive mobility, referring to the cycling of residents into 
and out of the neighborhood due to prison entry and community reentry (Clear et al., 
2003), directly contributes to residential instability since the displacement of a large 
portion of residents creates holes in the structure of systemic networks and weakens their 
ability to facilitate informal social control (Rose and Clear, 1998). Coercive mobility also 
indirectly contributes to further residential instability and poverty since highly 
incarcerated neighborhoods develop poor reputations and high rates of crime (due to 
reductions in informal social control) so that residents who can afford to move choose to 
relocate, leaving behind the most disadvantaged residents (see Burgess, 1925; Rose and 
Clear, 1998). Further, although coercive mobility does not directly contribute to racial 
and ethnic heterogeneity, it may indirectly impact segregation through effects to poverty, 
subsequently leading to specific groups remaining in the neighborhood while others are 
able to move out since poverty and race and ethnicity are highly correlated. Coercive 
mobility also contributes to the heterogeneity of cultural norms due to the introduction of 
the prison subculture from the constant flux of incarcerated residents back into the 
community (Rose and Clear, 1998). Effects to norm heterogeneity are just as important if 
not more important for informal social control as racial and ethnic heterogeneity since 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity is thought to impede informal social control through its 
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disruption of neighbor cohesion due to residents’ divergent backgrounds and cultural 
norms (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993). Former offenders return to the community with a 
stronger deviant orientation, having been exposed and desensitized to criminal attitudes 
while incarcerated, contributing to a breakdown of cohesive attitudes and informal social 
control (Lerman, 2013; Rose and Clear, 1998). Lerman (2013: 162; 166) suggests that the 
“hostile or aggressive attitudes” and “types of social ties that are formed and maintained 
in America’s more violent and punitive prisons…are also broadly characteristic of the 
communities to which ex-prisoners predominantly return.” She argues that the social 
attitudes formed in prison leave with the inmates who adopt them, reducing law-abiding 
attitudes within the communities to which they return (Lerman, 2013: 166). 
Coercive mobility theory specifies that neighborhood structure leads to reductions 
in the effectiveness of informal social control through diminished human (e.g., skills and 
abilities) and social capital (Rose and Clear, 1998). Thus, within Figure 2, human and 
social capital mediates the relationship between neighborhood structure and informal 
social control, which in turn is associated with levels of neighborhood crime and 
incarceration (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993; Rose and Clear, 1998).  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR COERCIVE MOBILITY THEORY 
According to coercive mobility theory, incarceration in small doses contributes to 
a reduction in crime as intended, but produces harmful “feedback” effects once a “tipping 
point” in the level of incarceration has been reached (Clear et al., 2003; Renauer, 
Cunningham, Feyerherm, O’Connor, and Bellatty, 2006; Waring, Clear, and Scully, 
2005). An empirical test by Clear and colleagues (2003) examined the relationship 
between neighborhood-level incarceration and crime rates one year later among a sample 
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of Tallahassee neighborhoods. They found that prison releases contributed to increased 
crime rates one year later. Furthermore, a “tipping point” was found in which high rates 
of prison admissions were associated with higher crime rates the following year. On the 
other hand, Lynch and Sabol (2004b) found that increasing admission rates (measured as 
a five-year change in rates) were associated with decreased crime in a sample of 
Baltimore neighborhoods when they added drug arrest rates as an instrumental variable, 
allowing them to isolate causal ordering.  
 Lynch and Sabol (2004b) further tested the effects of incarceration on elements of 
community-level social control, using aggregate measures combining both men’s and 
women’s survey responses. They found that increasing changes in admission rates lead to 
decreased feelings of community solidarity, as well as marginally increased participation 
in informal social control, although the latter of the two effects was much smaller than 
the former. These results are counter-intuitive since decreases in community solidarity 
would be in contrast to the formation of informal social control (Lynch and Sabol, 
2004b). One explanation for these seemingly counter-intuitive findings is that the effect 
of incarceration may vary for men and women, causing these findings to diverge and 
concealing a more complicated story within the community-level results. 
A similar story is found within extant literature examining individual-level 
outcomes. A recent study by Lerman (2013) found that prison release rates are associated 
with an increase in individual residents’ frequency of informal socializing with friends 
and relatives, but a decrease in their trust and community cooperation. Again, these 
findings are somewhat counterintuitive and although gender may offer one plausible 
explanation for these divergent findings, there is no inclusion of separate estimates for 
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men and women (or a comparison of the two). Also, it is worth noting that “cooperation” 
in Lerman’s (2013) study is admittedly an “imperfect measure,” which gauges the 
likelihood that residents would cooperate to conserve water or electricity in a state of 
emergency and not residents’ cooperation to prevent crime.  
Although coercive mobility theory provides an important area of research 
to investigate, there is very little data available that allows for direct empirical 
testing of all of its components. As a result, the studies surrounding incarceration 
and its effects are rare and those that do exist are not without their limitations. 
Notably, the causal ordering of variables is difficult to distinguish, as with all 
cross-sectional research, but particularly with research that attempts to distinguish 
among a number of potential confounding effects, such as the characteristics of 
disadvantaged context coupled with incarceration. As the 2014 National 
Academies Press (NAP) Report on “The Growth of Incarceration in the United 
States” concludes: 
“A major problem is that incarceration at the neighborhood level is 
entangled with a large number of preexisting social disadvantages, 
especially the concentration of high levels of poverty and violence” (2014: 
282). 
 
This confounding of disadvantaged factors, all of which could contribute to 
outcomes posited to be associated with incarceration, can clearly be seen in Figure 1. 
Despite this hardship, the NAP report concedes that there is an “importance of 
undertaking a rigorous, extensive research program to examine incarceration’s effects at 
the community level” (2014: 298) since “the intense concentration of incarceration added 
to existing social inequalities constitutes a severe hardship faced by a small subset of 
neighborhoods” (2014: 282). 
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In sum, coercive mobility contributes to further neighborhood-level disadvantage 
and social problems in communities with high rates of incarceration by reducing both 
individual and community social capital. Rose and Clear (1998) and others (Clear, 1996; 
Lynch and Sabol, 2004a; 2004b; 1992; Moore, 1996; Nightingale and Watts, 1996; 
Renauer et al., 2006; Waring, Clear, and Scully, 2005) infer from the extant literature that 
high rates of incarceration contribute to increased crime through reductions to 
incarcerated men’s social capital and a weakening of family and community networks 
capable of enacting informal social control. However, the extant work has not fully tested 
these relationships. Previous work has not attempted to isolate the individual and 
community effects of incarceration separately for men and women, nor has it attempted 
to determine if impacts to men and women are significantly gendered (i.e., significantly 
different from one another). More importantly, coercive mobility theory has neglected to 
theoretically assess the effects of men’s incarceration on women’s capital and has ignored 
how women’s capital may produce gendered effects to community informal social 
control and crime. These evident gaps in the research are particularly troubling given that 
the potential uniqueness of men’s and women’s responses to incarceration is one 
plausible explanation for the divergent findings of extant work. The proposed project 
moves the field forward by examining these evident gaps in the research both 
theoretically and empirically. 
COERCIVE MOBILITY THEORY AND WOMEN  
 Some collateral consequences of incarceration to women who remain in the 
community (see Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Comfort, 2008; Fishman, 1990; Wakefield 
and Wildeman, 2014), as well as consequences specifically relating to women’s and 
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children’s capital have been documented in extant literature (see for example Hagan and 
Dinovitzer, 1999), mainly with the use of in-depth qualitative studies. However, there 
remains much to be learned about the community consequences of incarceration and 
consequences particularly to residents who are not involved with the criminal justice 
system themselves. In addition, these issues have yet to be synthesized into one thesis 
that demonstrates how each form of capital influences others. Additionally, work in this 
area has not demonstrated how these effects build to impact the community and its ability 
to facilitate informal social control and reduce crime. Similarly, although coercive 
mobility theory has well-articulated consequences to the social capital of returning men, 
resulting in deleterious community consequences, this body of work has neglected to 
include how consequences to women’s capital also build to result in unique family and 
subsequent community consequences. Finally, the consequences of incarceration to both 
men and women have not been examined in relation to one another in order to determine 
whether they represent distinctly gendered responses or processes. 
 The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One, introduced the 
problem, as well as the basic theoretical components and empirical evidence surrounding 
coercive mobility theory in the literature thus far. Chapter Two synthesizes literature on 
the collateral consequences of incarceration, coercive mobility theory, and forms of 
capital in order to theoretically describe the processes whereby incarceration results in 
consequences to women’s capital and neighborhood-level consequences essential for 
social control and crime reduction. This chapter incorporates women into coercive 
mobility theory, elaborating on how each form of women’s capital and social control is 
affected within these processes. This chapter also theorizes regarding how incarceration 
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may be associated with unique consequences to women’s capital and social control 
compared to men, lending itself towards a revised and expanded gendered theory of 
coercive mobility. In Chapter Three, the data and measures are detailed. Chapter Four 
describes the proposed analytic strategies of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
estimate outcomes at the neighborhood-level and hierarchical linear models (HLM) to 
estimate outcomes at the individual-level, while controlling for neighborhood-level 
characteristics. Chapters Five and Six present the study’s findings for the impacts of 
incarceration on women’s and men’s forms of capital and social control at the 
neighborhood and individual-level, respectively. Lastly, Chapter Seven concludes with a 
discussion of the study’s findings, limitations, and suggestions for future research and 
policy implications.   
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES TO WOMEN IN THE COMMUNITY 
Neglecting the segment of women who are indirectly affected by incarceration, 
through the incarceration of men in the community, ignores the largest portion of women 
who are affected by the criminal justice system. Incarceration is highly concentrated 
among men, comprising 93% of the U.S. prison population (Harrison and Beck, 2006). 
Therefore, although the study of female inmates is an emergent and essential field in 
criminology and criminal justice, it captures a less common segment of women affected 
by the system.  
 It is estimated that 107,518 women are state and federal inmates, a figure that is 
growing much faster than the rate of incarcerated men (4.6% versus 3.0%) (Harrison and 
Beck, 2006). However, the most conservative estimates for the number of women who 
are affected by incarceration through the incarceration of a marriage partner 
(approximately 278,000) are still more than double the estimated proportion of women 
who are incarcerated themselves (BJS, 1997). Including women who are in a 
heterosexual relationship with a currently incarcerated partner increases this estimate to 
695,000 women (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Grinstead, Zack, Faigeles, Grossman, Blea, 
1999; Jorgensen, Hernandez, and Warren, 1986). In her pivotal work, Doing Time 
Together, Comfort (2008) emphasizes that after expanding this figure to include the 13 
million men that pass through the jail and prison system each year, approximately 6.5 
million women are estimated to experience the removal of a partner annually (based on 
50% of incarcerated men reporting being in heterosexual relationships). Since men are 
incarcerated at a rate of almost thirteen times that of women (Comfort, 2008), the number 
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of women affected by the incarceration of a male partner, family member, friend, or 
neighbor surpasses that of men experiencing the incarceration of a female loved one.  
 Although the consequences of male removal due to incarceration can be both 
harmful and beneficial, they are more likely to result in harmful consequences to those 
left behind. In general, the effects of the removal of male offenders are more harmful due 
to the fact that the pool of incarcerated men includes a greater portion of “low-risk” and 
non-violent offenders compared to the pool of female offenders (Wakefield and 
Wildeman, 2014). As Todd Clear argues, “the idea that removing criminals has primarily 
the effect of eliminating community deficits comports closely with dominant public 
opinion about criminals: they are viewed as people whose net contribution to community 
life is negative, and so not much will be lost by their being gone” (2002: 181). However, 
the criminal justice policy changes that have led to mass incarceration have put away men 
who are far more complex than this black and white depiction and who represent more 
“socially integrated offenders” than in the past (Lynch and Sabol, 1997: 5), which may be 
especially true for male offenders. Furthermore, Wildeman and Western (2010: 163) 
argue that “as the imprisonment rate has grown, prisoners have come to resemble more 
closely the general population” in terms of their social and familial contributions, adding 
that although they may contribute to more crime than the average person in the 
population their removal has negative consequences none the less. And so, much of the 
literature concludes that these men do make positive contributions to their families, 
friends, and neighbors, despite their participation in illegal activities, and therefore, their 
removal results in an array of negative consequences to the individuals they leave behind, 
as well as to the neighborhood as a whole.  
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Wakefield and Wildeman (2014) summarize findings on maternal and paternal 
incarceration, noting that the effects of paternal incarceration are consistently in the 
direction of harm, while maternal incarceration produces greater variation in 
consequences. They find that “the effects of maternal incarceration…are dwarfed by 
existing disadvantages before incarceration,” resulting in less dramatic and even positive 
impacts to children following a “high-risk” mother’s removal (Wakefield and Wildeman, 
2014: 73). This argument extends beyond the consequences to children of the 
incarcerated. Although many criminal men’s removal may result in positive 
consequences to their families and communities, the removal of “low-risk” men who 
make many prosocial contributions to their families and community means that their 
removal is likely to have damaging effects to their partners, families, and communities.  
 Therefore, it is critical to understand how women are impacted by the 
incarceration of male residents. Furthermore, women’s indirect experiences with 
incarceration are likely to be much different from men’s experiences, resulting in specific 
individual and subsequent neighborhood-level consequences (see Clarson and Cervera, 
1992; Comfort, 2008; Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). For example, the additional 
challenges that women face in the job market and responsibilities as traditional primary 
caregivers to their children, with whom they often reside, adds to women’s struggle of 
living within high incarceration neighborhoods compared to men. Women are likely to 
experience greater reductions to their physical, human, and social capital compared to 
men, contributing to deleterious consequences for neighborhoods with high incarceration 
rates. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a gendered theory of coercive mobility, 
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demonstrating how these relationships unfold separately for men and women at both the 
individual and neighborhood-level. 
EXPANDING COERCIVE MOBIILTY: A GENDERED EXPERIENCE  
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships present in the proposed gendered theory of 
coercive mobility. Within the figure, consequences to women’s capital (and men’s 
capital), are the result of neighborhood structure, as well as the level of incarceration. 
Additionally, women’s physical and human capital (as well as men’s capital) is 
connected to their social capital and the social capital of their families, which 
subsequently affects women’s aggregate social capital. Incarceration is predicted to be 
associated with separate and unique effects to women’s capital and social control 
compared to men. Finally, women’s aggregate social capital and the social capital of the 
community “feedback” onto individual residents (through impacts to informal social 
control, crime, and incarceration), producing indirect individual-level consequences to 
those who reside in high incarceration communities, regardless of their association with 
incarcerated residents. Also, because it has been suggested that women's social capital 
may be more effective for informal social control compared to men's (see Rountree and 
Warner, 1999) this relationship has particular importance for community rates of crime 
and incarceration. The following sections elaborate on each of these stages 
independently, although a large degree of overlap exists between each stage. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF COERCIVE MOBILITY 
 
Individual-level consequences of incarceration occur to women who share a 
relationship with the incarcerated (e.g., wives, girlfriends, partners, family members), as 
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well as those who simply reside in the neighborhood, regardless of their association with 
any specific incarcerated individual. Although, the proposed theory extends to all women 
in neighborhoods with high rates of incarceration, the foundational literature is drawn 
from research that focuses on that of the wife, girlfriend, or partner, since these groups 
have been examined most thoroughly. Furthermore, wives, partners, and girlfriends likely 
experience the greatest impact while other related kin (i.e., mothers, grandmothers, 
sisters, daughters, aunts, etc.) and friends (i.e., neighbors) are likely to experience similar 
impacts of incarceration relative to the closeness of their relationship with the 
incarcerated and in proportion to their reliance on them and others’ connections to them.2 
Women’s Physical and Human Capital 
Incarceration (Figure 3, box 9) contributes to further disadvantage and declining 
community characteristics (Figure 3, box 2), which in turn, depletes the physical and 
human capital of women who reside within the community (Figure 3, box 2). Overall, 
consequences to women’s physical capital occur in the form of income loss, while losses 
to human capital may occur through education and career stagnation. Additionally, 
women are more likely to experience declines in health and well-being and encounter 
changes in crime and victimization experiences, contributing to further declines in human 
capital (see Figure 3, box 2).  
 
 
                                                          
2Grandmothers are often impacted heavily by the incarceration of a child (Hanlon, Carswell, and Rose, 
2007; Bloom and Steinhart, 1993). However, the grandmother’s role as a central caregiver takes place more 
often during a mother’s incarceration compared to a fathers’ due to the living circumstances of the affected 
children (Porterfield, Dressel, and Barnhill, 2000).Approximately 90% of children stay within the care of 
their mother during a father’s incarceration, while 50% of children are placed with grandmothers during a 
mother’s incarceration (25% live with their father, 15% stay with friends or family, and 10% are placed in 
foster care) (Porterfield, Dressel, and Barnhill, 2000).  
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Physical Capital: Income Loss 
  To begin, women who experience the temporary loss of a partner or loved one to 
incarceration deal with much uncertainty and instability. A partners’ removal may 
contribute to a reduction in physical capital, or capital in its most tangible form, including 
assets, resources, materials, and tools (Coleman, 1990). Income loss is a major difficultly 
reported by female partners of male prisoners (Braman, 2004; Carlson and Cervera, 1992; 
Fishman, 1990; Morris, 1965; Murray, 2005; Nurse, 2002; Schneller, 1975; Wakefield 
and Wildeman, 2014). In addition, women report dealing with financial challenges, such 
as finding affordable childcare, locating affordable housing, looking for work, and 
struggling to ask for emotional and financial support from family members, following the 
incarceration of a partner (Braman, 2004; Murray, 2005; Wakefield and Wildeman, 
2014).  
In general, women are likely to experience greater income loss due to the 
incarceration of a male partner compared to men experiencing the loss of a female partner 
given the gender gap in earnings (Braman, 2003; Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Wakefield 
and Wildeman, 2014). However, this is more likely the case for couples of median or 
high income. According to the work of Kathryn Edin and others (Edin, 2000; Tach and 
Edin, 2011; Tach, Mincy, and Edin, 2010), couples within disadvantaged communities 
often feature women acting as main providers with more economic control compared to 
the male partner. Unmarried male partners, in particular, are likely to supplement their 
girlfriend’s income while they reside at the home that she rents or owns (Edin, 2000). 
Overall, women residing in disadvantaged communities are less likely to marry compared 
to other women (Edin, 2000; Tach and Edin, 2011; Wilson, 1987) and often maintain 
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their single status or end relationships due to the lack of job and income stability that men 
in these communities with high-unemployment rates contribute (Edin, 2000). Therefore, 
the certainty of income loss for women living in disadvantaged communities following 
the incarceration of a male partner is less consistent compared to other women and their 
reliance on their partner’s income, which may already be anticipated as unstable, may be 
minimal. However, married men and men who have maintained long-term partnerships 
within these disadvantaged communities tend to be men who have provided more stable 
support (monetary and emotional) over the course of the relationship (Comfort, 2008; 
Edin, 2000; Tach and Edin, 2011). Therefore, it’s likely that the men who women are 
willing to remain with throughout a period of incarceration (or at least the beginning of a 
period of incarceration) were contributors to household income, acted as supportive 
parents or partners, or assisted in some way.  
 In addition, research shows that many individuals who are involved in criminality 
are also assets to their families and communities. Ethnographic work shows that many 
active gang members are also fathers who hold legitimate, although often sporadic, jobs 
(Decker, 1996; Venkatesh, 1997). Male street-level drug dealers (MacCoun and Reuter, 
1992) and young offenders (Clines, 1992; Sullivan, 1989; Wakefield and Wildeman, 
2014) contribute to their families through legitimate sources of income. Offenders 
provide monetary support, in addition to resources and networks of extended family and 
associates (i.e., social capital) (Browning, 2009; McCall, 1994; Pattillo, 1998; Shakur, 
1993) that is unexpectedly and abruptly removed when they experience a period of 
incarceration. Overall, the portrait of offenders as ‘all bad’ ignores their presence as 
positive contributors and even agents of informal social control, especially “low-risk” 
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offenders (Comfort, 2008; Rose and Clear, 1998), and distorts a much more complex 
understanding of offender networks and contributions.  
 Furthermore, regardless of the man’s financial contribution before incarceration, 
the associated costs of incarceration itself are often at the expense of their partners and 
family members. Legal costs before, during, and after incarceration can cause a major 
burden for the partners and families of the incarcerated (Christian, 2005; Comfort, 2008; 
Fishman, 1990). In addition, costs of staying in contact may include traveling to the 
prison for visits, expensive phone calls, stamps, and email subscription fees. Families 
also often contribute to prisoners’ commissary accounts so that they may purchase 
necessities, such as toothpaste, and other personal hygiene items, that are not always 
supplied, as well as other items they made need (i.e., special dietary items) (Comfort, 
2008; Christian, 2005). 
 Following incarceration and often for the rest of their lives, men’s incomes are 
substantially reduced once they return to their families. A study using the Fragile 
Families and Child Well-being Study (FFCWS), which followed a cohort of mostly 
disadvantaged children born to unmarried parents in the late 1990’s, found that 
previously incarcerated men were 14% less likely to contribute to their families with 
small children and those who did contribute provided an average of $1,400 less per year 
compared to similar men with no history of incarceration (Geller, Garfinkel, and 
Western, 2011). Therefore, losses to physical capital are a major difficultly reported by 
women with incarcerated partners and one that lasts indefinitely. 
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Human Capital: Education and Career Stagnation 
 Reductions in income also contribute to subsequent losses in women’s human 
capital, which refers to the “personal resources an individual brings to the social and 
economic marketplace” (Travis and Visher, 2005: 186). This includes education, job 
training, talents and skills, such as parenting, financial knowledge, or any abilities and 
qualities that exist within a person that they can draw upon, without requiring 
connections to a network (as social capital demands).  
The incarceration of a partner reduces opportunities for women to develop 
potential human capital through work and educational pursuits (Braman, 2004; Edin and 
Jencks, 1990; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999). Although sometimes unstable (see Edin, 
2000), the absence of men’s contributions to the family and household, including income, 
childcare assistance, and emotional support, makes it more difficult for women to pursue 
options towards long-term career growth, such as higher education and vocational school 
while their partner is incarcerated. The need for immediate income or additional childcare 
costs to replace the losses that their partner’s incarceration created often means they must 
sacrifice time and investments for upward mobility in order to work jobs that they are 
qualified for and that are open immediately, usually meaning low-paying or temporary 
positions. The skill set acquired from working in the minimum wage job sector is 
unlikely to develop into potential physical or human capital capable of investment into 
future career opportunities for upward mobility (Ehrenreich, 2010; Edin and Jencks, 
1990), hindering women’s long-term career prospects even after their partners return. The 
luxury of investing time and preparation into selecting a job or career is even less 
probable in disadvantaged communities due to high rates of unemployment and the 
  
25 
 
scarcity of available jobs (Wilson, 1987). Given these circumstances, the job market is 
likely to be less desirable and even more limited for women, often entering the workforce 
with less experience, potential earning power, and more stringent expectations for 
fulfilling childcare responsibilities (AAUW, 2014). Also, since women generally require 
more human capital in the form of education in order to achieve the same pay as men 
with less formal education (AAUW, 2014), the incarceration of a male partner may be 
more detrimental in determining women’s career prospects compared to men who 
experience the incarceration of a female partner. Overall, women’s potential lifetime 
physical and human capital is cut short due to periods of incarceration that are not their 
own.  
Human Capital: Health and Well-being 
An individual’s health and well-being impacts the human capital that they 
possess. Anxious or depressive symptoms restrict an individual’s skill set, depleting job 
and school performance, as well as inhibiting effective childcare. Compared to men, 
women commonly suffer psychological symptoms, including anxiety and depression 
following negative local network events, such as the death of a family member or divorce 
(Conger, Lorenz, Elder, Simons, and Ge, 1993; Maciejewski, Prigerson, and Mazure, 
2001; Meadows, McLanahan, and Brooks-Gunn, 2008; Thoits, 1987). A study by 
Maciejewski and colleagues (2001) found that women are approximately three times 
more likely than men to experience major depression in response to any stressful life 
event, including the death of a child or spouse, the death of a friend or family member, 
divorce, and financial or legal trouble. 
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Wildeman, Schnittker, and Turney (2012) recently investigated whether the same 
was true of women experiencing the incarceration of a partner. They found that a 
partner’s incarceration increased a woman’s risk for a major depressive episode and her 
level of life dissatisfaction, while controlling for prior mental health and even among 
women who were partnered to men who were incarcerated prior to the most recent period 
under study. More specifically, they found that the odds of being depressed are 54% 
higher for mothers who had a child with a recently incarcerated man compared to women 
who had a child with a man not recently incarcerated. They also found that changes in 
economic well-being and parenting stress and experiences were primary mechanisms 
linking the partner’s incarceration to women’s depression (Wildeman, Schnittker, and 
Turney, 2012). Furthermore, the body of ethnographic research in this area suggests that 
women experience high emotional and social costs of a partner’s incarceration that often 
leads to depression (Braman, 2004; Comfort, 2008; Wildeman and Western, 2010). 
Therefore, when women experience a loss within their local networks, they often react 
with internalizing symptoms that likely reduce their engagement within those networks, 
contributing to a withdrawal from social contacts (affecting social capital in addition to 
human capital) (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Morris, 1965; Rosenfeld, Rosenstein, and 
Raab, 1973). 
Human Capital: Experiences with Crime and Victimization 
 Women’s criminality may increase or decrease following the incarceration of 
their partner. Scholars find that women offenders often engage in relationships that 
facilitate their criminal behavior (Robertson and Murachver, 2007; Van Voorhis, Wright, 
Salisbury, and Bauman, 2010). Therefore, women's criminal activity may cease or 
  
27 
 
decrease upon the removal of their partner, increasing their human capital through a 
lessened criminal record or opportunities to build conventional skill sets in the absence of 
criminal behavior. However, women may also find themselves participating in more 
crime following their partner’s removal since they may be free to deviate in their partners' 
absence or since they may view illegal activity as a route to securing additional physical 
capital. Limited opportunities for legitimate work in these settings may contribute to a 
reduced stake in conformity and an increased likelihood for criminal activity (Crutchfield 
and Pitchford, 1997), further complicating the cycle of incarceration and disadvantage. 
Furthermore, women's criminal activity can also lead to their own incarceration, 
complicating the story of parent removal, return, and overall deterioration of systemic 
networks. 
 The absence of males in the community can also be felt in terms of a lack of 
protection or guardianship, contributing to an increase in violent and property 
victimization, as well as a decrease in the human capital of remaining women. Removal 
from the home may reduce the protection these residents have provided in terms of the 
time spent at the home, acting as a physical presence or surveillance, as well as protection 
provided through connections to other residents (both sources of social capital). 
Therefore, their removal may have consequences mainly related to property, but also 
violent victimization. In the case where the incarcerated was contributing to their 
partners’ victimization, in the form of domestic abuse, the effects of their removal are 
much more complex. Here, direct victimization to their partner would be eliminated, but 
this could also potentially open up the home to vandalism, burglary, or other crimes from 
outside sources. The view of the incarcerated here is again complex, acting as both a 
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capable guardian and a motivated offender, to put it in the language of routine activities 
theory (Felson and Cohen, 1980), but this image coincides with the complex, reformed 
depiction of offenders as “socially integrated” contributors to family and community life 
(Clear, 2002; Lynch and Sabol, 1997; Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014; Wildeman and 
Western, 2010).  
In addition, direct and indirect experiences (perceived from others’ encounters, 
media, or neighborhood cues, such as disorder) with crime and victimization are likely to 
contribute to fear of crime and perceptions that the neighborhood is unsafe, resulting in a 
decline in overall mental health and well-being (Adams and Serpe, 2000; Box, Hale, and 
Andrews, 1988; Brown and Polk, 1996; Fisher and Nasar, 1992; Skogan, 1986; Skogan 
and Maxfield, 1981) or restricted human capital, as well as withdrawal from relationships 
(having additional consequences for social capital).  
Women’s Social Capital  
 
Consequences to women’s physical and human capital spill over to affect hers, as 
well as the entire family’s social capital, referring to the relationships that foster the 
potential exchange of tangible capital (Coleman, 1990). Overall, the removal of a male 
partner or father creates greater burdens and more dramatic effects to the remaining home 
environment, often resulting in parenting struggles and relationship or marriage 
dissolution. Coercive mobility’s effects to family relationships and dissolution are 
thought of as contributing to social capital since by definition they involve a dyadic 
relationship at the very least, which likely extends to larger relative and friendship 
networks (see Figure 3, box 2).  
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Parenting 
 It is estimated that over 990,000 jail and prison inmates in the U.S. are fathers 
(Comfort, 2007; Parke and Clarke-Stewart, 2003) and conservative estimates show that 
the number of children (those 18 and under) who have a father in prison (not including 
those with a father in jail) is over one and a half million (1,559,200) (147,400 children 
are estimated to have a mother in prison) (BJS, 2010; see also Western, Lopoo, and 
McLanahan, 2004). Wildeman (2009) finds that racial and class inequality is also present 
in the risk of children experiencing parental incarceration. For example, over 50% 
(50.5%) of black children born in 1990 whose parents were high school dropouts were 
expected to have an incarcerated father by age 14 compared to 7.2% of their white 
counterparts (Wildeman, 2009). The patterns for children of incarcerated fathers are 
presumably concentrated by residential location, given the concentration of incarceration 
more generally. Therefore, considerable overlap exists among the concentration of child 
and young adult socialization in the absence of a stable father and the contexts of 
incarceration and disadvantage, adding to the difficulty of overcoming “feedback” effects 
in these neighborhoods. 
Exacerbated Consequences of Coercive Mobility for Mothers 
Effects of incarceration to children and children’s social capital are particularly 
important for women since women are more often residentially tied to their children and 
traditionally fill the role of primary care-giver compared to men. More incarcerated 
mothers report living with their children prior to their incarceration (64.5%) compared to 
incarcerated fathers (46.5%) (BJS, 2010) and mothers are more likely to be the sole live-
in parent compared to men (Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). As a result, children are 
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more likely to move to the homes of extended family or be placed in child services when 
their mother is incarcerated (Comfort, 2008; Fishman, 1990). Therefore, a mother’s 
incarceration has the potential to completely erase and renew the living situation of her 
children, contributing to drastic changes in the child’s home environment and sources of 
social capital. On the other hand, a father’s removal usually means that he is simply 
removed from the existing home environment, contributing to more drastic losses to the 
mother’s social capital through additional financial burdens (e.g., childcare and living 
expenses) and parenting struggles (e.g, discipline, supervision) compared to fathers in the 
same situation. 
A father’s absence contributes to reductions in social capital, directly by 
experiencing his absence and indirectly, by losing the potential resources that his 
connections may have brought to the family. Recall that these men contribute a multitude 
of resources and relations to the family and family structure, despite their offending 
histories (Browning, 2009). Additionally, Wakefield and Wildeman (2014) report a wide 
range of parental involvement prior to incarceration (see also Braman, 2004). They find 
that many incarcerated fathers are viewed as “good fathers” who contributed time and 
emotional support, both forms of social capital, to their partners and children (Smith and 
Clear, 1997; Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). Research directly related to criminality 
and fatherhood suggests a nuanced depiction in which criminality is both viewed as 
incompatible with fatherhood and discouraged by mothers (Hembry, 1988; Sullivan, 
1992), while others see their child’s needs as a motivation for instrumental crimes, such 
as theft or drug dealing (Achatz and MacAllum, 1994; Johnson, 2000).  
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The FFCWS found that 90% of unmarried fathers (most of whom were 
disadvantaged) provided financial and emotional support to mothers during pregnancy 
(Carlson and McLanahan, 2001; McLanahan, Garfinkel, Reichman, Teitler, Carlson, and 
Audigier, 2003), despite much engagement in drug use and physical abuse found in this 
and other samples of disadvantaged men (Waller and Swisher, 2006). Findings such as 
these, along with a considerable amount of recent work and academic debate, has begun 
to dismantle the false projection of the low-income, black father as one who is “invisible, 
irresponsible” and contributes “little economically to the well-being of their children” 
(Jarrett, Roy, and Burton, 2002: 211; see also Coles, 2009; Coles and Green, 2009; 
Marsiglio, Amato, Day, and Lamb, 2000) and instead depicts disadvantaged, unmarried, 
and black fathers— some of whom may also be involved in criminal activity— as highly 
involved (Hamer, 2001; Huang, 2006; King, Harris, and Heard, 2004; Waller, 2002; 
Young, 2003).  
Since women are traditionally the primary caregiver and they are more likely to 
make drastic changes to make up for losses to their physical capital (e.g., enter the 
workforce for the first time, take on multiple jobs, greatly increase the number of hours 
worked), the reduction in the amount of time they have to spend with their children tends 
to be greater compared to the changes that men make in light of a partner’s incarceration 
(Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Comfort, 2008; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999). These losses 
further contribute to declines in mothers’ psychological well-being and increases in stress 
and anxiety (i.e., human capital) and in turn, social capital. 
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Marriage or Partnership 
 The removal of a male partner or father results in a unique restructuring of roles 
(Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Christian, 2005; Codd, 2000). Generally, the wife or 
girlfriend continues to fulfill her own role in the family, while also taking on the 
additional role and tasks of the male partner since she can no longer rely on his social 
capital to meet family obligations. In some families and communities where the 
traditional father role is characterized by masculinity and authority (see Anderson, 1990), 
the mother may choose to retain the father as the satellite head-of-household, with respect 
being given to his authority and decision-making role. Children in these situations are 
often told to ‘wait to ask Dad’ regarding major parenting decisions (Carlson and Cervera, 
1992; Codd, 2000), reducing the amount of control that the remaining parent has over her 
children (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Parcel and Menaghan, 1993). In other situations, 
the mother may act as a “gatekeeper” to her children, increasing her control over the 
amount and means of contact she allows while the father is removed from the home 
(Classens, 2007). Overall, many women report hardships managing their children while 
their partner is incarcerated (Codd, 2000; Howlett, 1973; Morris, 1965). Role strain and 
additional anxiety reduces women’s human capital, as well as social capital in the form of 
withdrawal from relationships. 
 Incarceration can also place the entire relationship in jeopardy (Brodsky, 1975; 
Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Fishman, 1990; Tach and Edin, 2011). The relationships in 
question are often already strained by poverty, drug use, criminal activity, and other 
stressors, making them highly susceptible to divorce or break-up during periods of 
incarceration. Although Carlson and Cervera report that “some marriages [and 
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relationships] respond to these circumstances (incarceration) by improving—becoming 
closer and healthier” others find that “the majority respond by deteriorating” (1992: 25; 
see also, Brodsky, 1975; Fishman, 1990; Freedman and Rice, 1977; Hannon, Martin, and 
Martin, 1984; Tach and Edin, 2011).  
The likelihood of divorce among incarcerated men is extremely high (Lopoo and 
Western, 2005; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western, 2006; Western, Lopoo, and McLanahan, 
2004). Lopoo and Western (2005) find that incarcerated men experience divorce more 
quickly than the general public, reaching a divorce rate of 50% in about one-third of the 
time. Relationship turmoil or divorce brought on by incarceration reduces the social 
capital of wives, girlfriends, and children of returning offenders due to “knifing off” or 
reductions in contacts, such as relationships with their ex’s extended relatives, friends, 
and larger neighboring networks. In addition, the stability of living arrangements, school, 
work, and childcare is jeopardized, causing additional relationships to also be lost (e.g., 
work, school, neighbors).  
 Relationships that do not dissolve under the initial stress and isolation of 
incarceration are still in jeopardy when the partner returns. Due to the hostile 
environment of male prisons and stress caused by separation from their family, many 
men return home in a state of depression, anxiety, and confusion surrounding new 
relationship roles and lacking strategies for family coping (Showalter and Hunsinger, 
2007). They often struggle to adjust from the strict and impersonal interactions among 
inmates and staff in prison (Carlson and Cervera, 1992) and return alienated from law-
abiding society (Lerman, 2013), making it difficult for them to rekindle broken bonds 
with their partners and family members who may also hold resentful attitudes towards 
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them for their absence. Therefore, the social capital of the entire family is compromised 
even among families who remain intact. 
Extended Family Networks 
Regardless of divorce or a break up, women tend to withdrawal from outside 
social contacts with family, friends, and neighbors (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Morris, 
1965; Rosenfeld, Rosenstein, and Raab, 1973). This often occurs due to the strain caused 
by a reliance on family for support following a partner’s incarceration (Comfort, 2008; 
Edin and Lein, 1997).  
Initially, the incarceration of a loved one may result in the strengthening or even 
creation of bonds among family members and extended family in the community as they 
band together to determine what should be done, schedule visitations and travel 
arrangements to the prison, discuss how to care for the remaining partner and their 
children, and discuss practical matters, such as assistance with financial issues or 
transportation to work and school. As these relationships evolve, however, and as stress 
surmounts, they often result in strains and resentments within extended family networks 
due to the burdens that they have caused (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Comfort, 2008; 
Edin and Lein, 1997). Kin networks involve sensitive dynamics and patterned 
expectations, instilling pressure on those who take from the network to be able to return 
the support that was given to them in another member’s time of need (Antonucci, Fuhrer, 
and Jackson, 1990; Neighbors, 1997). These networks are extremely vulnerable in 
disorganized neighborhoods due to limited resources and constant requests for assistance 
(Miller-Cribbs and Farber, 2008; Neighbors, 1997). 
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Further, Braman (2003) found that many women hide the incarceration of their 
partner or details of it from friends and family due to stigma. Therefore, the kin networks 
that are available are not fully utilized for monetary or emotional support and the hiding 
of information leads to withdrawal from relationships overall. He argues that the stigma 
endured by female friends and relatives is more damaging than that endured by former 
inmates since men are more likely to deflect blame and identify with redemption scripts 
whereas women are more likely to internalize failure in the form of depression and 
withdrawal (Braman, 2003).  
Although many women report receiving assistance from extended family, most 
women find that the support that they receive from relative networks is not sufficient and 
report receiving more support from their own families than from the families of their 
husbands (Carlson and Cervera, 1992). Many women of incarcerated partners report a 
lack of supportive friend and kinship networks (Bates, Lawrence-Wills, and Hairston 
2003; Braman, 2004) and say that they are struggling to cope alone or with their children 
(Bakker, Morris, and Janus, 1978; Hinds, 1981; Nurse, 2002; Swan, 1981). According to 
Moore (1996), the failure of a husband’s or boyfriend’s family to lend monetary and 
emotional support in a time of need often causes resentment and devaluation of men in 
the community, which is then socialized in children in these settings, further contributing 
to low marriage rates (Braman, 2003) and restricting social capital at the aggregate-level. 
 Another source of strain to family ties comes from prison visits (Christian, 2005). 
Visits, although also a source of joy, excitement, and an aid in the continuation of ties 
with the incarcerated, which decreases their likelihood of recidivism (Casey-Acevedo and 
Bakken, 2002; Petersilia, 2002), are a source of strain, stress, and sadness that often 
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evoke feelings of helplessness and pain for family members (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; 
Comfort, 2008; Fishman, 1990). These visits induce stress and financial burdens that 
often result in a crippling of family ties (Christian, 2005; Comfort, 2008). In response to 
this, family members often put visits on hold for periods of time when they become too 
overwhelming, tiresome, stressful, or financially debilitating (Christian, 2005). 
Additionally, these visits sometimes not only lead to weakened families ties, but as 
Christian (2005) points out, often remove the remaining social ties from the community, 
taking these women with them and contributing to an overall absence of ties in the 
community, leaving it incredibly vulnerable. As Christian (2005) explains, some of these 
women take a bus several hours away to visit with their incarcerated partners or family 
members every or every other weekend, taking away time spent in the community, 
supervising children, and involvement in neighborhood activities, as well as contributing 
to their own “secondary prisonization” and institutionalization (Comfort, 2008; Petersilia, 
2002).  
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF COERCIVE MOBILITY 
 
 The consequences of incarceration to physical, human, and social capital are 
exacerbated at the neighborhood-level. As shown in Figure 3, the neighborhood-level 
consequences of incarceration can accumulate indirectly as a result of individual-level 
restrictions to physical, human, and social capital (Figure 3, box 2 to box 3) or can be 
directly affected by incarceration (Figure 3, box 9 to box 3). For example, effects to the 
neighborhood economy are the result of men and women’s restricted physical, human, 
and social capital (indirect neighborhood-level consequences), along with aggregate 
effects that prevent businesses from settling into the area (direct neighborhood-level 
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consequences). Similarly, marriage markets and aggregate informal social control are 
disrupted by incarceration through reductions to individual and neighborhood-level 
capital. 
Women’s Aggregate Social Capital  
 
The Economy 
 Incarceration affects individual physical and human capital in the form of job 
prospects, which build to impact the entire community and neighborhood economy 
(Western and Beckett, 1999). Freeman (1992) finds that incarceration produces a 
permanent impact on the earning potential of returning male offenders (see also Pager, 
2003). But women also experience losses in physical and human capital in terms of 
income, education, and career training, reducing the probability that they will eventually 
secure long term employment, regardless of their criminal history. Rose and Clear (1998: 
462) conclude that the “large-scale incarceration of men may influence the earning power 
of the women they leave behind” due to the lack of work experience that incarceration 
creates within disadvantaged areas (see also Browne, 1997; Huebner, 2005). 
Furthermore, high rates of incarceration contribute to a reduction in labor force 
attachments, isolating residents and depleting their connections and networking 
experiences (foundations for social capital) that they have with successful individuals 
(see Wilson, 1987).  
Incarceration is also directly related to declines in the neighborhood economy due 
to businesses choosing not to invest in areas with high rates of incarceration due to the 
limited market of consumers and skills of potential workers. Without reputable and 
profitable businesses choosing to settle and invest in these areas, jobs simply do not exist. 
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This means that the financial promise and resources that new businesses and 
developments bring are also absent, contributing to a further depletion of internal and 
external resources (physical and human capital) from which residents can draw (Wilson, 
1987).  
Additionally, Hagan and Dinovitzer (1999: 131) note that “the collateral costs of 
this disinvestment are social as well as economic.” Investments into prisons means 
displaced investments taken from other areas, such as education, health care, and other 
social institutions (Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999), contributing to additional damage and 
offering little support for struggling residents. The economic effects of incarceration 
return to the individual-level to again stifle the dismal job prospects of individual 
residents, particularly women with less work experience, education, and potential earning 
power (AAUW, 2014). 
Marriage Markets 
 Incarceration contributes to high rates of divorce and delays and reduces the 
probability of marriage for entire communities (Huebner, 2005; 2007; Wilson, 1987). 
Regardless of whether a woman’s partner or members of her local peer group become 
incarcerated, she is less likely to marry simply due to her proximity to concentrated rates 
of incarceration and the norms and socialization processes that are associated with this 
context (Huebner, 2005; 2007; Wilson, 1987). First of all, there are simply fewer men 
available for women to marry in areas with high incarceration rates due to their current 
incapacitation or frequent flux of removal and reentry. For example, in the high 
incarceration neighborhoods of Washington, DC there are only 62 men for every 100 
women (Braman, 2003: 86). Second, men who remain in the community or return from 
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prison may not be viewed as desirable marriage partners due to their lack of stable 
employment and the stigma of a criminal record (Darity and Myers, 1989; Huebner, 
2005; 2007; Lynch and Sabol; 2004a, 2004b; Myers, 2000; Wilson, 1987).  
 Wilson (1987) finds that men’s attractiveness as “marriageable men” declines 
with their employment probability. Furthermore, Freeman (1996) explains that all black 
men within disadvantaged communities may be viewed as less desirable partners due to 
limited employment opportunities, regardless of their criminal records (see also Huebner, 
2005; 2007; Pager, 2003). Therefore, high incarceration and unemployment may explain 
the particularly low marriage rates of African Americans and may shift marriage rates 
further so that it is no longer a norm or expectation within these communities (Lynch and 
Sabol, 2004a).  
At the aggregate-level, the absence of suitable fathers and marriageable men 
contributes to the importance of the peer group and deprioritizing of the nuclear family 
(Moore, 1996). Men exhibit a detached "cool pose" in order to emphasize their 
independence from women and family and demonstrate the strength of “being a man” 
(Anderson, 1999; Majors and Billson, 1992; Moore, 1996; Wilson, 1987). Although most 
women residing in disadvantaged communities desire and value marriage (Edin and 
Kefalas, 2005; South, 1993), their outlook is often pessimistic, viewing marriage as 
unlikely. Jarrett (1998: 390) finds that some women in these communities think of 
marriage and stable family formation as an out of reach “little white girls dream.” This 
detachment from family and marriage frees men from important sources of social capital 
that could otherwise supply informal social control and prevent them from engaging in 
criminal activity (Sampson and Laub, 1990).  
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Braman (2003; 2004) further extends the consequences of marriage dissolution to 
the aggregate dissolution of families in high incarceration neighborhoods. He argues that 
family norms and roles are eroded by incarceration, which “has been pulling apart the 
most vulnerable families in our society” for the past 30 years (Braman, 2003: 122-123; 
2004). Specifically, he finds that the skewed ratios of men to women encourage infidelity 
since women sacrifice more and demand less of the limited pool of available men. The 
imbalanced sex ratios and subsequent rises in infidelity increases the rate at which 
children are born to multiple partners and reduces parental investment, particularly for 
men, serving to “undermine family formation and promote family dissolution” (Braman, 
2003: 122). The result is that single-headed households are more common than co-
parenting or marriage in neighborhoods with high incarceration rates. In fact, Braman’s 
(2003) investigation of incarceration and parenting in the District of Columbia revealed 
that an incarceration rate above 2% was associated with fathers being absent from over 
50% of families. Consequences of marriage and family dissolution contribute to 
continued incarceration and the "feedback" of reductions in physical, human, and social 
capital at the individual-level.  
AGGREGATE REDUCTIONS IN WOMEN’S INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL 
 Low marriage rates and high proportions of female-headed households also 
contribute to reductions in supervision and women’s informal social control, referring to 
their ability to react to and prevent crime, at the neighborhood-level (Figure 3, box 4). 
Incarceration reduces the amount of family social capital available for the supervision of 
children and teens, increasing the likelihood that they will experience considerable 
behavior problems (Parcel and Menaghan, 1993; Wakefield and Wildeman, 2011), 
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including delinquency (Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999). With mothers taking on more work 
and fathers gone from the home, children are left unsupervised and are free to engage in 
deviant activities in their parents’ absence (Clear, Rose, and Ryder, 2001; Sampson, 
1987). At the neighborhood-level, concentrated rates of incarceration remove a large 
proportion of men, leaving behind an additional segment of female-headed households 
and thereby reducing the entire community's ability to supervise its children and protect 
its residents (Parcel and Menaghan, 1993; Rose and Clear, 1998).  
 Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) explain that neighborhoods with many 
incarcerated parents experience limited organizational participation, involvement in 
systemic networks, and intergenerational closure, referring to the ability of residents to 
know the parents or relatives of their children's friends. Limited participation in the 
exchange of information regarding children's whereabouts and activities restricts the 
entire supervisory capacity of the neighborhood. In addition, neighborhoods that 
experience high incarceration are also highly disadvantaged, which predicts lowered 
expectations for shared child control, or expectations that other parents or adults will 
intervene to control the behavior of neighborhood children (Sampson, Morenoff, and 
Earls, 1999). 
At the neighborhood-level, women's social capital adds particular relevance to the 
theory of coercive mobility not only because women are left to supervise and control the 
neighborhood while men more commonly cycle in and out due to incarceration, but more 
importantly, women's social capital, in terms of neighborhood relational networks, may 
be more important for informal social control (see Rountree and Warner, 1999). 
Specifically, Rountree and Warner (1999) found that the networks that women are 
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imbedded in are more effective for reducing violent crime. Therefore, the effect of 
coercive mobility on women's social capital is likely to have a much greater impact on 
informal social control relative to men's social capital, including the social capital of men 
who are directly affected by incarceration.  
Furthermore, women's networks have been shown to be much less effective for 
crime reduction in contexts with a large proportion of female headed-households like 
those with high rates of incarceration, suggesting that men’s networks (and other capital) 
(see Figure 3, boxes 5 and 6) may serve as a support system to free up and allow 
women’s capital to function for social control (Figure 3, box 2 to box 4) (Rountree and 
Warner, 1999). Therefore, although men's ties are not as effective for social control, they 
add to the effectiveness of women's ties. This is because men add to the physical, human, 
and social capital of the relationship or family by providing income, resources, and time 
that enables women to supervise more effectively, spend more time with their children, 
and also have more time available for organizational participation and interaction in the 
systemic networks that facilitate informal social control. Without this support, women's 
social capital at the neighborhood-level is spread thin and results in aggregate reductions 
in supervision and informal social control (Rountree and Warner, 1999).  
Additionally, women’s networks may be more effective for the reduction of 
violent crime because they tend to be more localized compared to men's (Bernard, 1981; 
Campbell and Lee, 1992; Michelson, 1985; Rosenthal, 1985). In Michelson’s 1977 study 
of couples, wives were more likely to report a neighbor as someone who they had the 
most frequent contact with compared to husbands. More recent studies have controlled 
for full and part-time work, marital status, and the presence of children and still found 
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that women had larger local relational networks compared to men (Campbell and Lee, 
1990; 1992). Women's social capital may also be more effective for informal social 
control compared to men’s since they are often the carriers of information flow, including 
information relative to supervision and their children’s whereabouts (Rountree and 
Warner, 1999; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999). 
Therefore, women’s networks more readily operate towards social control.  
However, since women’s networks are more localized they tend to be more 
negatively affected by the array of local network events discussed as inhibitors of human 
capital, including the death of a family member, divorce, and the incarceration of a loved 
one. Women tend to respond to these events with internalizing depressive and anxious 
symptoms (Maciejewski, Prigerson, and Mazure, 2001; Wildeman, Schnittker, and 
Turney, 2012). At the aggregate-level, women's withdrawal from local networks results 
in a decline in community social capital and an overall reduction in the effectiveness of 
informal social control.  
Overall, women who experience the incarceration of a partner or loved one not 
only deal with issues associated with being a single-headed householder, but also 
encounter additional burdens, including unexpected costs associated with incarceration, 
role strain, parenting issues, child behavior problems, stigma, managing extended family 
ties, and psychological symptoms, further diminishing their capital and potential for 
informal social control. At the neighborhood-level, women must face the additive effects 
of these issues, along with the hardships that accompany the neighborhood context, 
including concentrated disadvantage, high unemployment, low marriage rates, and 
instability due to coercive mobility (Rose and Clear, 1998), further depleting the 
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effectiveness of their social capital for informal social control. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of women's social capital for informal social control within the context of 
coercive mobility is especially limited. Shown in Figure 3, a deficiency in both women’s 
and men’s informal social control (boxes 4 and 7) results in increased neighborhood 
crime and delinquency (box 8) (Sampson, 1987), which extends to exacerbate the cycle 
of incarceration (box 9), feeding once again into neighborhood structure (box 1) and 
individual, familial, and neighborhood consequences (boxes 2, 3, 5, and 6). 
EXTENSIONS TO ALL NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS 
 
Thus far, the majority of theoretical relationships have focused on ways that 
individuals are impacted by the incarceration of someone they know, along with both 
direct and indirect neighborhood-level consequences. However, the individual-level 
consequences of incarceration are not limited to individuals who are linked to the 
incarcerated. In fact, although the personal individual-level consequences of incarceration 
are theoretically important for illustrating how indirect neighborhood-level consequences 
unfold in a synthesized gendered theory of coercive mobility, collateral consequences to 
the wives, girlfriends, partners, family, and friends of the incarcerated have been widely 
examined in previous work (Carlson and Cervera, 1992; Comfort, 2008; Fishman, 1990; 
Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). The central goal of this dissertation is to describe the 
impacts of incarceration to women who reside within high incarceration neighborhoods, 
regardless of their associations with the incarcerated themselves, an area of research that 
has received very little attention (see, for example, Wildeman and Western, 2010). 
Indeed, the probability that individuals know someone who is or has been to 
prison is more likely than not. Rose and Clear (2004) found that among a general sample 
  
45 
 
of Tallahassee residents, 64.9% of respondents either knew someone who had been 
incarcerated or was incarcerated at some point themselves (9.0%). Despite widespread 
connections to incarcerated individuals throughout the general public, knowing someone 
intimately who has been incarcerated is not a necessary condition to experience 
individual-level effects. These community consequences of incarceration occur to 
individuals who simply reside within high incarceration communities and are 
hypothesized to have “feedback” effects of neighborhood-level consequences at the 
individual-level. Those residing in high incarceration neighborhoods bear the burden of 
poor economic conditions in the form of reduced job prospects, educational standards, 
income earning potential, neighborhood safety, involvement in neighborhood activities 
and community engagement. Therefore, all community residents, including men, women, 
and children, are impacted. 
THE PRESENT STUDY  
 In sum, the consequences of incarceration for female residents, as well as the 
gendered or differential effects of incarceration to women and men, represent an evident 
gap in the literature. The present study seeks to overcome this gap by proposing a 
gendered theory of coercive mobility, which incorporates women's capital as an 
additional mechanism for understanding how coercive mobility unfolds to result in 
counterproductive effects to informal social control in communities with high rates of 
incarceration. Furthermore, women's capital is paramount for understanding how 
processes of coercive mobility unfold at the individual and neighborhood-level. 
Although, men's social capital is also likely to affect community informal social control, 
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women's social capital is likely to be more influential since women's networks have been 
shown to be more effective for crime reduction (Rountree and Warner, 1999).  
This dissertation tests the proposed gendered theory of coercive mobility using 
data on Baltimore residents and neighborhoods by estimating consequences to women’s 
and men’s forms of capital and social control at both the individual and neighborhood-
level. Figure 3 presents the complete set of relationships present within this proposed 
theory. Within the figure, individual-level consequences to women’s capital are the result 
of neighborhood structure, as well as the level of incarceration and men’s capital 
(physical, human, and social). Women’s physical and human capital contributes to their 
social capital and the social capital of their families, which subsequently affects women’s 
aggregate social capital. At the neighborhood-level incarceration “feeds back” to affect 
aggregated outcomes, including the physical, human, and social capital of women, 
subsequently contributing to women’s aggregated social control. Finally, women's social 
capital has been shown to be more effective for social control compared to men's 
(Rountree and Warner, 1999), heightening its importance for community rates of crime 
and incarceration.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The project investigates the central relationships within the proposed gendered 
theory of coercive mobility. First, each of the following research questions is examined 
separately for women and men in order to determine how women (as well as men) are 
impacted by neighborhood-level incarceration (i.e., the association between incarceration 
and women’s and men’s outcomes, separately, are compared to zero). Second, the 
research questions seek to reveal whether the significant findings are distinctly gendered, 
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meaning that the associations between incarceration and women’s outcomes are 
significantly different from the associations between incarceration and men’s outcomes. 
Lastly, potential mediators of the relationship between incarceration and women’s and 
men’s social control outcomes are examined.   
Research questions are examined at both the individual and neighborhood-level, 
as well as for both prison admissions and prison releases. Figure 4 provides an overview 
of the individual and neighborhood-level effects of incarceration, summarizing the four 
possible direct and indirect ways that individuals and communities are affected.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
First, individuals who reside in communities with high rates of incarceration 
experience direct individual-level effects of incarceration in the form of depleted 
physical, human, and social capital (Figure 4, relationship #1). Second, individual effects 
can build to produce aggregated indirect community effects (Figure 4, relationship #2). 
Third, communities may experience direct effects of incarceration rates that are 
distinguishable from the sum total of individual-level effects (e.g., poor economy due to 
businesses withdrawal from high incarceration neighborhoods) (Figure 4, relationship 
#3). Lastly, effects to the community (both direct and indirect) “feed back” to produce 
indirect individual-level consequences to residents (Figure 4, relationship #4).  
All hypotheses are derived from literature on the gendered collateral 
consequences of incarceration, along with research on coercive mobility. Hypotheses do 
not differentiate between prison admissions and releases, as well as the level of analysis, 
given the limited extant literature in these areas: 
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Research Question 1: Are women’s and men’s individual and neighborhood-level forms 
of capital (physical, human, and social) affected by incarceration? Are these effects 
gendered? 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Prison admissions and releases will significantly impact women’s 
forms of capital (physical, human, and social) at both the individual and 
neighborhood-level. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The effects of prison admissions and releases on women’s forms 
of capital will be significantly different (larger) from the effects of incarceration 
on men’s forms of capital.  
 
Research Question 2: Are women’s and men’s individual and neighborhood-level social 
control efforts affected by incarceration? Are these effects gendered? 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Prison admissions and releases will significantly impact women’s 
social control (i.e., informal, formal) at both the individual and neighborhood-
level. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The effects of prison admissions and releases on women’s social 
control will be significantly different (larger) from the effects of incarceration on 
men’s social control.  
 
Research Question 3: Do women’s and men’s neighborhood-level forms of capital 
(physical, human, and social) mediate the relationship between incarceration and 
individual and neighborhood-level social control? 
 
Hypothesis 3: Women’s neighborhood-level physical, human, and social capital 
will mediate the relationship between incarceration and social control at both the 
individual and neighborhood-level. 
Chapter Three proceeds to introduce the data and measures included in the present 
study. The following chapter, Chapter Four, introduces the analytic strategy used to 
empirically test these proposed relationships.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND MEASURES 
DATA 
 Data are drawn from the “Effects of Arrests and Incarceration on Informal Social 
Control in Baltimore, Maryland Neighborhoods, 1980-1994” (2003), in which Lynch and 
Sabol linked prison admission and release rates (1987, 1992, and 1994) to the 30 
Baltimore neighborhoods included in Ralph Taylor’s “Crime Changes in Baltimore 1970-
1994” resident surveys (n= 704) (1999a).  
The design purpose of the “Crime Changes in Baltimore, 1970-1994” study was 
to investigate the relationships among physical deterioration, crime rates, residents’ 
attitudes, and neighborhood structure. The data include crime rates obtained from the 
Baltimore Police Department from 1987 to 1992, as well as 1990 census items matched 
by neighborhood identifiers. Neighborhoods were originally sampled in 1982, when 66 of 
the 236 Baltimore neighborhoods were randomly selected for block assessment. Then in 
1994, 30 of these original neighborhoods were selected using stratified sampling3 based 
on crime data in order to capture equal segments of neighborhoods that experienced a 
large change in violent and property crime, a small change in violent and property crime, 
and a change in one type of crime, but not the other.4 Once selected, eight census blocks 
within each neighborhood were randomly chosen for inclusion. Addresses were selected 
from both sides of the street block using simple random sampling from a list of telephone 
numbers merged from three separate phone listings until a quota of at least 4 and no more 
                                                          
3The sampling procedure excluded neighborhoods that were not included in the 1982 block assessment, had 
changed boundaries since 1979, did not have a sufficient number of telephone listings available, or were 
dominated by large apartment buildings. 
4Comparisons by Taylor, Brower, and Drain (1979) between the 30 neighborhoods selected for inclusion in 
the 1994 survey and the 36 neighborhoods that were not revealed no significant differences on key 
variables, including the percent black and proportion of owner-occupied units. 
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than 16 interviews were completed per block. The head of the household or his or her 
spouse was randomly selected to complete an interview. All interviews were conducted 
by telephone, using CATI (Computer Automated Telephone Interviewing) (Taylor, 
1999b). The response rate of the 1994 survey is 76 percent (Taylor, 1999a). The resulting 
sample includes 18-24 respondents in each neighborhood with an average of 23 
respondents per neighborhood for a total sample size of n=704. 
Lynch and Sabol (2003) obtained prison admission and release data from the 
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections (MDPSC). They geocoded the 
address of each person admitted to or released from prison to correspond with the 
appropriate Baltimore neighborhood using latitude and longitude coordinates (Lynch et 
al., 2002). Incarceration data were then linked to Taylor’s (1999a) neighborhood survey. 
The admission and release counts and rates for 1987, 1992, and 1994 are included in the 
achieved data (Lynch and Sabol, 2003).  
These data are exceptionally rare, existing as the only archived data with 
neighborhood-level incarceration rates linked with individual-level interview or survey 
data. A strength of the data is the unique construction of neighborhood boundaries 
through interviews with neighborhood leaders and residents by Taylor, Brower, and 
Drain (1979). Residents were asked if they agreed with the established boundaries and 
neighborhood names shown on a map and adjustments were made to more accurately 
depict the neighborhood according to those who live there (Snell, 2001; Taylor, Brower, 
and Drain, 1979). This technique improves the validity of survey items aimed at 
capturing neighborhood-level phenomenon since the respondent’s understanding of the 
“neighborhood” coincides with the actual boundaries of study. The newly identified 
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boundaries created by Taylor and colleagues were adopted as officially named 
neighborhoods by the Bureau of the Census beginning in 1980 (Snell, 2001). In addition, 
two forms of social control, informal social control and resident-initiated formal social 
control, are included in the data, unique to other neighborhood surveys. Although widely 
used global measures of informal social control were previously thought to theoretically 
capture resident-initiated formal efforts (Sampson, 2006), these combined measures have 
been more recently criticized for their tendency to pick up on informal social control 
alone (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Warner, 2007). Finally, since these data do not allow for 
the identification of respondents who know or are related to someone who has 
experienced incarceration, the results of this study will provide a conservative estimate of 
the effects of incarceration at the individual-level.  
BALTIMORE: CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
Data for the present study are derived, in part, from surveys with Baltimore 
residents (Taylor, 1999a). Thus, it is important to understand the context of Baltimore to 
investigate the proposed research questions. Baltimore is often described as a “city of 
neighborhoods” (McDougall, 1993) with an eclectic range of structural and cultural 
characteristics, making it an ideal setting for the present study. 
Historically, like all major U.S. industrial cities, Baltimore experienced 
population declines due to the downfall in manufacturing jobs beginning in the 1950’s, a 
trend that continued into the 1990’s due to middle-class residents leaving for the 
surrounding metropolitan areas. These losses contributed to increased poverty and crime 
within the city. Today, Baltimore is a dynamic white-ethnic and black city (McDougall, 
1993) with just over 600,000 inhabitants thanks to its first population increase in 2012. 
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The city is approximately 31.6% white and 63.3% black, a segment that doubled from 
23.8% in 1950 to 46.4% by 1970 during the second great migration (U.S. Census, 2010). 
Drastic changes in racial composition contributed to racial tension and racialized housing 
practices, fragmenting many neighborhoods.  
Similarly sized cities also experienced declines in population beginning in the 
1950’s and continuing well into the 1990’s for most cities. During the 1970’s, for 
example, nearly half of America’s large cities shrank in population by 10%, while St. 
Louis, Cleveland, and Detroit each shrank by more than 20% during this time period 
(Rappaport, 2003). Baltimore experienced a 3.5% decline in population during the 1970’s 
and continued to lose between 6.5% and 13.0% each year over the next three decades 
(U.S. Census, 2010). While some cities experienced temporary revitalizations in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the overall losses are astonishing over the longer period; between 
1950 and 2000, St. Louis lost 59% of its total population, while Cleveland, Detroit, and 
Newark lost more than 45% each (Thompson, 1999) and Baltimore shrank by 35% (U.S. 
Census, 2010). 
The shared histories among America’s industrial cities has resulted in similar 
racial compositions and associated tensions that exist today. For example, between 1970 
and 1980 in Detroit, more than 310,000 white city residents left for the suburbs, 
increasing the percentage of black residents from 43.7% to 67.1% in just ten years 
(Thompson, 1999), abruptly bringing racialized sentiments and practices. Similar trends 
in other cities resulted in the largely segmented black-white demographics that exist in 
Baltimore today (31.6% white and 63.3% black). For example, St. Louis’s 319,294 
residents are approximately 49.2% black and 43.9% white. Cleveland’s population is 
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53.3% black and 37.3% white, Detroit is 82.7% black and 10.6% white, and Newark is 
52.4% black and 26.3% white (U.S. Census, 2010).  
White-black segregation can be captured within a dissimilarity index (DI), which 
measures the relative separation of groups across all neighborhoods within a metropolitan 
area (Frey and Myers, 2011; Quinn and Pawasarat, 2003).5 Baltimore’s white-black 
dissimilarity based on the 2000 census index was 75.2 (ranked 28th nationally), meaning 
that approximately 75% of white people would need to move to another neighborhood to 
make whites and blacks evenly distributed across all neighborhoods (Frey and Myers, 
2011). Detroit was ranked as the 2nd most segregated (white-black segregation) city in the 
nation with a dissimilarity index of 86.7, while Newark was ranked 6th (DI=83.4). 
Cleveland (DI=79.7) and St. Louis (DI=78.0) were ranked among the top twenty of the 
nation’s most racially segregated cities based on 2000 census data (ranked 9th and 13th, 
respectively) (Frey and Myers, 2011).  
The changes occurring in Baltimore in terms of population and segregation are 
typical of other similar-sized cities during this time (Taylor, 2001). Taylor (2001) argues 
that Baltimore, and specifically, the data used in the present study are generalizable to 
other large cities due to similarities in poverty rates, housing prices, and additional 
demographics, including age, unemployment, and rates of homeownership, as well as 
changes in crime rates during the period under study. Examining Part I Index crimes, 
excluding arson, in Baltimore compared to 15 other moderately-sized cities spread 
geographically throughout the country (ranging in population from 300,000 (El Paso) to 2 
million (Philadelphia)), Taylor and colleagues (2001) found that although Baltimore 
                                                          
5Several other methods have been proposed and utilized for comparing segregation among groups, 
including block-level examinations (see Frey and Myers, 2011 for a review). Since this is not a direct focus 
of the present study, the most conventionally used method was chosen for comparison. 
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experienced higher crime rates than all but one of the 15 comparison cities, the year-to-
year changes in crime rates leading up to 1994 (from 1970 through 1992) closely 
reflected the changes occurring in comparison cities. For example, robbery rates in 
Baltimore (12 per 1,000 residents) were about 3 times that of comparison cities beginning 
in 1970, but fell to about 9.5 per 1,000 by 1977. From this point on, the fluctuations in 
rates matched that of the group average, rising throughout the remainder of the 1970’s 
and peaking in 1981 before dropping throughout the mid-1980’s. In 1988, with the rise of 
the crack epidemic, Baltimore’s robbery rate began to rise at a steeper rate (resulting in a 
rate of 17 per 1,000 residents in 1992) compared to the comparison group average, which 
leveled off at a rate of around 6.5 per 1,000 in 1991 and 1992. Despite Baltimore’s 
steeper incline during the last four years of these trends, Taylor and colleagues (2001) 
conclude that the change in crime rates between Baltimore and comparison cities is 
similar. Overall, during the period from 1970-1992 Baltimore’s robbery rate grew by 
55%, while comparison cities grew by 40% on average (Taylor, 2001). Fluctuations in 
other index crimes in Baltimore also mimic comparison cities (Taylor, 2001).  
In addition, incarceration rates for the state of Maryland fall somewhere in the 
middle in terms of a national comparison for the period under study (1990-1994). In 
1994, Maryland was ranked 37th nationally with an incarceration rate of 395 prisoners 
with a sentence of more than 1 year per 100,000 residents (BJS, 1995). Maryland’s rate is 
only slightly higher than the state-wide average of 356 prisoners per 100,000 residents 
that same year, in which rates ranged from 78 prisoners per 100,000 residents in North 
Dakota to 1,583 prisoners per 100,000 residents in the District of Columbia (BJS, 1995).  
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City-level rates are more difficult to obtain, particularly for an earlier time period. 
However, more contemporary data allows for comparisons to be made among cities 
within Maryland, which are more likely to have experienced similar changes in trends 
compared to cities outside of the state. While Baltimore experienced the highest 
incarceration rate in the state with 1,255 prisoners per 1000,000 residents in 2010, eight 
other cities experienced incarceration rates above the state’s rate, including Hagerstown 
(1,034), Cambridge (925), Salisbury (870), Aberdeen (702), Easton (445), Havre de 
Grace (409), and Annapolis (394) (The state-wide incarceration rate in Maryland was 383 
prisoners per 100,000 residents in 2010) (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy 
Institute, 2015).  
Comparisons among cities outside of Maryland only provide a partial 
understanding of where Baltimore falls since they are only available for some cities. 
Recent rates in New York City (2012) are much lower compared to Baltimore, at 448 
prisoners per 100,000 residents, although, New York City is unique in its recent decline 
in rates compared to most other major U.S. cities (NYC.gov, 2013). Similarly, recent 
incarceration rates in Chicago, for example, which incarcerated 650 prisoners per 
100,000 residents in 2006 (Sampson and Loeffler, 2010) also depict Baltimore as much 
higher in comparison, while cities like Detroit, which incarcerated close to 1,200 inmates 
per 100,000 residents in 2007 (The Pew Center on the States, 2009), are more similar 
compared to Baltimore. Other cities, such as Washington, D.C., which incarcerated 
nearly 2,000 inmates per 100,000 residents in 2009 (Justice Policy Institute, 2010), 
represent the high end of incarceration rates in the United States. 
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Although crime rates in Baltimore and incarceration rates in Maryland were not 
unprecedented in the period under study (1990-1994), the growing level of concern about 
crime in the U.S. was reaching its peak (Simon, 2007; Taylor, 2001; Zimring, 2008). The 
concern over crime beginning in this period was due, in large part, to the response to the 
increases in violence following the growth in crack cocaine markets, as well as the 
political emphasis that followed (see, for example, Simon, 2007). Additionally, these 
markets contributed to stark contrasts between city and suburban crime trends, which 
were markedly different among Baltimore neighborhoods, causing particular concern for 
the safety of urban neighborhoods. Specifically, the ratio between the central city crime 
rate in Baltimore and its surrounding metro area increased from about 2:1 to 3:1 from the 
early 1980’s to the early 1990’s (Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, the percentage of “safe” 
neighborhoods was declining, while the proportion of “unsafe” neighborhoods in 
Baltimore grew. In 1970, the safest 20% of neighborhoods had assault rates of .005 per 
1,000, but by 1980 only 3-4% of neighborhoods had rates this low (Taylor, 2001). 
Similarly, no neighborhoods had robbery rates of over 1 per 1,000 in 1970, but nearly 
half of neighborhoods did by 1980. These trends (although more dramatic from 1970-80) 
continued into the next decade.  
Observing the perceived success of policing strategies implemented in New York 
City, Baltimore officials eventually responded to the increases in violent crime trends by 
adopting a similar style of policing, known for its aggressive tactics and “order-
maintenance” stop and frisk policies following the election of Mayor Martin O’Malley in 
1999 (Harcourt, 2009; Trettien, 2006). First, however, Commissioner Ed Woods would 
implement a “community policing” strategy beginning in 1990, which accompanied the 
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creation of a violence task force aimed at homicide reduction. The strategy lasted until 
1994 when it was abandoned due to falling arrest and clearance rates since a hiring freeze 
limited the number of officers available for its implementation. Therefore, the period 
under study (1990-1994) does not encompass the more well-known era of “zero 
tolerance” strategies implemented in Baltimore to fight rising violence. In fact, it includes 
an era of Baltimore policing that actively opposed the New York strategy and would only 
come to implement a “zero-tolerance” model following the implementation of yet another 
approach (Boston’s Cease Fire model) and after hiring two more Police Commissioners 
(Ronald Daniel and Edward Norris, the latter of which was responsible for implementing 
the New York approach). This point is an important one given the “zero-tolerance” 
model’s association with increased citizen complaints, and its potential to contribute to 
other negative side-effects for police-citizen relationships, including decreased police 
legitimacy, citizen compliance, resident-initiated formal social control, and the promotion 
of informal social control strategies among residents (See Harcourt, 2009; Trettien, 
2006).  
Indeed, the “community policing” tactics implemented by Commissioner Woods 
from 1990-1994 as well as earlier strategies, along with the steep increases in violent 
crime that took place during the period under study are likely to have contributed to 
nuanced police-citizen relations in Baltimore (see, for example, Harcourt, 2009). 
Therefore, it is important to take these conditions into consideration when interpreting the 
results of the present study with regards to their generalizability.  
Overall, it is clear that Baltimore shares many historical and structural similarities 
with similarly-sized industrial American cities, arguably making it an ideal setting for the 
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present study. In addition, incarceration trends during the period under study (1990-1994) 
were on the rise, making it an ideal window of study. The study’s timeframe also 
encompasses a more stable period following a long history of population and economic 
change. Furthermore, the study controls for the structural characteristics of 
neighborhoods, including incarceration, residential mobility, concentrated disadvantage, 
and prior crime. Finally, despite its historical placement, substantive similarities exist 
between contemporary Baltimore compared to the period under study, including 
economic conditions, incarceration rates (in Maryland), and crime trends. Violent crime 
rates, in particular, are returning to their 1990’s peaks. In 2015, violent riots followed the 
controversial death of Freddie Gray that occurred while Gray was in the custody of 
Baltimore police. That same year, the city’s murder rate reached 48.97 per 100,000 
residents, surpassing its 1993 peak of 48.77 homicides per 100,000 residents (Rector and 
Fenton, 2015). 
MEASURES 
 The main independent variables included in the present study are three-year 
changes in prison admission and prison release rates measured from 1992-1994. In 
addition, the study controls for neighborhood characteristics, including concentrated 
disadvantage and residential mobility, captured using 1990 census data.6 Finally, the 
dependent variables, including forms of capital and social control, are captured in the 
1994 survey.  
 
 
                                                          
6Additional neighborhood-level controls (see Chapter Four) include: neighborhood crime rate (averaged 
across 1990-1992), neighborhood population (1990 census), and lack of police response (1994 survey), the 
latter of which is only included in the models estimating social control. 
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DEPENDENT MEASURES 
 Two forms of social control, informal social control and resident-initiated formal 
social control, are included since they have been found to have different theoretical and 
empirical implications in previous work (Cwick, 2015; Warner, 2007). Although, 
coercive mobility theory in its current form only posits relationships between 
incarceration and informal social control, theorists highlight the interconnectedness of 
various types of social control, arguing as a main premise that an overreliance on formal 
social control may restrict informal social control (Clear, 2007; Rose and Clear, 1998). 
The present study acknowledges that, in addition to informal efforts, residents initiate 
formal social control by informing authorities of a crime, commonly by calling the 
police, which is likely to operate distinctly from informal efforts.  
Two measures capture informal social control. The main measure is a scale 
similar to those found in extant work (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Warner, 
2007). The second measure is a single item, which specifically captures informal social 
control efforts directed at neighborhood children. One measure, a scale similar to the 
scale for informal social control, but with respect to citizen’s engagement of the police, 
captures formal social control. 
Informal Social Control is a four-item scale (α=.83)7 that captures respondents’ 
perceptions of neighbors’ willingness to intervene or react to deviant and criminal 
behaviors in their neighborhood. Respondents were asked “Suppose a suspicious person 
was trying to break into a neighbor’s home” and “Suppose some teenagers around 15 or 
16 years old were shouting and making a loud disturbance on your street around 11:00 at 
                                                          
7The alpha reliability scores for informal and formal social control and all scales combining dichotomous 
items were calculated using estimations of tetrachoric correlations (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2012; 
Uebersax, 2006). 
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night.” Responses to two follow-up questions, “Do you think any of your neighbors 
would personally try to stop the person?” and “Do you think any of your neighbors would 
get another neighbor’s help to try to stop the person?” were coded “1” for “yes” and “0” 
for “no” for each scenario. All four responses were then averaged for each respondent. 
This measure was then aggregated to the neighborhood-level by gender by summing the 
individual scores separately for men and women and dividing each by the total number of 
men and women, respectively, within each neighborhood.  
Reprimanding neighborhood children is also included as a form of informal social 
control. It is a single-item that asks, “During the past year have you tried to stop a 
neighbor’s children from doing something they shouldn’t be doing?” Responses include 
“yes” (“1”) or “no” (“0”). Responses were aggregated to the neighborhood-level by 
summing the individual items separately for men and women and dividing each by the total 
number of men and women, respectively, in each neighborhood. 
Formal Social Control (α=.68) captures residents’ willingness to engage or call 
the police to help with neighborhood issues.8 At the individual-level, formal social 
control includes the average of responses to the follow-up question “Do you think any of 
your neighbors would call the police?” for both scenarios (coded “1”= “yes,” “0”= “no”). 
This measure was also aggregated to the neighborhood-level by gender by summing the 
individual scores separately for men and women and dividing each by the total number of 
men and women, respectively, within each neighborhood. Identifying consequences of 
incarceration for formal social control is of particular importance since it is likely to be 
                                                          
8The author acknowledges that face validity of this measure may overlap with measures of residents’ legal 
cynicism or trust in police. This measure aims to capture residents’ willingness to initiate or involve police 
in neighborhood issues regardless of the reasoning for doing so or not. In an attempt to separate residents’ 
motivations from practical explanations for involving or not involving police a measure of the lack of 
police response is included as a control (see Chapter Four: Analytic Methods). 
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discouraged in high incarceration neighborhoods due to police cynicism and distrust of 
the criminal justice system (Wilkinson, 2007).  
POTENTIAL MEDIATORS 
Physical Capital 
 Income. A question within the 1994 survey asked respondents to estimate their 
annual household income in 1993 before taxes. Income responses range from “0” to “8,” 
beginning with “below $5,000,” and ending with “above $40,000” per year, increasing in 
$5,000 increments between categories. Income was aggregated to the neighborhood-level 
separately for men and women by calculating the average among included respondents.9 
Human Capital  
 Education is a single-item, coded “1” if the respondent reported either graduating 
from high school or completing a GED (those who completed less than high school or 
GED were coded “0”). This item was aggregated to the neighborhood-level by 
calculating the average proportion of men and women who completed high school in 
each neighborhood. 
 Not in Workforce was coded “1” for respondents age 60 or younger who reported 
not being fully or partially employed at the time of the survey and said that they had not 
worked for pay within the past year. The average proportion of men and women who 
reported being out of the workforce was then calculated for each neighborhood to serve 
as the aggregated measure. 
                                                          
9Missingness for income is 12.2%. Missingness ranges from 0-4 men and 0-6 women in each 
neighborhood. However, the majority of neighborhoods are missing income information for fewer than two 
men or women (90.6% of neighborhoods are missing income for two or fewer men and 69.5% of 
neighborhoods are missing income for two or fewer women). Those missing on income are significantly 
more likely to be older and female, but are similar on key variables, including educational attainment, 
marital status, race, and employment status, as well as many study outcomes, such as informal and formal 
social control, general neighboring, well-being, and social ties. 
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Well-Being. Resident’s health and psychological well-being is important since it 
has the potential to influence residents’ skills and abilities at work and at home, in 
addition to contributing to neighborhood interactions, withdrawal, anxiety, and the 
routine activities of residents. A three-item scale (α=.71) of resident well-being includes 
responses to: “In general,” 1) “…how energetic have you felt lately” (.80), 2) “…how has 
your health been lately” (.83), and 3) “…how have your spirits been lately?” (.77).10 
Responses range from “1” to “4,” with “4” reflecting the most energy and “very good” 
health or spirits. The average of all three responses was taken for each respondent when 
at least two valid responses were given. This measure was then aggregated to the 
neighborhood-level by gender by summing the individual scores separately for men and 
women and dividing each by the total number of men and women, respectively, within each 
neighborhood.  
 Property Victimization is included since victimization experiences have been 
shown to be associated with a decline in mental health and well-being (see Adams and 
Serpe, 2000), affecting residents’ human capital. Property victimization was coded “1” if 
the respondent reported either a burglary to their home or auto theft of their car or a 
household member’s car within the last year when at least one of these items was valid. 
The average proportion of men and women who reported being the victim of a property 
crime was then calculated for each neighborhood to serve as the aggregated measure. 
Unsafe Neighborhood. Similar to property victimization, perceptions that the 
neighborhood is unsafe also can contribute to fear and a decline in mental health 
(Skogan, 1986; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). This construct is captured by items tapping 
                                                          
10A principal components analysis revealed that all three items load on one factor and factor loadings are 
indicated in parentheses.  
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feelings of uneasiness and insecurity about living in the neighborhood. Unsafe 
neighborhood is a multi-dimensional four-item scale (α=.84)11 that combines responses 
to: “How safe would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood” 1) “…during the 
day” and 2) “…at night?” and “If you were out alone at night in your neighborhood, 
around the corner from your block, would you” 3) “…be afraid if a stranger stopped you 
to ask for directions” and 4) “…feel uneasy if you heard footsteps behind you?”12 
Response sets for the first two questions (“very safe”= “1,” “somewhat safe”= “2,” 
“somewhat unsafe”= “3,” and “very unsafe”= “4”) were collapsed to match the latter two 
questions so that “very unsafe” and “somewhat unsafe” were coded “1” and all other 
responses were coded “0.” For the latter two questions, “yes” responses were coded “1” 
and “no” responses coded “0.” The mean of all four responses when at least two 
responses were valid was calculated for each respondent. This measure was then 
aggregated to the neighborhood-level by gender by summing the individual scores 
separately for men and women and dividing each by the total number of men and women, 
respectively, within each neighborhood.  
Social Capital 
 Marriage is a single item, coded “1” for respondents who reported their marital 
status as legally “married” or “living with someone as though you were married.” All 
other responses (“widowed,” “divorced or separated,” and “never been married”) were 
                                                          
11The alpha reliability score for unsafe neighborhood was calculated using estimations of tetrachoric 
correlations, which are preferred for dichotomous items (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2012; Uebersax, 
2006). 
12After recoding, a principal components analysis using varimax rotation revealed that the four included 
items loaded on two separate factors. The first factor included feeling unsafe in the neighborhood during 
the day (.89) and at night (.71) and the second factor included feeling afraid if a stranger were to ask for 
directions (.82) and if one heard footsteps behind them (.84) at night. Factor loadings are noted in 
parentheses. 
  
64 
 
coded “0.” The individual-level measure was also aggregated to the neighborhood-level 
by calculating the average for men and women in each neighborhood. 
 Social Ties sums the number of friends and relatives reported to be living within 
the respondent’s neighborhood. This item is aggregated to the neighborhood-level by 
averaging the total number of reported friends and relatives for men and women within 
each neighborhood. 
 General Neighboring is a four-item scale (α=.78)13 that captures the degree to 
which residents are engaged or involved with their neighbors. Respondents were asked: 
“During the past year have you:” 1) “visited inside a neighbor’s house on your block,” 2) 
“run a shopping errand for a neighbor on your block,” 3) “borrowed tools or household 
items from a neighbor on your block,” and 4) “worked together with other neighbors on 
your block to improve its appearance?” Responses were coded “1” for “yes” and “0” for 
“no” and the mean of all four items was calculated for each respondent when at least 
three items were valid. This measure was also aggregated by averaging the individual 
scores within each neighborhood separately for men and women. 
 Defensive Neighboring is a three-item scale (α=.86)14 that includes responses to 
the following; 1) “Have you kept watch on a house or apartment while a neighbor was 
away, or has a neighbor done this for you?,” 2) “Have you arranged with other people in 
your neighborhood to have newspapers or mail brought in while you or they were 
away?,” and 3) “Have you given another person in your neighborhood your key, or have 
                                                          
13The alpha reliability score for general neighboring was calculated using estimations of tetrachoric 
correlations, which are preferred for dichotomous items (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2012; Uebersax, 
2006). 
14The alpha reliability score for defensive neighboring was calculated using estimations of tetrachoric 
correlations, which are preferred for dichotomous items (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2012; Uebersax, 
2006). 
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they given you theirs, so that animals could be fed, plants watered, or the house checked 
on while you or they were away?” Responses to each item were either “yes” (“1”) or 
“no” (“0”) and the mean was taken for each respondent before aggregating to the 
neighborhood-level by calculating the average response in each neighborhood separately 
for men and women. 
 Community Solidarity is a seven-item scale (α =.83), assessing feelings of 
neighborhood attachment and closeness among neighbors. It includes responses to the 
following: “How much do you feel a sense of community with other people” 1) “…in 
your neighborhood” (.71) and 2) “…on your block? That is, how much do you share their 
interests and concerns?” (.77), “How attached do you feel” 3) “…to your neighborhood” 
(.70) and 4) “…to the block you are living on now?” (.74), and “On your block” 5) “…to 
what extent do you rely on your neighbors for emotional support” (.63), 6) “…how many 
people do you know by face or name” (.70), and 7) “…to what extent do you feel 
accepted by your neighbors?” (.70).15 Responses to the first two items include “not at all” 
(“1”), “somewhat” (“2”), and “a great deal” (“3”). These responses were multiplied by 
1.33 so that they could be more easily numerically combined with the remaining 
questions response set of: “not at all” (“1”), “small extent” (“2”), “medium extent” (“3”), 
and “large extent” (“4”). The resulting items were averaged across respondents and then 
aggregated to the neighborhood-level by calculating the average among men and women 
for each neighborhood. 
 Presence of Voluntary Associations is captured in residents’ reported knowledge 
of neighborhood associations or organizations that are located within their neighborhood. 
                                                          
15Principal components analysis (after recoding) revealed that all items loaded on a single factor and factor 
loadings are noted in parentheses. 
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The survey lists nine neighborhood groups, including neighborhood associations, church 
or synagogue connected groups, parent-teacher associations, youth groups (e.g., boy or 
girl scouts), community or recreation center organizations, political clubs or issue-
oriented groups, block clubs, social groups or clubs, and “other” neighborhood-level 
organizations, and asks if any are located within the respondents’ neighborhood. The 
number of associations that each respondent reported as located within their 
neighborhood was summed and then aggregated to the neighborhood-level by calculating 
the average number of neighborhood groups reported among men and women for each 
neighborhood.16  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Coercive Mobility 
 Change in Prison Admission Rates at the neighborhood-level from 1992-1994 is 
the first measure of coercive mobility. This measure was calculated using the same 
method used by Lynch and Sabol in prior work (2004a; 2004b; Lynch et al., 2002). The 
number of persons admitted to prison in 1994 was divided by the proportion of the 
population at risk for incarceration (ages 18 to 34) and subtracted from the same rate 
calculated for 1992 before being multiplied by 1,000.  
 Change in Prison Release Rates at the neighborhood-level from 1992-1994, a 
second measure of coercive mobility, is calculated in the same way. The number of 
persons released from prison in 1994 was divided by the proportion of the population at 
                                                          
16This item was chosen over a similar item, which asked, of the nine included neighborhood associations, 
“Are you or is anyone in your household a member?” This item was not selected due to a large amount of 
missing data (11.6%). However, the sum of household memberships in neighborhood associations is 
significantly correlated (r=.57, p< .05) with the selected measure (presence of voluntary associations). 
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risk for incarceration (ages 18-34) and subtracted from the same rate calculated for 1992 
before being multiplied by 1,000.17 
The restrictive denominator of ages 18-34, intended to capture those “at risk” for 
incarceration, was chosen to calculate both measures since most admissions, and 
therefore releases, to prison are young people. More specifically, in 1994, 71.4% of new 
court commitments to state prisons were between the ages of 18 and 34, according to the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011).  
 The change in rates from 1992-1994 is used to operationalize coercive mobility 
since the theory aims to understand how the cumulative number of persons experiencing 
the cycling of prison affects the individual and community. A single or averaged rate of 
prison admissions or releases would not be capable of capturing the cumulative effects 
theorized to have a coercive community impact (Lynch et al., 2002). Although single 
rates of admissions and releases have been shown to be related to crime (Clear et al., 
2003), cumulative concentrations of incarceration are likely the best measure for 
capturing effects to individuals, as well as community organization and informal social 
control. As Clear and colleagues (2003) note, even high incarceration neighborhoods may 
only experience a 2-3% removal or return rate per year. However, over several years this 
rate results in a “pattern of disruption overtime” that is capable of damaging community 
networks and informal social control (Clear et al., 2003: 39). 
                                                          
17A limitation of the correctional data is that some cases are missing address information, resulting in 
incompleteness. Lynch and colleagues’ (2002) original comparison between data received from the 
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Corrections (MDPSC) (at the census tract level with address 
information) and county-level estimates revealed that admissions and release data are underreported by 
about one-third. However, this underrepresentation is believed to be spread evenly throughout 
communities, and therefore, should only affect the magnitude of incarceration and not the distribution of 
rates across communities (Lynch et al., 2002). 
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 Finally, since the admission of residents to prison and their return home are likely 
to have differential effects to community organization and informal social control, the 
measures are left separate instead of attempting to combine them into a single measure of 
coercive mobility. The separation of measures into prison admissions and releases is 
typical, following research in this area (Clear et al., 2003; Lynch and Sabol, 2004a; 
2004b; Lynch et al., 2002).  
Neighborhood Structure  
Two variables are intended to capture the neighborhood structural characteristics 
included within the systemic reformation of social disorganization and coercive mobility 
theory. They are residential mobility and concentrated disadvantage, which includes 
racial composition and poverty. 
Residential Mobility is a two-item scale (α=.73),18 constructed by averaging the 
standardized z-scores for the 1990 census proportions of residents who lived in a 
different house in 1985 (e.g., 5 years before the survey) than at the time of the survey and 
who rent their homes or apartments.19 Residential mobility ranges from -1.64 to 2.58 
(mean=0; sd=0.87).  
Concentrated Disadvantage is a standardized five-item scale (α=.86)20 that 
includes 1990 census items that are supported in the literature on social disorganization 
theory. Following the tradition of neighborhood scholars (see for example Morenoff, 
Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001), concentrated disadvantage was created by averaging 
                                                          
18Alpha based on standardized items. 
19A principal components analysis showed that both items load on a single factor (both loadings=.89). 
20Alpha based on standardized items. 
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the standardized z-scores for each included item:21 the proportion of residents who are 25 
and over with less than a high school education (.74), the proportion of residents living in 
poverty (.78), the proportion of residents who identify as black (.61), the proportion of 
residents receiving government assistance (.94), and the proportion of single-headed 
households (.94).22 Concentrated disadvantage ranges from -1.15 to 1.88 (mean=0; 
sd=0.80) across neighborhoods.  
Individual-level Controls 
 Several variables are included as controls at the individual-level since they are 
likely to impact respondents’ forms of capital and perspective on the social control efforts 
of their neighbors. Age includes each respondent’s age at the time of the interview 
(mean=51.59; sd=16.52; range=20, 94). Race was coded “1” if the respondent identified 
as “black” (33.0%) and “0” if they identified as “white” (60.4%) or “other.” Homeowner 
was coded “1” if the respondent indicated that they owned their home (75.1%) and “0” if 
they did not. Presence of Children (age 18 and under) living within the home is included 
since many of the theoretical components within the proposed gendered theory of 
coercive mobility rely on the presence of children contributing to the additional 
challenges that women face. Those who reported any minor children under the age of 18 
living within the home were coded “1” and those with no children were coded “0.” 
Overall, 27.6% of respondents (20.4% of men and 32.2% of women) reported living with 
minor children at the time of the interview. 
 
                                                          
21This method is preferred since it considers each included variable within the combined score equally so 
that scores reflect “true” differences among variables. Other methods (e.g., factor scores) weight each 
included variable, making scores less directly interpretable (see DiStefano, Zhu, and Mîndrilă, 2009). 
22A principal components analysis showed that each of the included items load on a single factor. Factor 
loadings are indicated in parentheses.  
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MISSING DATA 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL  
 Two neighborhoods were missing a 1994 prison release rate, one neighborhood 
was missing a 1992 admission rate, and one neighborhood was missing a 1994 admission 
rate needed to calculate the change in admission rates for these years. Therefore, before 
proceeding with the analysis, these missing rates were estimated, using OLS regression, 
in order to retain the full sample of neighborhoods. Several neighborhood level 
predictors, as well as alternative years of admission and release rates, were included in 
the imputation models in order to accurately and informatively estimate the missing 
admission and release rates used to calculate the final change in rates. A number of 
models were tested and models that produced predicted values closest to and most highly 
correlated with non-missing values were chosen as imputed values for the missing 
points.23 From the imputed single year rates, change rates of prison admission and release 
rates were calculated similarly to the rest of the data. No other variables are missing data 
at the neighborhood-level. 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
 All key variables, with the exception of income, are missing fewer than five 
percent of cases (ranging from 0% to 4.1% missing). For these measures, mean 
imputation was utilized to estimate the missing data in order to retain the largest number 
of possible cases. Since income is missing 12.2% of cases, and the only available 
                                                          
23In order to estimate the two missing 1994 prison release rates, concentrated disadvantage, the proportion 
of black residents, crime, and prison admissions in 1994 and releases in 1992 were used as predictors. To 
estimate the missing 1994 admission rate, concentrated disadvantage, the proportion of black residents, 
crime, and prison admissions in 1992 and releases in 1994 were used as predictors. Finally, to estimate the 
missing 1992 admission rate, concentrated disadvantage, the proportion of black residents, and prison 
admissions in 1994 and 1987, and releases in 1994 were used as predictors. The predicted rates are highly 
correlated with the actual rates (correlations range from .88 to .96, p<.001). 
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demographic information to estimate income using a regression strategy includes other 
variables of interest (e.g. education, not in workforce), cases missing on this variable will 
be dropped for the models estimating income, resulting in 618 respondents (87.8% of the 
full sample).  
The number of years of schooling completed was mean imputed prior to 
dichotomizing this measure to high school/GED completion for the 13 individuals (1.8%) 
who are missing. However, mean imputation could not be used for several dichotomous 
items, including not in the workforce (2.3% missing), property victimization (1.1% 
missing), marriage (0.9% missing), reprimanding neighborhood children (0.6% missing), 
and presence of children (0.5% missing) since imputation of a decimal would be 
conceptually meaningless for these items. Therefore, these individual-level models will 
include 688 to 700 cases (97.7%-99.4% of the full sample). Only the presence of children 
(0.5%) precludes retention of the full sample for all models since it is included as a 
control, resulting in retention of 99.4% of the full sample (n=700) at the individual-level. 
RULING OUT POSSIBLE AGGREGATION BIAS WITHIN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
 Although each neighborhood contains a substantial number of individuals (18-24) 
for the purposes of creating aggregated measures (see Blakely and Woodward, 2000), the 
number of available responses becomes more limited when separated by gender. The 
aggregated responses for women are still based on a substantial eight to twenty-three 
respondents. However, given the tendency of neighborhood surveys to receive more 
compliance from women respondents compared to men (Curtin, Presser, and Singer, 
2000; Moore and Tarnai, 2002; Singer, van Hoewyk, and Maher, 2000) (and this sample 
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is no exception, being comprised of 60.9% women), the range of aggregated responses of 
men is two to sixteen per neighborhood.  
 Bias may arise if cohesiveness of individual-level responses is lacking (Blakely 
and Woodward, 2000), an issue that is more probable given fewer randomly selected 
respondents. The more heterogeneity among responses, the greater amount of 
measurement error exists within aggregated constructs since these measures are based on 
the average or another arithmetic computation of individual items (Diez Roux, 2004). 
Therefore, heterogeneity on key variables was examined among males residing in low 
male respondent neighborhoods (those with five or fewer male respondents). Within all 
three low male respondent neighborhoods, responses exhibited considerable overlap on 
key variables, including general and defensive neighboring, informal social control, 
social ties, and reprimanding neighborhood children, indicating agreement among 
respondents. In addition, the relationship between low male respondent neighborhoods 
and high rates of prison admissions or low male neighborhood populations (based on the 
1990 U.S. census) was examined, which revealed no major differences among these 
neighborhoods and the rest of the sample. Low male respondent neighborhoods fit within 
the normal range of prison admission rates for 1992 and 1994 and do not reflect outliers 
or even the highest prison admission rates within the data.24 Furthermore, as part of the 
                                                          
24One low male respondent neighborhood has the highest change in admissions from 1992-1994 (7.24), 
despite having below average admission rates for both years (5.57 in 1992 and 12.81 in 1994). However, 
this neighborhoods’ change in prison release rates from 1992-1994 is below average (-2.79). None of the 
three low male respondent neighborhoods feature a low proportion of males based on U.S. census data 
(ranges from 45-46% male for “low male respondent neighborhoods”), however this data is based on the 
1990 decennial census (before the 1992-1994 prison admission rates). 
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analyses, models excluding low male respondent neighborhoods will be compared to 
models including the full sample of neighborhoods.25 
Having outlined the data and measures included in the proposed study, including 
strategies for overcoming missing data challenges, the next chapter details the analytic 
strategy. Specifically, Chapter Four describes how the data will be used to estimate the 
impact of incarceration to women and men, as well as the potential gendered 
consequences of incarceration at both the neighborhood and individual-level.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
25Analyses excluding neighborhoods with five or less men produced identical substantive results in 90% of 
models (27 out of 30). These findings are reported in Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYTIC METHODS 
The analytic strategy aims to test the complete gendered theory of coercive 
mobility. In order to test the theory, the effects of incarceration at both the neighborhood 
and individual-level must be estimated. An investigation at both levels will reveal which 
aggregated finding is the result of an accumulation of individual-level findings (indirect 
neighborhood-level effects) and which occur solely at the neighborhood-level (direct 
neighborhood-level effects). In addition, an important part of the analysis is the potential 
mediation of forms of capital (physical, human, and social) in the relationship between 
incarceration and social control at each level of analysis. This part of the analysis will 
reveal how women’s and men’s aggregated capital may build to influence the 
neighborhood’s ability to police themselves and prevent crime by engaging in social 
control, including informal social control (e.g., stopping a behavior themselves or by 
engaging another neighbor’s help; reprimanding neighborhood children) and initiating 
formal social control (e.g., calling the police), as well as how neighborhood-level forms 
of capital may feedback to impact individual-level social control efforts. 
DESCRIPTIVES AND BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS 
The analysis begins with an examination of descriptive statistics and the bivariate 
relationships among study variables at the neighborhood and individual-level. Following 
a descriptive and bivariate analysis, the study will proceed with the main analyses.  
EXAMINING DESCRIPTIVES RELATED TO ENDOGENEITY 
An important part of the descriptive analysis is examination of the change in 
prison admissions and change in prison releases from 1992-1994. Since endogeneity, a 
statistical problem in which incorrect causal ordering or other modeling issues contribute 
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to correlation between an independent variable and an error term, is a potential issue with 
the present study, as it is with all cross-sectional neighborhood-level analyses, a 
consideration must be given to the possibility that the included variables are contributing 
to each other in reverse causal order (i.e., Y is actually contributing to X, or in this case, 
forms of capital and social control are contributing to prison admissions and releases). It 
is crucial that the changes in incarceration rates represent distinct trends that are not just 
extensions of previous or subsequent years in order to support the argument that X is 
affecting Y and diminish the possibility that Y is actually influencing a similar and 
subsequent trend in X. Further evidence for correct causal ordering would be to estimate 
and rule out the effect of Y on X. However, corresponding years of incarceration rates are 
not available to test this hypothesis with these data. Since this issue cannot be ruled out 
with future years of incarceration data, the analysis of prison admission rates and release 
rates, as well as the inclusion of a control for prior crime (1990-1992) assists in 
substantiating the correct causal ordering of variables.  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The main analysis examines the multivariate relationships among included 
variables by investigating each of the proposed research questions (separately for prison 
admissions and releases) in two stages; neighborhood-level and individual-level analyses. 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL 
Beginning with step one, the effects of incarceration at the neighborhood-level are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression since all outcomes at this level 
are continuous and normally distributed. Specifically, the direct relationships among 
prison admissions and releases and social control (informal, reprimanding neighborhood 
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children, and formal) and prison admissions and releases and each potential mediator 
(physical, human, and social capital) are estimated separately for women and men to 
determine which relationships, if any, are significant (i.e., significantly different from 
zero). Following the estimation of relationships for both women and men, a gendered 
analysis will determine which relationships are significantly different for women and 
men (i.e., the associations between incarceration and women’s forms of capital and social 
control are significantly different from the associations between incarceration and men’s 
forms of capital and social control).  
Since the number of included neighborhoods is limited (n=30), the main models 
include only the three main independent variables (either prison admissions or releases, 
along with indicators of neighborhood structure). In addition, due to the limited power 
available in models with this sample size, significance for all results is interpreted at the 
relaxed p< .10 level (see, for example, Warner, 2007).  
Following the estimation of the direct effects of incarceration on women’s and 
men’s forms of capital and social control, an equality of coefficients test is employed, 
comparing the coefficients for women to the coefficients for men to determine if effects 
are significantly different from one and other and therefore, significantly gendered. 
Following the work of Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998; see also, 
Brame, Paternoster, Mazerolle, and Piquero, 1998), the z-score for the difference between 
the two coefficients of admissions or releases is calculated using an unbiased estimate of 
the standard deviation of the sampling distribution to determine if gendered differences 
are significant. More specifically, the equation referred to throughout as the Clogg test 
(see Paternoster et al., 1998; Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou, 1995), written as: 
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z = (b1–b2)/ √ (SEb12 + SEb22) 
where b1 and SEb1 represent the coefficient of the variable of interest and standard error 
for women, respectively, and b2 and SEb2 represent the coefficient and standard error for 
men, respectively, is employed.26  
Mediation Analysis 
After estimating the direct relationships between incarceration (for both prison 
admissions and releases) and each dependent variable, and estimating the direct 
relationships between incarceration (for both prison admissions and releases) and each 
potential mediator for women and men, the analysis proceeds with a proxy test of 
mediation among these variables at the neighborhood-level. The included mediation test 
is considered a proxy due to the absence of complete sequential ordering of included 
variables, namely that the mediators and outcomes are both captured within the 1994 
survey. Although this limitation reduces the establishment of precise causal ordering 
among potential mediators, it is used to estimate the potential for mediation to inform 
future research. In fact, “most empirical tests of mediation utilize cross-sectional data 
despite the fact that mediation consists of causal processes that unfold overtime” and 
although three time points is ideal, two time points— which are available in the present 
study— may be adequate for testing mediation (Maxwell and Cole, 2003: 1; Cole and 
Maxwell, 2003). Thus, this dissertation continues to use the language of mediation with 
the understanding that not all mediation criteria can be established with these data. 
                                                          
26At the neighborhood-level the Clogg test n=60 (30 aggregations of women and 30 aggregations of men). 
Sufficient sample size is necessary in order to avoid violating the assumption of a normal distribution 
required by the Clogg test. Although no objective n has been established among scholars, the Clogg test has 
been used to investigate relationships using similarly-sized samples at both the neighborhood (Warner, 
2003; n=66) and city levels (Pyrooz, 2013; n=88). Still, caution should be applied with the interpretation of 
these results. 
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To begin, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria for testing mediation is used to 
establish which variables require further testing. According to their criteria and shown in 
Figure 5, the following requirements must be met by potential mediators: 
[Figure 5 about here] 
1) The independent variable has a significant direct association with the 
dependent variable. In this case, the change in prison admissions or releases must 
be significantly related to one of the three forms of social control (informal, 
reprimanding neighborhood children, formal) (Figure 5, path #1). 
2) The independent variable (change in prison admissions or releases) must be 
significantly related to the potential mediator (forms of capital) (Figure 5, path 
#2). 
3) The potential mediator (forms of capital) must be related to the dependent 
variable (social control) (Figure 5, path #3). 
4) The mediator must reduce the coefficient of the independent variable (change 
in prison admissions or releases) once it is entered into the model. 
 
After determining which potential mediators meet the above criteria, each is 
further examined to determine whether the reduction experienced by the independent 
variable due to each potential mediator (criterion 4) is in fact significant. The present 
study relies on the bootstrapping method, which is a nonparametric approach that makes 
no assumptions about the shape of the distributions of the variables or the sampling 
distribution of the statistic, making it ideal for small samples (Preacher and Hayes, 2004; 
Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Bootstrapping uses sampling with replacement to generate a 
large number of samples the size of the original sample and computes the indirect effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable for each of these computer-
generated samples (Preacher and Hayes, 2004; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). The test sorts 
1,000 estimates of the indirect effect from low to high. A confidence interval of 90% is 
used given the sample size of the present study (n=30). Therefore, the lower limit of the 
confidence interval is defined as the 5th percentile score in this sorted distribution, and 
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the upper limit is defined as the 95th percentile score in the distribution (5% on both tails) 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2004). When zero does not fall within the 90% confidence interval, 
it can be concluded that the indirect effect is indeed significantly different from zero at 
p<.10 (two-tailed), meaning that the mediation is significant.27 Furthermore, although the 
mediation analysis does not specifically test for a gendered effect with the use of 
significance testing, such as the Clogg test for direct effects, women’s and men’s 
significant mediators will be compared in terms of the number of significant domains for 
each, indicating whether women’s or men’s forms of capital better explain the 
relationship between incarceration and social control. 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
The second stage of the analysis involves the examination of the individual-level 
effects of incarceration, while controlling for neighborhood-level characteristics. First, 
separate effects for women and men are estimated, followed by a comparison of 
differences or gendered effects among women and men. The purpose of the individual-
analysis is to demonstrate how individual residents are impacted by incarceration, as well 
as to establish which neighborhood-level effects occur due to the accumulation of 
individual-level effects. In addition, the individual-level analyses can determine whether 
neighborhood-level effects “feedback” at the individual-level with the use of a mediation 
analysis. All analyses at this stage are conducted using Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
software (HLM, v.7.0) (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon, 2004) since data are 
nested, such that individuals are clustered within neighborhoods. Multi-level modeling 
techniques are used since they avoid violation of independent error terms across 
                                                          
27Bootstrapping is used in place of the Sobel (1982) test, a commonly used z-test, used for testing mediation 
in large samples, which compares the strength of the indirect effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable to the point that it equals zero. 
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neighborhood levels (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Multi-level modeling allows for the 
estimation of the effects of level-one units, entities within a grouping, and level-two 
units, referring to the variation across units, simultaneously. Within the present study, the 
level-one units are individuals and level-two units are the neighborhoods in which they 
reside.  
The main multi-level models control for age, race, homeownership, and the 
presence of children within the household at the individual-level and concentrated 
disadvantage and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level. Within HLM, several 
centering choices for independent variables are available, which allow for various 
interpretations of the coefficients. In the present study all continuous variables are grand-
mean centered so that the coefficients may be interpreted as the neighborhood average 
and binary variables are left uncentered. The majority of individual-level outcomes are 
continuous and are estimated with linear models. For example, the level-one equation 
estimating women’s or men’s social ties, a measure of social capital, as the dependent 
variable can be written as follows: 
SocialTiesij = ȕ0j + ȕ1j(Ageij) + ȕ2j(Raceij) + ȕ3j(Homeownerij) + ȕ4j(Childrenij) + rij               (1a) 
where SocialTiesij is equal to the number of social ties for person i in neighborhood j and 
ȕ0j is the mean level of social ties in neighborhood j, controlling for age, race, 
homeownership, and the presence of children. The model error is rij. 
 Several individual-level outcomes are dichotomous (e.g., high school completion, 
not in workforce, property victimization, marriage, and reprimanding neighborhood 
children) and are estimated within an over-dispersed Bernoulli model.28 In these models, 
                                                          
28The over-dispersed Bernoulli model corrects for both over-dispersion (inflated “0’s”) and under-
dispersion (inflated “1’s”), the latter of which is the issue with these data. 
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the probability that person i in neighborhood j completed high school or received their 
GED, for example, is defined as ϕij = Pr(HighSchoolCompletionij=1). Within the level-
one equation for this outcome, ϕij is modeled using a logit link function and can be 
written as: 
log[ϕij/(1 - ϕij)] = ηij                                                   (1b)                                     
ηij = ȕ0j + ȕ1j(Ageij) + ȕ2j(Raceij) + ȕ3j(Homeownerij) + ȕ4j(Childrenij) + rij        
where ηij is the natural logarithm of the odds (i.e., log-odds) that individual i in 
neighborhood j completed high school or received their GED and ȕ0j is the mean level of 
high school completion in neighborhood j, controlling for age, race, homeownership, and 
the presence of children.
 
At level two, the change in prison admissions/releases from 
1992-1994, as well as residential mobility and concentrated disadvantage, are included in 
the main models. Therefore, the level-two equation for both continuous and dichotomous 
outcome types is: 
ȕ0j = Ȗ00 + Ȗ01(Incarcerationj) + Ȗ02(Mobilityj) + Ȗ03(Disadvantagej) + u0j            (1c) 
ȕ1j = Ȗ10 
ȕ2j = Ȗ20 
ȕ3j = Ȗ30 
ȕ4j = Ȗ40 
where ȕ0j is the distributive effects in neighborhood j, equal to the effects of 
neighborhood characteristics on the distribution of outcomes within neighborhood j plus 
the unique effect associated with neighborhood j. Each variable at level-one becomes an 
outcome at level-two (Ȗ10-40). 
As with the neighborhood-level analyses, an equality of coefficients test is 
employed in order to compare the effects for women and men and determine if they are 
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significantly gendered. The Clogg test (Paternoster et al., 1998; Brame et al., 1998) is 
also used at the individual-level. However, models estimating a dichotomous outcome are 
unfit for the Clogg test and therefore, a separate model containing the cross-level 
interaction term gender*incarceration is estimated in place of the Clogg test. 
Mediation Analysis  
After estimating the direct individual-level effects of incarceration, the analysis 
moves on to a preliminary mediation analysis similar to that conducted at the 
neighborhood-level. Using multi-level mediation, this part of the analysis seeks to 
determine if neighborhood-level forms of capital mediate the relationship between 
incarceration and individual-level social controls. In other words, do the effects to 
neighborhood-level phenomenon “feedback” onto residents at the individual-level?  
The steps for estimating incarceration’s direct effect on individual-level forms of 
social control (criterion 1) and neighborhood-level forms of capital (criterion 2) have 
already been discussed. Therefore, the next step in the multi-level mediation analysis is to 
assess criterion three of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) requirements, testing whether there is 
a significant direct relationship among the potential neighborhood-level mediator and the 
significant individual-level social control outcomes. These relationships can more clearly 
be seen in Figure 5.  
When a potential neighborhood-level mediator, for example, the proportion of 
men not in the workforce, is added to the model the components of the level-one equation 
remain unchanged. For example, the following is the level-one mediation equation 
estimating informal social control:29  
                                                          
29Centering choices remain the same as in previous models (e.g., all continuous variables are grand-mean 
centered and binary variables are left uncentered). 
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InformalSocialControlij = ȕ0j + ȕ1j(Ageij) + ȕ2j(Raceij) + ȕ3j(Homeownerij) + ȕ4j(Childrenij) + rij             (2a) 
The level-two equation for informal and formal social control can be written as:30  
ȕ0j = Ȗ00 + Ȗ01(MalesNotInWorkforcej) + u0j                                                                (2b) 
ȕ1j = Ȗ10 
ȕ2j = Ȗ20 
ȕ3j = Ȗ30 
ȕ4j = Ȗ40 
Step four of the mediation analysis proceeds with all potential neighborhood-level 
mediators meeting criteria one through three to test whether the addition of a potential 
mediator reduces the coefficient for incarceration. Again, the level-one equation remains 
unchanged and  
the level-two equation becomes:31 
ȕ0j = Ȗ00 + Ȗ01(Incarcerationj) + Ȗ02(Mobilityj) + Ȗ03(Disadvantagej) + Ȗ04(MalesNotInWorkforcej) + u0j         (3a) 
ȕ1j = Ȗ10 
ȕ2j = Ȗ20 
ȕ3j = Ȗ30 
ȕ4j = Ȗ40 
 
Significant coefficients for incarceration within models estimating its direct effect 
on women’s and men’s forms of social control (see equations 1a and 1c for continuous 
outcomes and 1b and 1c for dichotomous outcomes) are compared with the coefficient 
for incarceration resulting from models including potential mediators (see equations 2a 
and 3a for continuous outcomes; see footnote 31 for dichotomous outcomes). The 
                                                          
30For the dichotomous variable, reprimanding neighborhood children, the level-one equation is the same as 
equation 1b
 
and ϕij is defined as Pr(ReprimandingChildrenij=1), the probability that that person i in 
neighborhood j will reprimand neighborhood children who were misbehaving. The level-two equation for 
this outcome is Β0j = Ȗ00 + Ȗ01(MalesNotInWorkforcej) + u0j, ȕ1j = Ȗ10+ u1, ȕ2j = Ȗ20+ u2, ȕ3j = Ȗ30+ u3, ȕ4j = Ȗ40+ u4. 
31
 For the dichotomous variable, reprimanding neighborhood children, error terms are included so that the 
level-two equation is ȕ0j = Ȗ00 + Ȗ01(Incarcerationj) + Ȗ02(Mobilityj) + Ȗ03(Disadvantagej) + Ȗ04(MalesNotInWorkforcej) + u0j, ȕ1j = Ȗ10+ u1, ȕ2j = Ȗ20+ u2, ȕ3j = Ȗ30+ u3, ȕ4j = Ȗ40+ u4. 
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potential mediators which resulted in a reduction in the coefficient for incarceration once 
entered into the model are then further examined. 
Bootstrapping, the mediation method used at the neighborhood-level, is not 
feasible for use with multi-level models with small samples since models may randomly 
generate a constant variable, preventing convergence (Preacher and Selig, 2012). 
Therefore, in order to test whether the reductions in the coefficient for incarceration due 
to potential mediators are in fact significant, quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo confidence 
intervals are estimated. The quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo method generates sample 
statistics from their combined asymptotic distribution, instead of resampling or 
generating data as in the bootstrapping method used in the neighborhood-level analysis. 
The advantage of quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo confidence intervals for multi-level 
mediation is that the model needs to fit the data only once.32 The advantages of quasi-
Bayesian Monte Carlo confidence intervals include most of those associated with 
bootstrapping (e.g., asymmetry) (Preacher and Selig, 2012), making it the ideal method 
for mediation testing at this level. 
The Monte Carlo method generates a sample distribution from a combined 
statistic using estimates from component statistics and an asymptotic covariance matrix. 
As in the neighborhood-level mediation analysis, 1,000 random selections of point 
estimates and asymptotic variances for the means are taken to estimate a sampling 
distribution. Confidence intervals can then be formed from this sampling distribution just 
as with bootstrap intervals. Ninety percent confidence intervals will be used to conclude 
whether the mediated portion of the effect is indeed significantly different from zero 
                                                          
32The quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo method is not used at the neighborhood-level since convergence is not 
an issue at this level and since bootstrapping offers the additional advantage of resampling the data to 
create computer-generate samples and estimates of the indirect effect. 
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(zero does not fall within the confidence interval) at p<.10 (two-tailed), meaning that the 
mediation is significant. As with the individual-level analysis, the number of significant 
mediators found for women and men will be compared in order to determine which offers 
more domains capable of explaining the relationship between incarceration and social 
control. 
INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
 Additional models, including controls for the neighborhood crime rate and 
neighborhood population are also estimated in order to verify the reliability of the results. 
Neighborhood crime rate, in particular, is an important control in establishing causal 
ordering. Additionally, lack of police response is added to models estimating each form 
of social control.33  
 Neighborhood Crime Rate per 100 residents is included as a control since it is related 
to key study variables (e.g., level of incarceration, neighborhood structure, social control, 
forms of capital). The total crime rate for each neighborhood was calculated by averaging the 
rates for violent crime (including homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and property 
crime (including larceny, burglary, and motor vehicle theft) across three years (1990-1992).34 
The total crime rate ranges from 2.61 to 41.69 crimes per 100 residents (mean=11.91) within 
each neighborhood.  
                                                          
33Fear of retaliation was considered as an additional control since it has been found to influence whether or 
not adults intervene to stop unwanted behaviors (Wilkinson, 2007). This measure was not included due to a 
large amount of missing data (19.9%), however, it is significantly correlated (r=.47, p< .05) with the 
included concentrated disadvantage. Fear of retaliation includes respondents’ responses to the question, 
“Do you think… these teenagers would hurt your neighbor, damage his or her property, or anything like 
that” (if they tried to intervene in their making noise at night)? “Yes” responses were coded “1” and the 
proportion of residents who felt that teens would retaliate was calculated for each neighborhood. On 
average, 59% of residents feel that teens would retaliate in some way if neighbors asked them to stop 
making noise late at night. 
34Total crime rate was selected since both violent and property crime have been shown to affect 
neighborhood social control (Miethe, 1995; Skogan, 1986). Similar results were achieved when property 
crime or violent crime was included separately.  
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 The inclusion of prior neighborhood crime is helpful in establishing causal ordering 
and ruling out the issue of endogeneity. Since prior crime (1990-1992) serves as a proxy for 
prior measures of social capital and social control (which are not included in the data), the 
inclusion of prior crime (1990-1992) helps to rule out the possibility that previous measures 
of social capital and social control are not causally related to the changes in prison admission 
and release rates (1992-1994), but establishes that changes in admission and release rates 
(1992-1994) are indeed causally related to subsequent measures of social capital and social 
control (1994), as hypothesized. Support is drawn for the latter position if the relationship 
between changes in prison admission and release rates (1992-1994) and social capital and 
social control (1994) remains significant, while controlling for prior crime (1990-1992). 
 Neighborhood Population relative to 1,000 residents is also included as a control 
since it is likely to impact community organization, informal social control, and other key 
variables. These variables could simply be a function of neighborhood size. The number of 
residents may restrict the degree of interaction among neighbors. On the other hand, larger 
neighborhood populations may reduce the opportunity for neighbors to get to know one 
another on more intimate levels and could also reduce neighboring and participation in 
informal social control (Wirth, 1938). 
 Lack of Police Response is included since it is likely to interfere with resident’s 
perceptions of formal social control and may also interfere with informal social control35 
(e.g., contribute to withdrawal from network immersion due to a lack of trust in police to 
respond; contribute to a greater reliance on informal controls). This two-item scale (α 
                                                          
35Among the full sample, the lack of police response at the neighborhood-level is significantly related to 
residents’ individual-level reprimanding of neighborhood children within a nested HLM model 
(OR=234.40, p<.05), as well as residents’ neighborhood-level reprimanding of neighborhood children 
within an OLS model (r= 1.28, se= 0.81, p<.10). Lack of police response at the neighborhood-level is not 
significantly related to informal or formal social control at the individual or neighborhood-level among the 
full sample of respondents. 
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=.92)36 combines the responses for both scenarios (residential burglary and teens making 
noise at night). Residents’ who indicated that their neighbors would call the police given 
either scenario (n=636) were asked, “Do you think the police would come and do 
something about it/the noise?” If respondents answered “no” to either scenario they were 
coded as “1.” “Yes” responses and “Yes, the police would come, but too late to help” 
were coded as “0” in order to capture the most conservative estimate of the lack of police 
response. The proportion of residents who did not believe that the police would come in 
either scenario (of those who said that neighbors would call) was totaled for each 
neighborhood in order to aggregate it to the neighborhood-level. Missing data at the 
individual-level is 3.6% and is spread evenly across neighborhoods, ranging from 0 (n= 
15) to 5 (n=1). Since mean imputation could not be done given the dichotomous nature of 
this item, missing individual-level items were dropped and are not captured within the 
neighborhood-level aggregation. Despite similarity between this measure and the 
measure of formal social control, these items are not significantly correlated at either the 
neighborhood (r= -.085) or individual-level (r= -.026).  
CONCLUSION  
The analytic strategy, investigating the effects of incarceration at both the 
neighborhood and individual-level, is designed to reveal the entire story of gender and 
coercive mobility. Furthermore, the analytic plan anticipates and employs strategic 
safeguards against potential limitations. These include the addition of expanded models 
in order to account for additional controls, models excluding low male respondent 
neighborhoods, and regression and imputation strategies aimed at retaining the largest 
                                                          
36The alpha reliability score for the lack of police response was calculated using estimations of tetrachoric 
correlations, which are preferred for dichotomous items (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2012; Uebersax, 
2006). 
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possible sample. Utilizing data on Baltimore neighborhoods and with the above 
considerations in mind, the present study seeks to answer the begging question of how 
coercive mobility impacts women and men, and how these impacts may be gendered, 
providing important implications for community social control. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 describes the sample of women and men on the key variables used in this 
study, aggregated to the neighborhood-level. On average, significantly fewer women 
(49.1%) are married in each neighborhood compared to men (58.8%), although there is 
more variation in the proportion of married men within each neighborhood (6%-100%) 
compared to women (13%-83%). Contrary to extant literature, on average men have a 
slightly higher number of reported social ties per neighborhood (8.78) compared to 
women (7.23), although the difference is not statistically significant. While no significant 
gender variations exist in the use of any form of social control at the neighborhood-level, 
more women (49.2%) tend to engage in the reprimanding of neighborhood children in 
each neighborhood, on average, compared to men (42.7%). Among the full sample, as 
well as separately for women and men, more variation exists among reprimanding 
neighborhood children (mean=47.0%, range=0.08 to 0.94) compared to both informal 
(mean=0.56, sd=0.08) and formal social control strategies (mean=0.95, sd=0.04). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Also shown in Table 1, the average change in prison admission rates from 1992 to 
1994 is -0.02 offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds, but ranges from a decrease of 16.84 to 
an increase of 7.24. Shown in Figure 6, half (n=15) of the included neighborhoods 
experienced a decline in prison admissions during this time and the other half either 
remained stable (n=3) or increased (n=12). Among declining neighborhoods, the average 
decline is -3.09 offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds and the average increase is 3.81 
among increasing neighborhoods. 
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[Figure 6 about here] 
 Overall, neighborhood release rates increased by an average of 1.68 offenders per 
1,000 18-34 year olds from 1992-1994. Shown in Figure 7, a third (n=10) of 
neighborhoods experienced a decline in prison releases from 1992 to 1994; the average 
decline being -3.32 offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds. Over half (53.33%; n=16) of 
neighborhoods experienced an increase in releases. On average, the increase was 5.79 
offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds. Finally, 13.33% (n=4) of neighborhoods’ release 
rates remained stable during this period. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
In addition the yearly 1992 and 1994, admission and release rates vary, with 
admissions ranging from 0 to 51.76 offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds and releases 
ranging from 0 to 50.45 offenders per 1,000 18-34 year olds. Variation in admission and 
release rates is important for several reasons. First, variation means that these data will 
allow for examination of a range of incarceration rates and associated consequences, 
expanding the generalizability of results. Second, it means that these data included 
neighborhoods that are higher in terms of admission and release rates relative to other 
included neighborhoods. This inclusion allows for an examination of the potential 
negative consequences posited by coercive mobility theory. Although there is no 
consensus definition— theoretical or empirical— as to what constitutes a “high 
incarceration” rate, a study by Renauer and colleagues (2006) provides some insight to 
further examine if any “high incarceration neighborhoods” capable of producing the 
effects proposed by coercive mobility theorists exist within these data. 
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Renauer and colleagues (2006) defined “high incarceration neighborhoods” as 
having more than 3 prison admissions per 1,000 residents using data on 95 
neighborhoods in Portland, Oregon. However, since the rates calculated for the present 
study use a more conservative at risk age group for the denominator (18-34 year olds) 
they represent an inflated comparison. On average, 18-34 year olds made up about 30% 
of the included neighborhood’s population in 1990. Therefore, a rough comparison can 
be done by converting Renauer and colleagues (2006) denominator to adjust for isolation 
of an at risk population comparable to that of the present study by multiplying it by 30% 
(1,000 X .30 = 300), so that the new “high” rate represents 3 admissions per 300 18-34 
year olds or a rate of about 1%. Using this rough definition, “high” prison admission rates 
greater than 1% (10 admissions per 1,000 18-34 year olds) with the potential to become 
“tipping points” are present in 16 neighborhoods in 1992 and 17 neighborhoods in 1994 
within the present data. Likewise “high” release rates (over 10 per 1,000 18-34 year olds) 
are present in 13 neighborhoods in 1992 and 14 in 1994. Therefore, there is potential 
within these data for an examination of the consequences of “high incarceration 
neighborhoods.” 
 Finally, the variation present within both the rates themselves and trends in rates 
is particularly important for establishing the correct causal ordering of the tested 
variables. 
Importantly, both the changes in admission rates and release rates from 1992 to 1994 in 
the included Baltimore neighborhoods represent distinct trends when compared to an 
earlier period. For example, trends in both admissions and releases from the period 
directly prior to the study period, from 1987 to 1992, represent an overwhelming upward 
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trend. All but one neighborhood experienced a positive admission rate and two 
neighborhoods were stable from 1987 to 1992. Similarly, all but two neighborhoods 
experienced an increasing release rate and one neighborhood was stable from 1987 to 
1992 (data not shown).37 The difference in neighborhood-level prison admissions and 
releases from 1992 to 1994 compared to 1987 to 1992 is evidence that these trends 
experience variation across time, which provides a basis of support for causal ordering 
since it is unlikely that these trends were identical or even similar in the period that 
follows and thus, cannot likely be concluded as resulting from the tested outcomes.  
BIVARIATE RESULTS 
Bivariate correlations among neighborhood-level study variables can be found in 
Table 2. Notably, concentrated disadvantage is highly correlated with several outcomes, 
including income (r= -.76, p<. 01) and marriage (r= -.63, p< .01). Since these correlations 
may present potential issues with multi-collinearity, separate models, excluding the 
highly correlated (>|.50|) components of concentrated disadvantage were also estimated. 
These models confirmed the study results except where noted.38  
[Table 2 about here] 
Several other interesting bivariate findings emerged from the data. First, although 
concentrated disadvantage is correlated with defensive neighboring, it is not related to 
general neighboring (e.g., visiting with neighbors), perhaps because general neighboring 
may occur regardless of disadvantage (Browning, 2009). However, previous research has 
posited that neighboring fulfills other functions outside of crime control and defensive 
                                                          
37The 1987 to 1992 change in admission and release rates are calculated based on 27 and 26 neighborhoods, 
respectively, due to missing data points. 
38Only one model, income, was no longer significant when highly correlated (>|.50|) components of 
concentrated disadvantage were included. 
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strategies in disadvantaged areas (Anderson, 1999; Suttles, 1968), which may explain why 
defensive neighboring is significantly and inversely related to concentrated disadvantage. 
Second, the change in prison admissions from 1992-1994 is inversely related to 
residential mobility (r= -.39, p< .05). This finding may be because the incarceration of 
residents forces the friends, family, and neighbors to stay within the neighborhood due to 
economic decline and an inability to move out once their loved one is incarcerated. 
Finally, reprimanding neighborhood children is correlated with a number of different 
variables at the neighborhood-level, including measures of physical (i.e., income (r= -.59, 
p< .01)), human (i.e., high school completion (r= -.49, p< .01)), and social capital (i.e., 
marriage (r= -.44, p< .05)), while informal social control is only related to high school 
completion (r= -.38, p<.05) (human capital) and formal social control is related to income 
(r= .45, p<.05) (physical capital) and being out of the workforce (r= -.50, p<.01) (human 
capital), perhaps suggesting potential mediators for these outcomes in relation to prison 
admissions and releases. 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
PRISON ADMISSIONS 
Direct Relationships 
Research Question 1: Consequences of Prison Admissions for Forms of Capital  
With respect to prison admissions and neighborhood-level outcomes, Research 
Question 1 first asks, ‘Are women’s and men’s neighborhood-level forms of capital 
(physical, human, and social) affected by prison admissions?’ In addition, Research 
Question 1 proceeds to ask ‘Are the effects of prison admissions to women’s and men’s 
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forms of capital significantly different from one another, meaning are the effects of 
prison admissions on women’s and men’s forms of capital significantly gendered?’ 
Physical and Human Capital 
Table 3 summarizes the effects of prison admissions on women’s and men’s 
physical and human capital at the neighborhood-level. As shown in Table 3, changes in 
prison admissions are not significantly correlated with effects to women’s physical or 
human capital at the neighborhood-level.39 Additionally, the association between prison 
admissions and men’s physical and human capital is not significant at this level.  
[Table 3 about here] 
With respect to the gendered nature of effects, the Clogg test, reported in the 
bottom row of Table 3, shows that the associations between prison admissions and 
physical and human capital are not significantly gendered.  
Social Capital 
In line with the proposed gendered theory of coercive mobility, the association 
between prison admissions and women’s aggregate social capital is negative and 
significant, as shown in Table 4. Declines in the proportion of married women, women’s 
social ties, and women’s perceptions of both community solidarity and the presence of 
voluntary associations are associated with prison admissions. Specifically, a one unit 
increase in the change in prison admissions is associated with a 2.1% decline in the 
proportion of married women at the neighborhood-level (b= -0.015, se=0.006, p<.05).40 
                                                          
39A change in prison admission rates is associated with a significant decline (b= -0.078, p<.05) in women’s 
aggregate income. However, when components of concentrated disadvantage that are highly correlated 
(>|.50|) with income are removed the coefficients for prison admissions are no longer significant.  
40The 2.1% decline in the proportion of married women, as well as subsequent percentage changes in 
coefficients, is calculated using the observed scale of the respective coefficient (i.e., women’s marriage) 
and using the equation (b /range) x 100 = % change (i.e., women’s marriage: min.= 0.13, max.= 0.83, 
range= 0.70; (0.015/0.70) x 100= 2.1%). 
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In addition, the average number of social ties women report within their neighborhood 
declines by 0.331 (se=0.134, p<.05) friends and relatives in association with every one 
unit increase in the change in prison admissions. Furthermore, women’s reports of 
community solidarity, a measure of feelings of neighborhood attachment and closeness 
among neighbors, declines by 0.023 (se=0.011, p<.05), which is about a 2% (1.6%) 
decline in the observed scale of women’s community solidarity. Lastly, women’s 
aggregate perceptions of the number of voluntary associations located within their 
neighborhood decreases by 0.071 (se=0.038, p<.10) neighborhood associations in relation 
to every one unit increase in the change in prison admission rates.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Also shown within Table 4, men experience declines in different types of social 
capital, namely neighboring, in association with a change in prison admissions compared 
to women. More specifically, a one unit increase in the change in prison admissions is 
associated with a 0.010 (se=0.005, p<.10) decline in men’s general neighboring, a 
measure of neighbor engagement (equivalent to a 2.0% decline on men’s observed scale 
of general neighboring). In addition, a one unit increase in the change in prison 
admissions is also associated with a significant decrease in men’s defensive neighboring 
(b= -0.010, se=0.004, p<.05), a measure of residents’ investment in the security of their 
neighbor’s homes (equivalent to a 2.1% decline).  
Models with additional controls, adding the neighborhood crime rate and 
neighborhood population, confirm the significant results for women’s and men’s social 
capital and are presented in Appendix C.41 Appendix B presents models for women’s and 
                                                          
41Nearly all (91.7%) of the significant findings produced by the neighborhood-level models (for prison 
admissions and releases) were replicated within models containing additional controls; only one (the 
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men’s physical and human capital with additional controls (although no significant 
findings for these outcomes were reported in the main models). The confirmation of 
findings for models with addition controls and neighborhood crime rate, in particular, 
provides evidence in support of the correct causal ordering of variables. Since controlling 
for crime acts as a proxy for previous measures of capital and the significance of the 
association between prison admissions and included outcomes remains after controlling 
for crime, the possibility of the reverse ordering of variables is diminished with 
confirmation of these results. 
Concerning the gendered nature of the findings for women’s and men’s social 
capital, all of the coefficients for prison admissions and women’s and men’s social capital 
are in the same direction and all are negative (meaning deleterious). However, the 
magnitude of the association between prison admissions and general neighboring is 
significantly gendered as shown by the Clogg test (z=1.33, p<.10). Men’s decline in 
general neighboring is stronger than women’s. While the associated decline for men is 
2% on men’s scale of general neighboring, the decline for women is equivalent to 0.7% 
on women’s scale of general neighboring (non-significant). 
Research Question 2: Consequences of Prison Admissions for Social Control  
The next set of results pertains to Research Question 2, “Are women’s and men’s 
neighborhood-level forms of social control affected by prison admissions?” These 
findings are reported in Table 5.  
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                                             
association between prison releases and the proportion of men who are out of the workforce) of the 12 
significant effects found within the neighborhood-level models is non-significant in models containing 
additional controls. 
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First, a significant finding for women is present. A change in prison admissions is 
associated with a significant decline in women’s aggregated informal social control 
efforts (b= -0.010, se=0.006, p<.10), which includes respondents’ perceptions of their 
neighbors’ willingness to approach a crime scenario themselves or to involve another 
neighbor for help. This finding equates to a 1.8% decrease in the perceptions of women’s 
informal social control efforts in association with every one unit increase in the change in 
prison admissions. 
Concerning men, their initiation of formal social control, or their perception of 
neighbors’ willingness to call the police, significantly decreases (b= -0.006, se=0.003, 
p<.05) in association with a change in prison admissions. This decrease is equivalent to a 
2.2% decline in men’s formal social control in association with every one unit increase in 
the change in prison admissions.42 
 Research Question 2 also asks, of the significant findings, ‘Are these effects 
gendered?’ Based on the Clogg equality of coefficients test, reported in the bottom row of 
Table 5, both the effect of prison admissions on informal social control (z= -1.50, p<.10) 
and the effect of prison admissions on formal social control (z=1.67, p<.05) are 
significantly gendered.43 In fact, the association between prison admissions and men’s 
informal social control and prison admissions and women’s formal social control, 
although not significant, are in the opposite direction (positive) than the significant 
negative associations between prison admissions and women’s informal social control 
                                                          
42The addition of neighborhood crime, neighborhood population, and lack of police response, did not 
change the significance of the associations found among prison admissions and social control for women 
and men. Models including these controls are reported in Appendix D. 
43Given that the present study’s Clogg test n=60 (30 aggregations of women and 30 aggregations of men) 
may be considered small with the potential to violate the assumption of a normal distribution required by 
the Clogg test an equality of coefficients test for small samples (see Cohen, 1983) was also estimated for 
this and other neighborhood-level results. Findings of this test were non-significant. 
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and prison admissions and men’s formal social control, indicating both substantively and 
statistically that the impacts of prison admissions on social control are gendered. 
Specifically, men experience approximately a 0.2% increase in informal social control 
(non-significant) compared to the 1.8% decline that women experience and women 
experience no change (b= 0.00) in formal social control (non-significant) compared to the 
2.2% decline that men experience in association with a change in prison admissions. 
Mediating Relationships 
Research Question 3: Mediation by Women’s and Men’s Forms of Capital in the 
Relationship between Prison Admissions and Social Control  
 Now that the first criteria of mediation, establishing the significant direct 
associations between prison admissions and social control and the second criteria for 
mediation, establishing the significant direct associations among prison admissions and 
potential mediators, have been established, the analysis can proceed to answer Research 
Question 3, with respect to prison admissions and neighborhood-level forms of capital, 
which asks ‘Do women’s and men’s neighborhood-level capital mediate the relationship 
between prison admissions and neighborhood-level social control?’ Although this 
question cannot be answered with specific regards to gender with the use of significance 
testing, such as the Clogg test for direct effects, this step will establish whether women or 
men provide more domains of capital capable of explaining the relationship between 
prison admissions and social control.  
Mediation 
Since both women’s informal social control and men’s formal social control were 
found to be significantly related to prison admissions (Figure 5, path #1) both of these 
relationships will be explored further within the mediation analysis. First, the potential 
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mediators that were found to be significantly related to prison admissions (Figure 5, path 
#2; see Tables 3 and 4) will be tested to see if they are also related to women’s informal 
social control (Figure 5, path #3). As shown in Tables 3 and 4, prison admissions are 
significantly related to women’s marriage, social ties, community solidarity, and 
perceptions of voluntary associations, as well as men’s general and defensive 
neighboring. These potential mediators are included in Table 6. The top portion of the 
table, labeled “Women’s Informal Social Control,” presents each variable’s association 
with women’s informal social control.  
 [Table 6 about here] 
As shown in Table 6, women’s marriage, social ties, community solidarity, and 
perceptions of voluntary associations are significantly associated with women’s informal 
social control. Therefore, these variables will be further examined in the mediation 
analysis. Similarly, the association between these potential mediators and men’s formal 
social control are examined in the bottom portion of Table 6, labeled “Men’s Initiation of 
Formal Social Control.” As shown, women’s aggregated income and social ties are 
significantly associated with men’s formal social control. 
Next, the significant forms of social capital from Table 6 are further examined in 
order to determine which of them reduce the coefficient for prison admissions once 
entered into models estimating women’s informal social control and men’s formal social 
control, respectively. Table 7 reports these findings. Model 1 contains prison admissions, 
concentrated disadvantage, and residential mobility.44 Each subsequent model includes a 
single potential mediator, which was found to be significantly associated with either 
                                                          
44Models excluding concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility produce substantively similar 
results (results not shown). 
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women’s informal social control or men’s formal social control (as reported in Table 6), 
respectively.  
[Table 7 about here] 
As seen in the upper portion of the Table 7, labeled “Women’s Informal Social 
Control,” the coefficient for prison admissions is reduced to non-significance when each 
of the potential mediators is introduced. The bottom portion of Table 7, labeled “Men’s 
Formal Social Control,” also reveals that both of the potential mediators reduce the 
coefficient for prison admissions to non-significance. The reduction in the coefficient for 
prison admissions with the addition of each potential mediator signifies that the potential 
mediator may be accounting for a portion of the direct relationship between prison 
admissions and the respective form of social control, thereby reducing the direct 
relationship. However, the reduction in the coefficient is not conclusive evidence for 
mediation and it cannot be concluded as significant without further examination.  
Mediation: Bootstrapping Analysis 
 A bootstrapping mediation test is used to generate a 90% confidence interval 
surrounding 1,000 estimates of the indirect effect of prison admissions on each 
significant outcome (i.e. women’s informal social control and men’s formal social 
control) through each mediator, while controlling for concentrated disadvantage and 
residential mobility.45 When zero does not fall within the 90% confidence interval, it can 
be concluded that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero at p<.10 (two-
tailed) and that the mediation is significant.  
                                                          
45Bootstrapping tests which did not include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility produced 
substantively similar results (results not shown). 
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In line with gendered coercive mobility theory, women’s social capital 
significantly mediates the relationship between prison admissions and social control. 
Specifically, the bootstrapping analysis reveals that women’s aggregated marriage rates 
significantly mediate the association found between prison admissions and women’s 
informal social control. The 90% confidence interval, (-0.0212, -0.0020), does not 
include zero, meaning that it can be concluded that the indirect effect is different from 
zero. In addition, women’s aggregated social ties also significantly mediate the 
association between prison admissions and women’s informal social control, which can 
be interpreted from the confidence interval: (-0.0092, -0.0003).  
As for the relationship between prison admissions and men’s formal social 
control, none of the potential mediators were found to significantly mediate this 
association. All of the bootstrapping intervals for the mediators in the relationship 
between prison admissions and men’s formal social control contained zero. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that the indirect effect is significantly different from zero at p<.10 
(two-tailed) and that the mediation is significant. 
Summary of Findings for Prison Admissions at the Neighborhood-level  
 In sum, prison admissions are significantly associated with impacts to women’s 
and men’s social capital and social control at the neighborhood-level. As hypothesized by 
gendered coercive mobility theory, more domains of women’s social capital are affected 
by prison admissions compared to men’s. As depicted in Figure 3 (boxes 9, 3 and 4), 
prison admissions are associated with a decline in women’s marriage rates, social ties, 
community solidarity, and their perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations and 
informal social control efforts at the neighborhood-level. Prison admissions are also 
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negatively correlated with impacts to men’s general and defensive neighboring, as well as 
their perception of residents’ initiation of formal social control at the neighborhood-level 
(Figure 3, boxes 9, 6, and 7). Moreover, general neighboring, informal social control, and 
formal social control were found to be significantly gendered.  
In line with gendered coercive mobility theory, women’s social capital, 
specifically aggregated marriage rates and social ties, significantly mediate the 
relationship between a change in prison admissions and women’s aggregated informal 
social control (see Figure 3, boxes 9, 3 and 4). However, the relationship between prison 
admissions and men’s aggregated initiation of formal social control was not significantly 
mediated by any of the included forms of aggregated social capital. Also in line with the 
theory, men’s capital does less to explain the relationship between prison admissions and 
social control compared to women’s capital since none of men’s aggregated forms of 
capital significantly mediated the relationship between prison admissions and social 
control. 
PRISON RELEASES 
 Similar analyses are repeated in order to answer Research Questions 1-3. These 
analyses are estimated with respect to prison releases at the neighborhood-level. Prison 
releases are likely to have differential effects since they return formerly incarcerated 
persons, although likely suffering from stigma, reduced job prospects, 
institutionalization, and strained relationships as a result of their incarceration 
experiences, to the neighborhood to possibly fill holes in the social fabric created by their 
removal. Therefore, their return has the potential to bring some positive effects to 
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community residents, in addition to negative ones associated with residential mobility 
and the turmoil caused by the incarceration experience.  
Direct Relationships 
Research Question 1: Consequences of Prison Releases for Forms of Capital  
Physical and Human Capital 
 Table 8 presents the findings relevant to prison releases and physical and human 
capital for Research Question 1, which asks, ‘Are women’s and men’s neighborhood-
level forms of capital affected by prison releases?’ Significant findings are present for the 
association between prison releases and both women’s and men’s human capital—but not 
physical capital. Findings reveal that changes in prison releases are associated with 
consequences for women’s feelings of neighborhood safety. More specifically, a change 
in prison release rates is associated with a 1.2% increase in women’s unsafe perceptions 
of the neighborhood (b=0.004, se=0.002, p<.10). This finding is counter to the hypothesis 
that men’s ties may fulfil a supervisory capacity that is removed once incarcerated, but is 
not completely unexpected at the neighborhood-level since the return of an aggregate 
group of unknown men may be viewed as a threat.  
In addition, prison releases are associated with a 1.1% increase (b= 0.011, 
se=0.006, p<.10) in the percentage of working age men who are out of the workforce.46 
This finding is in line with previous research, showing that incarceration not only results 
in declining career prospects for men following incarceration (Freeman, 1992; Geller, 
Garfinkel, and Western, 2011; Pager, 2003), but also has negative implications for the 
employment prospects of community residents and the neighborhood economy (Browne, 
                                                          
46The association between prison releases and men’s out of the workforce is not significant in a model with 
neighborhood crime and population and should be interpreted with caution (see Appendix B). 
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1997; Huebner, 2005; Rose and Clear, 1998; Western and Beckett, 1999), as 
hypothesized within the gendered theory of coercive mobility.47 
 [Table 8 about here] 
Relevant to the gendered portion of Research Question 1, ‘Are the effects of 
prison admissions to women’s and men’s forms of capital significantly different from one 
another?,’ the Clogg test, reported in the bottom row of Table 8, reveals that the 
association between prison releases and being out of the workforce is significantly 
gendered (z= -2.57, p<.01). While men experience a 1.1% increase in their percentage 
out of the workforce in association with a change in prison releases, for women, the 
association is in the opposite direction, although not significant (1.2% decrease; b= -
0.007). 
Social Capital 
 Research Question 1, also asks, ‘Are women’s and men’s forms of social capital 
affected by prison releases?’ as well as, ‘Are these effects gendered?’ Findings regarding 
the association between prison releases and social capital are reported in Table 9. Prisons 
releases are significantly associated with a 0.055 (se=0.025, p<.05) decline in the number 
of voluntary associations that women report being present within their neighborhoods.48 
However, with respect to gender, this effect is not significantly different for women and 
men based on the Clogg test. 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
                                                          
47The significant associations among prison releases and women’s and men’s human capital (with the 
exception of men’s out of the workforce) were confirmed in models with additional controls (see Appendix 
B). 
48After adding additional controls for neighborhood crime and neighborhood population this finding 
remained significant (see Appendix C).  
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Research Question 2: Consequences of Prison Releases for Social Control  
 Significant findings are also present for the association between the change in 
prison releases and social control at the neighborhood-level, shown in Table 10. 
Although, prison admissions are significantly associated with an impact to women’s 
social control, no significant associations were found between prison releases and 
women’s social control. In addition, unlike the impact of prison admissions, which are 
significantly associated with a decline in men’s formal social control, men’s aggregated 
perceptions of informal social control significantly increase in association with changes 
in prison releases. More specifically, a one unit increase in the release rate is associated 
with a 1.4% increase in the observed scale of men’s aggregated perceptions of informal 
social control (b= 0.011, se=0.004, p<.01).49 
 [Table 10 about here] 
With regards to gender, the Clogg equality of coefficients test reveals that the 
effect of prison releases on informal social control (z= -2.65, p<.01) is significantly 
different for women and men. Women experience approximately a 0.7% decline in 
informal social control (b = -0.004, non-significant) compared to the 1.4% increase that 
men experience in association with prison releases. Interestingly, although the direct 
effects of releases on formal social control for women and men are non-significant, the 
directionality of these effects are in opposition to one another and the Clogg test reveals 
that they are in fact gendered (z=1.50, p<.10).  
 
                                                          
49Models including additional controls (neighborhood crime, neighborhood population, and lack of police 
response) are reported in Appendix D. The addition of controls did not change the significance of the 
reported results. 
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Mediating Relationships 
Research Question 3: Mediation by Women’s and Men’s Forms of Capital in the 
Relationship between Prison Releases and Social Control  
 Research Question 3, with respect to prison releases and neighborhood-level 
forms of capital, specifically asks, ‘Do women’s and men’s neighborhood-level capital 
(human and social) mediate the relationship between prison releases and neighborhood-
level social control?’ 
Mediation 
Table 11 presents models estimating mediation criterion three. Specifically, the 
models are estimating the association between each potential mediator that is 
significantly associated with prison releases (see Tables 8 and 9) and men’s informal 
social control (see Figure 5, path #3), which is also significantly associated with prison 
releases (see Table 10). As shown in the table, women’s aggregated perceptions of the 
presence of voluntary associations in their neighborhoods and men’s aggregated being 
out of the workforce are significantly associated with men’s informal social control and 
will be further tested for mediation. 
[Table 11 about here] 
 The potential mediators (from Table 11) are entered into the models containing 
prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, and residential mobility presented in Table 
12.50 As shown, the coefficient for prison releases is reduced slightly with the addition of 
women’s aggregated perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations, as well as 
with the addition of men’s aggregated being out of the workforce, although it remains 
significant in each model. This indicates that the relationship between prison releases and 
                                                          
50Models excluding concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility produce substantively similar 
results (results not shown). 
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the potential mediators may be accounting for some of the relationship between prison 
releases and men’s informal social control. However, the reduced coefficient for prison 
releases does not establish that the mediation is significant in either case.  
[Table 12 about here] 
Mediation: Bootstrapping Analysis 
 Each potential mediator is further examined within a bootstrapping analysis, 
including prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and the 
potential mediator.51 The resulting bootstrapped 90% confidence interval produced by 
estimating the indirect effect of prison releases on men’s informal social control through 
women’s aggregated perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations does not 
include zero (.0007, .0060), indicating that the indirect effect is not equal to zero and that 
the mediation is significant. However, the interval produced using men’s aggregated 
being out of the workforce does include zero (-.0009, .0112) and therefore, does not 
indicate significant mediation. 
Summary of Findings for Prison Releases at the Neighborhood-level  
 In sum, prison releases are significantly associated with impacts to women’s 
human and social capital, as well as men’s human capital and informal social control at 
the neighborhood-level. Somewhat contrary to the proposed theory, which hypothesized 
that the removal of men’s ties may diminish women’s safety, prison releases are 
associated with an increase in women’s unsafe perceptions of the neighborhood. 
Furthermore, prison releases are associated with a decline in women’s perceptions of the 
presence of voluntary associations within their neighborhoods, as hypothesized and 
                                                          
51Confidence intervals were also estimated without the inclusion of concentrated disadvantage and 
residential mobility. These intervals produced substantively similar results (results not shown). 
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depicted in Figure 3 (boxes 9 and 3). Also in line with gendered coercive mobility theory, 
prison releases are significantly associated with an increase in the proportion of working 
age men who are not in the workforce (Figure 3, boxes 9 and 6). Finally, prison releases 
are associated with an increase in men’s perception of the initiation of formal social 
control, indicating a positive or beneficial impact of releases on community social 
control, distinct from the deleterious effects of prison admissions. Of the significant 
associations, being out of the workforce and informal social control were found to be 
significantly gendered.  
As with prison admissions, women’s aggregated capital, specifically their 
perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations, mediates the association between a 
change in prison releases and social control, specifically men’s aggregated informal 
social control (Figure 3, boxes 9, 3, and 7). Men’s forms of capital did not mediate the 
relationships among prison releases and social control (Figure 3, boxes 9, 6, 4 and 7).  
SUMMARY OF NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL FINDINGS  
Overall, incarceration is associated with impacts to women’s and men’s forms of 
capital, as well as forms of social control at the neighborhood-level. Prison admissions, in 
particular, are associated with more numerous deleterious effects to women’s capital 
compared to men’s. In addition, women’s social capital, significantly mediates the 
relationships between incarceration and women’s and men’s informal social control, 
while men’s capital does not. Finally, regarding gendered differences, all significant 
associations between incarceration and women’s and men’s informal and formal social 
control are significantly different for women and men, while the neighborhood-level 
findings regarding gender and forms of capital are more mixed. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 13 reports descriptive statistics for women and men separately at the 
individual-level. Many differences exist by gender (those highlighted in bold represent 
statistically significant differences). For instance, a significantly higher proportion of 
women (9.6%) report being out of the workforce compared to men (5.5%). However, no 
significant gender differences exist for educational attainment. Overall, the sample is 
fairly educated, with 82.2% of women and 83.6% of men reporting high school 
completion/GED equivalency. On average, women significantly perceive of their 
neighborhoods as more unsafe (mean=0.58, sd=0.25) compared to men (mean=0.43, 
sd=0.30), yet women report significantly higher levels of community solidarity 
(mean=2.96, sd=0.64) and engagement in reprimanding neighborhood children (50.4%) 
compared to men (mean of community solidarity=2.80, sd=0.63; percentage engaged in 
reprimanding neighborhood children=41.0%). 
[Table 13 about here] 
BIVARIATE ANALYSES 
Table 14 reports the bivariate correlations among individual-level variables. Key 
differences in the correlations at the individual and neighborhood-level indicate that these 
relationships operate differently at various stages as coercive mobility unfolds. For 
example, informal social control and the initiation of formal social control are weakly 
correlated (r= .20, p< .01) at the individual-level, yet shared no relationship in the 
aggregate form. The lack of an aggregate relationship is unexpected given coercive 
mobility theory’s description of their inter-reliance (Clear, 2007; Rose and Clear, 1998). 
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In addition, several forms of social capital are related at the individual-level, but not at 
the neighborhood-level. For example, social ties is significantly correlated with the 
presence of voluntary associations (r= .30, p< .01) and community solidarity (r= .26, p< 
.01) at the individual-level, but these measures are unrelated in the aggregate. Other 
associations present among the aggregated variables are not related at the individual-
level. For example, measures of high school completion and not in workforce are not 
significantly related for individuals, although they are inversely and moderately 
correlated at the neighborhood-level (r= -.47, p< .01). Similarly, marriage and well-being 
are unrelated at the individual-level, but are moderately correlated among the aggregated 
variables (r= .37, p< .05).  
On the contrary, some bivariate relationships are consistent across levels. For 
instance, general neighboring and defensive neighboring are significantly correlated (r= 
.42, p<. 01) at the individual-level, as well as at the neighborhood-level. Interestingly, 
reprimanding neighborhood children is not associated with informal social control or the 
initiation of formal social control at either level. These key differences and similarities 
can be statistically modeled using multi-level multivariate models. 
 [Table 14 about here] 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Similar to the neighborhood-level results, Research Questions 1-3 are answered 
by way of a direct and mediation analysis, using multi-level models to estimate the 
effects of prison admissions and releases on women’s and men’s individual-level forms 
of capital and social control. First, unconditional models without predictors were 
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estimated for each outcome.52 All subsequent models control for concentrated 
disadvantage and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, 
homeownership, and the presence of children within the household at the individual-
level. Concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility and age, are grand mean centered, 
while race, homeownership, and the presence of children within the household are left 
uncentered. Models include 700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods.53  
PRISON ADMISSIONS 
Direct Relationships 
Research Question 1: Consequences of Prison Admissions for Forms of Capital  
Results pertaining to Research Question 1 at the individual-level are reported in 
the sections that follow. Specifically, Research Question 1 asks, ‘Are women’s and men’s 
individual-level forms of capital (physical, human, and social) affected by prison 
admissions?’ as well as the follow-up question, ‘Are the effects of prison admissions to 
women’s and men’s forms of capital significantly different from one another?’ or in other 
words, ‘Are they significantly gendered?’  
Physical and Human Capital 
 Impacts to women’s physical capital and men’s human capital are significantly 
associated with a change in prison admissions, as shown in Table 15. Specifically, 
                                                          
52The proportion of variance occurring between female-aggregated neighborhoods or the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) ranges from .0005 (social ties) to .1494 (income) among linear models 
(average ICC= .0535) and from .0010 (not in the workforce) to .5265 (reprimanding neighborhood 
children) among the Bernoulli models (average ICC= .3028). For male aggregated models, the ICC ranges 
from .0001 (informal social control) to .2010 (income) among linear models (average ICC= .0656) and 
from .0001 (property victimization) to .7922 (not in the workforce) among the Bernoulli models (average 
ICC= .4579). 
53Four respondents were dropped from the analysis due to missing “presence of children within the 
household.” 
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women’s income is associated with a 0.068 (se=0.038, p<.10) decline, equivalent to a 
$340 loss annually, for every one unit increase in the change in prison admissions.  
Curiously, men experience an increase in high school completion, associated with 
an increase in the change in prison admissions. In association with every one unit 
increase in the change in prison admissions, the odds of high school completion for men 
increases by nearly 11% (OR= 1.106, p<.05). This increase in high school completion 
may be a selection effect since the removal of men due to incarceration is likely to 
remove those who are less likely to complete high school, leaving behind a greater 
proportion of men who are more likely to have completed high school within the 
community to be surveyed. 
[Table 15 about here] 
Regarding the gendered nature of these and other multi-level findings, two 
approaches are used. The Clogg test, which was used to assess the neighborhood-level 
findings, is used to assess the gendered nature of findings resulting from each multi-level 
linear model. In addition, since the Clogg test is only appropriate for linear models, an 
additional model containing the interaction term gender*prison admissions (or 
gender*prison releases) is estimated in order to assess the gendered nature of 
dichotomous findings resulting from Bernoulli models. The stratified models are reported 
as the main models for both continuous and dichotomous outcomes, as well as either the 
relevant interaction term (and confidence interval) for Bernoulli models or Clogg test for 
linear models. Shown in the bottom row of Table 15, the Clogg test and estimations of a 
gendered interaction term reveal that the associations between prison admissions and 
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women’s and men’s individual-level physical and human capital are not significantly 
different from one another.  
Social Capital 
 In addition, prison admissions are significantly associated with women’s and 
men’s social capital. These findings are reported in Table 16. As shown, for every one 
unit change in prison admissions women’s perceptions of the number of voluntary 
associations in their neighborhoods declines by 0.050 associations (se=0.022, p<.05).  
Contrary to the proposed gendered theory of coercive mobility, the majority of 
significant associations between prison admissions and individual-level social capital 
occur to men. Men experience a decline in many forms of social capital, including 
general neighboring (b= -0.008, se= 0.003, p<.05), defensive neighboring (b= -0.006, 
se=0.004, p<.10), community solidarity (b= -0.015, se=0.010, p<.10), and their 
perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations in their neighborhood (b= -0.062, 
se=0.022, p<.01), in association with a change in prison admissions.  
Concerning gender, only the association between prison admissions and general 
neighboring is significantly different for women and men based on the Clogg test 
(z=2.00, p<.05), reported in the bottom rows of Table 16. In fact, the effect of prison 
admissions on general neighboring is in the opposite direction for women (positive), 
although not significant, compared to men.  
[Table 16 about here] 
Models estimating the association between prison admissions and physical and 
human capital with the additional controls of total neighborhood crime rate per 100 
residents and the neighborhood population per 1,000 residents are reported in Appendix 
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E. Models estimating the association between prison admissions and social capital with 
controls added are reported in Appendix F. These findings confirm the significance of the 
main models, adding support for the correct causal ordering since controlling for crime 
acts as a proxy for previous measures of capital, reducing the possibility of the reverse 
ordering of variables.54  
Research Question 2: Consequences of Prison Admissions for Social Control  
 Research Question 2 with respect to prison admissions and individual-level social 
control asks, ‘Are women’s and men’s individual-level forms of social control affected 
by prison admissions?’ The corresponding results are presented in Table 17.  
As shown, contrary to gendered coercive mobility theory, no significant 
associations between prison admissions and women’s individual-level forms of social 
control were found. For men, however, a change in prison admissions is associated with a 
significant decline in their individual-level perceptions of formal social control (b= -
0.006, se=0.002, p<.05), referring to residents’ perceptions of neighbors’ willingness to 
call the police.55 
[Table 17 about here] 
The corresponding Clogg equality of coefficients tests and gendered interaction 
terms are reported in the bottom rows of Table 17. As shown, the association between 
prison admissions and men’s formal social control is significantly different from the 
                                                          
54Nearly all (87.5%) of the significant findings produced by the individual-level models (for prison 
admissions and releases) were replicated within models containing additional controls; only two (the 
association between prison releases and women’s high school completion and prison releases and women’s 
informal social control) of the 16 significant effects found within the individual-level models is non-
significant in models containing additional controls. 
55Appendix G reports models estimating the association of prison admissions and social control with 
additional controls. The significance of the main models was confirmed in models with the addition of 
neighborhood crime, neighborhood population, and lack of police response. 
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association between prison admissions and women’s formal social control (z=2.12, 
p<.05). 
Mediating Relationships 
Research Question 3: Mediation by Women’s and Men’s Forms of Capital in the 
Relationship between Prison Admissions and Social Control  
 Research Question 3 asks, ‘Do women’s and men’s neighborhood-level capital 
(physical, human, and social) mediate the relationship between prison admissions and 
individual-level social control?’ Neighborhood-level forms of capital are tested as 
mediators in the relationship between prison admissions and individual-level forms of 
social control since the present study is interested in how neighborhood-level effects of 
incarceration may “feedback” at the individual-level to influence residents’ perceptions 
of social control efforts. These relationships are presented within Figure 5. Within the 
figure, the outcomes of interest in the multi-level mediation analysis are individual-level 
forms of social control.  
Mediation 
 The multi-level mediation analysis begins by establishing criterion three of Baron 
and Kenny’s mediation requirements, determining whether the potential mediator is 
related to the dependent variable (see Figure 5, path #3). To do so, the neighborhood-
aggregated forms of capital found to be directly associated with prison admissions (see 
Tables 3 and 4; Figure 5, path #2) are tested to determine whether they are also 
significantly associated with men’s individual-level formal social control (see Table 17, 
Figure 5, path #3). Table 18 presents these findings. 
[Table 18 about here] 
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As shown in the table, two of the six potential neighborhood-level mediators, 
women’s aggregated social ties and women’s aggregated community solidarity, are 
significantly associated with men’s individual-level formal social control. Therefore, 
these two variables are further examined in the next step, determining mediation criterion 
4. 
 Table 19 presents Model 1, containing only prison admissions and controls, and 
subsequent models (Models 2 and 3) with each potential mediator included. As shown in 
the table, the coefficients for prison admissions are not reduced when women’s 
aggregated social ties and community solidarity are entered into the models. The lack of a 
reduction in the coefficient for prison admissions once entered into the models indicates 
that these variables do not mediate the relationship between prison admissions and men’s 
formal social control.56 
[Table 19 about here] 
Summary of Findings for Prison Admissions at the Individual-level  
 In sum, prison admissions are significantly associated with impacts to women’s 
physical and social capital (see Figure 3, boxes 9 and 2), and men’s human and social 
capital at the individual-level (Figure 3, boxes 9 and 5). Contrary to the gendered theory 
of coercive mobility, men experienced more significant associations among prison 
admissions and domains of capital compared to women. With respect to social control, 
prison admissions only impact men’s formal social control at the individual-level, also 
contrary to the proposed theory. Of these associations, general neighboring and formal 
social control were found to be significantly gendered.  
                                                          
56Quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo intervals confirmed that women’s aggregated social ties and community 
solidarity do not mediate the relationship between prison admissions and men’s individual-level formal 
social control. 
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The multi-level mediation results regarding prison admissions are also contrary to 
the gendered theory of coercive mobility. Surprisingly, none of the included 
neighborhood-level forms of capital, for women or men, were found to mediate the 
significant association between prison admissions and men’s formal social control 
measured at the individual-level (Figure 3, boxes 9, 3, 6, and 7).  
PRISON RELEASES 
Direct Relationships 
Research Question 1: Consequences of Prison Releases for Forms of Capital  
Physical and Human Capital 
 With respect to prison releases and women’s and men’s individual-level forms of 
capital, Research Question 1, ‘Are women’s and men’s individual-level forms of capital 
(physical, human, and social) affected by prison releases?’ is addressed. In addition, the 
findings are followed up with an examination of significant differences in effects 
occurring to women compared to men, answering the question, ‘Are these effects 
gendered?’  
Contrary to gendered coercive mobility theory, no significant associations were 
found between the change in prison releases and women’s physical capital. However, the 
change in prison releases is significantly associated with women’s human capital. As 
shown in Table 20, women’s likelihood of completing high school declines by nearly 2% 
(1.6%) (OR= 0.984, p<.01) in association with every unit increase in the change in prison 
releases. In addition, women’s unsafe perceptions of the neighborhood significantly 
increase (b= 0.004, se= 0.001, p<.01) in association with a change in prison releases. 
Interestingly, the change in prison releases also contributes to beneficial effects for 
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women, as hypothesized. Women’s likelihood of property victimization declines by 
nearly 3% (2.8%) in association with every one unit increase in the change in prison 
releases (OR= 0.972, p<.01).57 
[Table 20 about here] 
Concerning men, no significant associations were found between the change in 
prison releases and their individual-level physical and human capital. Therefore, women 
experience more associations among prison releases and domains of physical and human 
capital compared to men as predicted by the gendered theory of coercive mobility.  
Despite these significant effects to women’s human capital, only the association 
between the change in prison releases and unsafe perceptions of the neighborhood is 
significantly gendered based on the Clogg test (z=1.25, p<.10). Specifically, women’s 
unsafe perceptions of their neighborhood increase by 0.004, while men’s unsafe 
perceptions decrease by 0.001 (non-significant) in association with a one unit change in 
prison releases. 
Social Capital 
 In addition, the association between the change in prison releases and social 
capital is only significant for women, and not men. In association with every one unit 
increase in prison releases, women’s perceptions of the presence of voluntary 
associations in their neighborhoods declines by 0.044 (se=0.020, p<.05) associations, as 
shown in Table 21.58 
                                                          
57Appendix E presents models estimating the association between the change in prison releases and 
women’s and men’s physical and human capital with additional controls. One result, the association 
between prison releases and women’s individual-level high school completion is not confirmed once 
controls are added. Therefore, this result should be interpreted with caution. 
58Models with additional controls estimating the relationship between prison releases and social capital are 
presented in Appendix F. The significance of the main models is confirmed after the addition of the 
neighborhood crime rate and neighborhood population.  
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[Table 21 about here] 
The Clogg test and estimations of models including a gendered interaction term, 
reported in the bottom rows of Table 21, assess the gendered nature of the relationships 
among the change in prison releases and individual-level social capital. As shown, none 
of the associations between prison releases and women’s and men’s social capital are 
significantly gendered.  
Research Question 2: Consequences of Prison Releases for Social Control  
Table 22 presents the associations between the change in prison releases and 
women’s and men’s individual-level social control, controlling for neighborhood-level 
characteristics. As shown, women’s perceptions of neighbors’ informal social control 
efforts significantly decrease in association with a change in prison releases. More 
specifically, a one unit increase in the change in release rates is associated with a 0.003 
decline (se= 0.002, p<.10) in women’s perceptions of informal social control. In addition, 
prison releases are also associated with effects to women’s perceptions of formal social 
control. Specifically, every unit increase in the change in prison releases is associated 
with a 0.002 increase in women’s perceptions of formal social control (se=0.001, p<.10).  
Finally, a change in prison releases is associated with men’s perceptions of 
informal social control at the individual-level. Men’s informal social control increases by 
0.009 (se=0.003, p<.01) in association with every unit increase in the change in prison 
releases.59  
[Table 22 about here]  
                                                          
59Models estimating social control with additional controls confirmed the results for women’s formal social 
control and men’s informal social control. However, the significance of the association between prison 
releases and women’s informal social control was not confirmed in a model containing neighborhood crime 
rate, neighborhood population, and lack of police response. Therefore, caution should be used when 
interpreting this result. These models are reported in Appendix G. 
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The Clogg equality of coefficients test reveals that the association between prison 
releases and informal social control is significantly gendered (z= -3.33, p<.01). In 
addition, the association between prison releases and formal social control is also 
significantly gendered (z=2.86, p<.01). In both cases, the effects for women and men are 
in the opposite direction. Specifically, prison releases are associated with a decrease in 
women’s informal social control and an increase in men’s informal social control, as well 
as an increase in women’s formal social control and a decrease in men’s formal social 
control (non-significant). 
Mediating Relationships 
Research Question 3: Mediation by Women’s and Men’s Forms of Capital in the 
Relationship between Prison Releases and Social Control  
 The multi-level mediation analysis, with regards to prison releases, seeks to 
answer Research Question 3, ‘Do women’s and men’s neighborhood-level capital 
mediate the relationship between prison releases and individual-level social control?’ 
Mediation 
Table 23 presents the multi-level mediation analysis for prison releases, in which, 
each potential neighborhood-level mediator that is significantly associated with a change 
in prison releases (i.e., women’s unsafe perception of the neighborhood, women’s 
perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations, and men’s being out of the 
workforce) (see Tables 8 and 9, Figure 5, path #2) is tested to determine if it has a 
significant association with the significant individual-level outcomes (i.e., women’s 
informal social control, women’s formal social control, and men’s informal social 
control) (Figure 5, path #3).  
[Table 23 about here] 
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As shown in the top portion of Table 23, labeled “Women’s Informal Social 
Control,” women’s aggregated presence of voluntary associations is significantly related 
to women’s individual-level informal social control. Also shown in Table 23, in the 
portion labeled “Women’s Initiation of Formal Social Control,” women’s aggregated 
unsafe perception of the neighborhood is significantly related to women’s individual-
level formal social control. Lastly, of the tested potential neighborhood-level mediators 
among the association between a change in prison releases and men’s individual-level 
informal social control, two are significant. Shown in the bottom portion of Table 23, 
labeled “Men’s Informal Social Control,” women’s aggregated presence of voluntary 
associations and men’s aggregated out of workforce are significantly related to men’s 
individual-level informal social control. 
 Next, the potential mediators are entered into their respective models to determine 
if their addition results in a reduction in the coefficient for prison releases. First, women’s 
aggregated presence of voluntary associations is added to a model estimating women’s 
individual-level informal social control containing prison releases, concentrated 
disadvantage, and residential mobility, as well as individual-level controls. Table 24 
presents these results. As shown, the coefficient for the change in prison releases is 
reduced to non-significance in Model 2 when women’s aggregated presence of voluntary 
associations is entered into the model, indicating potential mediation.  
[Table 24 about here] 
 This step is repeated for the estimation of women’s formal social control by 
adding the significant neighborhood-level mediator, women’s unsafe perception of the 
neighborhood. In this case, the coefficient for incarceration is not reduced and actually 
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increases in level of significance as shown in Table 24. Since women’s aggregated unsafe 
perception of the neighborhood did not reduce the coefficient for prison releases, it can 
be concluded that it does not mediate the association found between prison releases and 
women’s initiation of formal social control and is not further examined.60  
 Finally, the significant neighborhood-level mediators are added to the models 
predicting men’s informal social control, also shown in Table 24. The coefficient for 
prison releases is marginally reduced upon the addition of each mediator, although it 
remains significant.  
Mediation: Monte Carlo Confidence Intervals  
 The potential mediators used to predict both women’s and men’s informal social 
control are further examined using Quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo Confidence Intervals, 
estimated with models including prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential 
mobility, and the potential mediator at the neighborhood-level.61 Concerning the 
association between the change in prison releases and women’s informal social control, 
women’s aggregated perceptions of the presence of voluntary associations includes zero 
within the 90% confidence interval (-0.004, 0.001), indicating that the indirect effect is 
equal to zero and that the mediation is not significant. In addition, none of the potential 
neighborhood-level mediators used in the analysis of men’s informal social control 
produced confidence intervals that exclude zero, indicating that no significant mediation 
is present for this outcome.  
                                                          
60Quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo Intervals generated by models including concentrated disadvantage and 
residential mobility as neighborhood-level controls provided further evidence that mediation was not 
significant. However, intervals produced excluding these controls indicated significant mediation (interval: 
(-0.00237, -0.00002), p<.10). 
61Confidence intervals were also estimated without the inclusion of concentrated disadvantage and 
residential mobility. These intervals produced substantively similar results (results not shown). 
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Summary of Findings for Prison Releases at the Individual-level  
 Prison releases are significantly associated with impacts to women’s human and 
social capital (see Figure 3, boxes 9 and 2) and men’s social capital (Figure 3, boxes 9 
and 5) at the individual-level. As hypothesized by gendered coercive mobility theory, 
more domains of women’s capital are impacted by prison releases compared to men’s. In 
addition, prison releases are related to women’s informal and formal social control, as 
well as men’s informal social control. Of the significant associations, unsafe view of the 
neighborhood, informal social control, and formal social control were found to be 
significantly gendered.  
Contrary to gendered coercive mobility theory, women’s aggregated capital does 
not mediate the associations between prison releases and social control measured at the 
individual-level (Figure 3, boxes 9, 3, 4, and 7). However, none of men’s forms of capital 
were found to mediate this relationship either (Figure 3, boxes 9, 6, 4, and 7). 
SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL FINDINGS  
Taking prison admissions and releases together, incarceration spans to impact 
more of women’s forms of capital, including physical, human, and social capital, 
compared to men’s (human and social). In addition, both women and men are impacted in 
terms of their individual-level forms of social control (i.e., informal and formal). None of 
the potential neighborhood-level forms of capital for women or men mediated the 
association between incarceration and social control at the individual-level.  
As with the neighborhood-level, all of the significant associations between 
incarceration and women’s and men’s informal and formal social control are significantly 
  
124 
 
gendered. However, the individual-level findings regarding gender and forms of capital 
are more mixed. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FULL STORY: COMBINING INDIVIDUAL AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL FINDINGS 
Careful review of the direct, gendered, and mediating relationships among 
incarceration and women’s and men’s capital and social control, reveals considerable 
support for the gendered theory of coercive mobility. To begin, the direct relationships 
examined in the present study reveal that incarceration is a contributor to a host of 
negative implications for communities and community members who already face 
numerous obstacles, a point which is strongly cited in extant work (see, for example, 
Hagan and Coleman, 2001; Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999; Wacquant, 1998; Wildeman and 
Western, 2010). Furthermore, the period under study takes place during the first half of a 
(thus far) four-decade long rise in national incarceration rates, bringing added concern 
regarding the accumulation of consequences that incarceration has on these vulnerable 
communities and residents. Specifically, results show that individuals who are not 
incarcerated are affected in terms of their physical, human, and social capital, as well as 
in ways that are related to further crime and criminal justice processes, including 
reporting and responding to crime in their communities.  
The direct effects of incarceration on women’s (see Figure 3, boxes 9, 2, and 3) 
and men’s forms of capital and social control (see Figure 3, boxes 9, 5, and 6), paint an 
interesting picture worthy of further investigation. Figure 8 provides a summary of the 
impacts of prison admissions at both levels of analysis. Here, the associations between 
admissions and women’s forms of capital and social control are labeled with a “(w),” 
those for men are labeled with an “(m),” and associations present for both women and 
men are labeled with a “(b).” 
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[Figure 8 about here] 
As shown, most of the significant associations between prison admissions and 
individual-level forms of capital occur for men. On the other hand, most of the significant 
associations between prison admissions and neighborhood-level forms of capital (social 
is the only significant form) occur for women. In addition, only men’s social control is 
affected by prison admissions at the individual-level, while both women’s and men’s 
social control are impacted at the neighborhood-level. Perhaps this is the case because 
women make up the majority of the population who remain in the community, 
experiencing a more aggregated impact, while men may experience prison admissions 
within the community as more personal, with a greater potential to be incarcerated 
themselves.  
 Similar to Figure 8, Figure 9 provides a summary of the associations between 
prison releases and included outcomes at both levels. As shown, four out of the five 
significant associations between prison releases and individual-level forms of capital are 
significant for women, as well as two of the three associations at the neighborhood-level, 
suggesting that the women who have remained within the community are likely to be 
personally impacted by prison returns, as well as experience an aggregate impact of 
returning offenders. In contrast to the findings regarding prison admissions, women 
experience more significant associations between prison releases and social control at the 
individual-level, while men experience the only significant direct association among 
prison releases and social control at the neighborhood-level. Therefore, the opposite may 
be true regarding releases, women may experience prison releases as more personal, since 
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they are often the ones personally anticipating the return of a former inmate, while men 
experience return as an aggregate phenomenon.  
[Figure 9 about here] 
Overall, the direct relationships examined within the present study show that 
women are negatively impacted by incarceration in their communities in terms of their 
physical, human, and social capital, as well as in terms of their social control efforts, 
consistent with gendered coercive mobility theory. In addition, men are impacted in 
numerous ways that also deserve serious attention from future work and future policy 
implementers.  
Furthermore, the results confirm that the ways in which male and female residents 
respond to incarceration in their communities diverge, particularly regarding their 
perceptions of social control. Shown in Figures 8 and 9, underlined forms of capital and 
social control indicate that the association is significantly gendered, meaning that the 
effect of incarceration is significantly different for women and men. Within Figure 8, all 
of the associations between prison admissions and forms of social control (individual-
level formal and neighborhood-level formal and informal) are significantly gendered. In 
addition, the associations between prison releases and social control (formal and 
informal) are significantly gendered at both levels, as shown in Figure 9. These 
relationships are central given social control’s ability to influence neighborhood crime 
(Bursik and Grasmik, 1993).  
Furthermore, two gendered findings in particular, the negative association 
between prison admissions and women’s informal social control at the neighborhood-
level and the negative association between prison releases and women’s informal social 
  
128 
 
control at the individual-level, are particularly important to acknowledge given extant 
work showing that women’s informal social control networks may be more important for 
reducing violent crime relative to men’s networks (Rountree and Warner, 1999). 
Specifically, incarceration’s negative impact to women’s social control efforts has the 
potential to contribute to further crime and prison cycling, exacerbating the problems that 
incarceration is intended to fix (Rose and Clear, 1998).  
 Although gendered findings regarding social control are consistent with gendered 
coercive mobility theory, the results offer only a partial confirmation of the gendered 
theory of coercive mobility as it relates to residents’ forms of capital. The study did not 
find support that many of the associations between incarceration and residents’ forms of 
capital significantly vary by gender at either the neighborhood or individual-level. Shown 
in Figure 8, the association between prison admissions and general neighboring is 
significantly gendered at both levels. In addition, the associations between prison releases 
and some types of human capital (unsafe view of the neighborhood at the individual-level 
and not in the workforce at the neighborhood-level) are significantly gendered, as shown 
in Figure 9. However, many of the significant direct findings for residents’ capital are not 
significantly gendered.  
Finally, support was found for the addition of women’s forms of capital as 
potential mediators or a mechanism to explain the relationship between incarceration and 
social control (see Figure 3, boxes 9, 3, and 4), the heart of the proposed gendered 
coercive mobility theory. Figures 8 and 9 present these relationships, with the measures 
included in the mediating relationships contained in boxes with connecting arrows to 
signify the mediating relationships. Women’s social capital (marriage, social ties, and the 
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presence of voluntary associations) significantly mediates the relationship between 
incarceration and social control at the neighborhood-level. However, none of the included 
forms of men’s capital significantly mediate this relationship. This finding supports the 
proposed theory, in that, the impact of incarceration to women’s capital (specifically, 
social capital) has important implications for neighborhood-level social control as 
hypothesized. Therefore, it is crucial that an examination of the implications of 
incarceration for female residents’ is incorporated into the research agendas of future 
policy and community crime reduction efforts.  
Finally, the multi-level mediation analysis revealed that neighborhood-level 
impacts of incarceration do not appear to feedback at the individual-level as hypothesized 
by gendered coercive mobility theory (see Figure 4, relationship #4; or see also, Figure 3, 
boxes 9, 3, and 2). However, temporal ordering may have limited the potential to capture 
this unraveling of events since this may be an effect that takes several years to unfold. 
Therefore, future research should aim to examine these relationships further.  
In addition to the study’s core emphasis on impacts to women and men, divergent 
findings also emerged regarding prison admissions and releases that are worth noting. 
Shown in Figure 9, while the consequences of prison releases for residents’ forms of 
capital are mostly deleterious, prison releases also have the beneficial effect of reducing 
women’s individual-level property victimization. In addition, the nearly consistent 
positive findings associated with prison releases and social control, along with the 
consistently negative associations between prison admissions and social control provide 
initial support for policies that aim to curtail incarceration rates through targeted release 
strategies. These findings distinguish the impacts of prison admissions from releases and 
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highlight a potential avenue for future research to explore additional ‘benefits’ of releases 
that could aid community residents.  
Overall, support is drawn for gendered coercive mobility. Mainly, the significance 
of women’s social capital as a mediator in the relationship between incarceration and 
social capital, as well as the numerous significant direct associations between 
incarceration and women’s capital, as well as the consistency of findings regarding the 
gendered nature of the association between incarceration and social control contribute to 
confirmation of the main components of gendered coercive mobility theory. Not without 
its dissention, some findings, including the lack of gendered differences concerning 
forms of capital and the absence of a “feedback” effect of neighborhood-level forms of 
capital on individual-level social control, provide opportunities to examine these areas 
further in future work rather than diminish the theories main premises. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The data used in the present study provide a valuable opportunity to examine the 
consequences of incarceration for women’s and men’s capital and social control, as they 
are currently the only publically available data of their kind. However, the data and the 
methods that accompany them are not without their limitations.  
First, these data were collected at a specific historical time point in Baltimore. 
This fact may preclude generalizability of the findings to other cities and time periods. In 
general, Baltimore shared (and still shares) many similarities, including population 
decline, demographics, and changing crime trends, with other moderately-sized cities 
during this time period. Despite this, Baltimore had higher rates of violence compared to 
other cities, which may have contributed to a context of police-citizen tension—perhaps 
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not unlike the context of neighborhoods plagued by high incarceration rates, but one—
that could potentially influence the findings presented here. Namely, increasing rates of 
incarceration are likely to coincide with police-citizen encounters, such as arrest, which 
are also likely to produce declines in formal, as well as informal social control. If this is 
the case, the findings presented here may attribute declines in social control to 
incarceration that may also be caused by arrests and other citizen-police encounters. 
Similarly, the actual association between prison releases and increased social control may 
be stronger than estimated and tempered due to the negative effect of other citizen-police 
encounters. 
Second, the forms of capital and social control included in the present study are 
limited to those included within the data. Specifically, the data does not include a 
measure of violent victimization. Given the significant positive associations among 
prison releases and women’s unsafe view of the neighborhood at both the individual and 
neighborhood-level, combined with the significant negative association among prison 
releases and women’s individual-level property victimization, it would be interesting to 
see whether the association between prison releases and women’s violent victimization is 
significant and in which direction. Therefore, the addition of a measure of violent 
victimization should be examined in future work. In addition, although the present data 
has the advantage of including separate forms of social control, including informal, 
formal, and the reprimanding of neighborhood children, a global or combined measure of 
social control was not tested in the present study. Similarly, the data does not include a 
measure of collective efficacy, which combines neighbor cohesion with a scale of global 
social control, and is also related to crime reduction (see Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 
1997). 
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Lastly, the issue of endogeneity is most crucial to the interpretation of results. 
Due to the confounding of incarceration with the many conditions of disadvantage, crime, 
social control, and other attributes, the difficulty in isolating and attributing effects to 
incarceration alone is paramount. A number of methodological choices, such as 
controlling for prior neighborhood crime, as well as identifying the variation in the 
changes in incarceration rates during the period under study, draw support for the 
conclusion that incarceration contributes to the included outcomes. However, firm 
evidence, such as ruling out the reverse causal ordering of variables (i.e., estimating the 
effect that social control and forms of capital have on future incarceration rates) with 
regression was not possible with these data given the included years of incarceration 
rates. Therefore, the present study may be interpreted as a snapshot or a single 
perspective on the issue and cannot be concluded as firm evidence regarding the causal 
impact of incarceration on communities or community members. Consistent with extant 
literature on the topic, caution should be used when interpreting these results and future 
research should pursue additional routes to overcoming this issue. 
Specifically, additional years of data or another data set could be investigated as a 
way to overcome all three of these limitations. Since no data similar to the data used in 
the present study are currently available the most efficient route to acquiring similar data 
would be to match an existing neighborhood survey with corresponding neighborhood-
level incarceration rates. The Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods 
(PHDCN) study is one potential dataset that could provide a stronger test of the gendered 
association between incarceration and individual and neighborhood-level social control. 
Since corresponding incarceration data is not included in the PHDCN and would need to 
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be mapped to match the 343 neighborhoods included in the 1995 survey one could match 
these data for years prior to, as well as proceeding the survey data in order to test a 
reverse causal ordering hypothesis and potentially rule out the issue of endogeneity. For 
example, data for the change in incarceration rates from 1993-1995 (needed to confirm 
the correct causal ordering of the association between incarceration and survey items), as 
well as for 1995-1997, could potentially rule out the possibility that the 1995 survey 
items contributed to the incarceration rates from 1995-1997 by estimating models testing 
this possibility. In addition, the PHDCN data include items similar to the present data and 
would therefore, be capable of answering similar research questions to those included in 
the present study, providing a historical comparison to the 1994 Baltimore survey data. In 
addition, the PHDCN contains additional outcomes of interest (i.e., collective efficacy) 
that could extend the present research questions. Overall, a comparison of findings using 
additional data, such as the PHDCN, would add to their generalizability and has the 
potential to further develop a gendered theory of coercive mobility and provide more 
detailed policy implications. 
Furthermore, although the current study’s sample size is not specifically listed as 
a limitation given its ability to detect effects for the included research questions, the 
inclusion of a larger sample of neighborhoods, such as the 343 neighborhoods included in 
the PHDCN, has the potential to ask more nuanced research questions that require 
stratification beyond the capabilities of the current data. For instance, a larger sample of 
neighborhoods is capable of answering questions such as, how does the impact of 
incarceration differ for neighborhoods with “high” verses “low” or “moderate” 
incarceration rates? Or, is there a “tipping point” in which the effect of incarceration on 
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social control changes from positive to negative? Similarly, residents in the “worst off” 
neighborhoods or those with the highest incarceration rates may be less impacted by 
incarceration compared to those with moderate rates due to the myriad of other harmful 
circumstances that they encounter as a result of residing within a disadvantaged 
neighborhood overall (i.e., an inoculation hypothesis), as is suggested by the “collateral 
damage” literature at the individual-level (Hagan and Dinovitzer, 1999). A larger sample 
of neighborhoods could test these and other research questions, as well as identify 
gendered outcomes. 
In general, future work should make understanding the gendered implications of 
incarceration for community residents a top priority given the present study’s findings for 
women’s forms of capital, the significant mediation of women’s capital in the unfolding 
of the relationship between incarceration and social control, and the significant gendered 
impacts to social control. A fuller investigation into each of these findings, with a 
consideration for the findings that were inconsistent with the proposed theory, is one 
place to start. For example, although the study’s findings did not confirm the gendered 
nature of incarceration’s impact to women’s and men’s forms of capital, it revealed 
numerous effects to different domains and types of capital for women and men that can 
be used to inform future work. One possibility is that women’s and men’s accumulation 
of capital may diverge in significant ways. Therefore, the examination of a 
comprehensive measure of capital in future work may reveal more about the gendered 
nature of capital for women compared to men, as well as how women’s and men’s 
accumulation of capital is related to incarceration.  
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Furthermore, a combined or comprehensive measure of physical, human, and 
social capital could be further tested within a gendered mediation analysis (see Preacher 
and Hayes, 2008). Specifically, the indirect effect of incarceration on social control 
through women’s accumulated capital can be contrasted with the indirect effect of 
incarceration on social control through men’s accumulated capital in order to determine 
which effect is stronger (MacKinnon, 2000; Preacher and Hayes, 2008). This type of 
analysis could confirm or dismiss the proposed gendered nature of the mediating 
relationships within the gendered theory of coercive mobility beyond the findings of the 
present study. 
In addition, the gendered relationship found between incarceration and residents’ 
social control should be investigated in future work. In particular, the present findings 
suggest an inter-reliance of women’s and men’s social control efforts. For example, the 
findings for women’s and men’s individual-level social control in relation to prison 
releases as a whole suggest a displacement of social control efforts. For instance, while 
women’s perceptions of informal social control decrease amidst changes in prison 
releases, their perceptions of formal social control increase, as do men’s perceptions of 
informal social control. Similarly, declines in women’s perceptions of voluntary 
associations associated with prison releases accounted for an increase in men’s 
neighborhood-level informal social control. Perhaps, men residing in neighborhoods 
where releases rates have contributed to a decline in women’s perceptions of involvement 
in voluntary associations or informal social control efforts compensate by fulfilling these 
informal roles themselves. The inter-reliance among social control types (formal and 
informal) has been identified in previous work (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993; Clear and 
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Karp, 1999; Lynch and Sabol, 2001; Sabol, Coulton, and Korbin, 2004; Silver and Miller, 
2004; Warner, 2007). Further examination of the relationships among women’s and 
men’s forms of social control, likely with the use of qualitative methods, could provide 
important insights into how they operate, including whether they are supportive of one 
another or whether displacement occurs, as well as insights into why certain efforts, 
including those of women’s, may be more effective for crime reduction (Rountree and 
Warner, 1999). 
Finally, future research should seek to uncover and more fully examine the 
nuanced associations among prison releases and individual-level forms of capital and 
social control found here. Prison releases are associated with both harmful (i.e., positive 
association with women’s unsafe view of the neighborhood) and beneficial (i.e., negative 
association with women’s property victimization) consequences at this level. Since 
increasing releases is one avenue for decreasing the prison population, in addition to an 
already occurring estimated 1,600 releases per day (Petersilia, 2002), it is critical to 
understand the impact of releases on communities. This avenue of research has the 
potential to take on a mixed methods approach. One possibility would be to examine 
these effects with the use of network data or propensity score matching to examine 
individuals who return to the same or different neighborhoods. In addition to these 
approaches, there is a need for a qualitative understanding of these complex relationships. 
Qualitative interviews, similar to Goffman’s (2009) study of young black males’ 
experiences with criminal justice contact and impacts to family, employment, and 
community relationships, could capture the dynamics that occur among women (and 
men) in neighborhoods with high incarceration rates by asking them about their direct 
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and indirect experiences with incarceration, social control, and interactions with other 
residents. 
In sum, studies investigating the impacts of incarceration on community residents 
are rare (Clear, 1996; Lynch and Sabol, 1992; 2004a; 2004b; Lynch et al., 2002; Moore, 
1996; Nightingale and Watts, 1996; Rose and Clear, 1998) and have yet to examine 
specific effects, such as the ones suggested for future research. Furthermore, although the 
existing literature provides some basic strategies for reducing incarceration and 
overcoming negative community impacts, little is known about the effects of current 
incarceration policies. Therefore, it is vital that future research seek to thoroughly 
examine these consequences in order to inform changes to the current incarceration 
policy to combat these effects.  
POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of the present study add to the literature on the collateral 
consequences of incarceration. In addition, they bring awareness to the fact that the 
consequences of incarceration spread well beyond those who are incarcerated themselves 
to impact community residents, particularly women and men who reside in 
neighborhoods with high incarceration rates. Together, with existing literature, the 
present study’s policy suggestions are two-fold and include: 1) reducing incarceration 
and increasing the use of sentencing alternatives that maintain offenders’ ties to 
community and 2) providing support to community members residing in neighborhoods 
with high incarceration rates.  
In general, the findings are consistent with extant literature on incarceration, 
which supports policies aimed at reducing the use of incarceration, particularly for non-
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violent offenders, and increasing the use of community sanctions. As Wildeman and 
Western (2010) point out, “nothing” is not a good alternative, but other options and 
interventions have the potential to maintain and foster individual, family, and community 
well-being. Community-based sanctions, including probation, community service, and 
electronic monitoring, are effective alternatives to incarceration, evident in lower 
recidivism rates (Arment, 2011; Gendreau et al., 2000). Furthermore, these sanctions 
allow fathers, partners, and family members who are contributing positively to their 
families to remain in the community where they can continue to provide support and 
contribute to the functionality of systemic networks. Allowing offenders to stay at home 
while completing community service, drug treatment, and other requirements of 
sentencing alternatives allows them to build and maintain pro-social connections and 
avoid the negative stigma and consequences associated with incarceration. Although 
some ties to the incarcerated (i.e., those to criminal friends and family members) may be 
considered deleterious (Sampson and Laub, 1993; Laub and Sampson, 1993) and viewed 
as beneficial to “knife off” or discontinue for the offender, community alternatives are a 
more effective approach to maintaining beneficial ties (La Vigne, Davies, and Brazzell, 
2008; Parke and Clarke-Stewart, 2003; Petersilia, 2002), while extinguishing negative 
ties. In addition, literature suggests that maintaining one’s prosocial ties with community 
and family members allows for a continuation and strengthening of social control efforts 
aimed at crime prevention (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993).  
Second, previous literature on the consequences of incarceration has suggested 
that services and support programs target the partners, children, and family members of 
the incarcerated (see Clear, Rose, and Ryder, 2001 for a review of suggestions; 
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Wakefield and Wildeman, 2014). The present study, along with others (Clear, Rose, and 
Ryder, 2001; Rose and Clear, 1998), suggests that similar strategies be adopted to support 
the residents of high incarceration communities.  
For example, community outreach programs could assist residents with career 
networking opportunities, resume help, job placement and training, and continued 
education services. Funds for these types of programs could be generated from 
neighboring communities, as well as community outreach organizations. Financial 
services, education counseling, and career services should specifically target women, 
given the present study’s findings of a significant reduction in women’s income in 
association with changes in prison admissions, as well as a significant reduction in 
women’s educational attainment in association with changes in prison releases. 
Furthermore, parenting classes and assistance with child supervision could be offered in 
order to help support mother’s career and educational pursuits.  
In addition, counseling and emotional support services, as well as family and 
community support groups similar to Al-Inon, and neighborhood watch groups and other 
programs aimed at encouraging cooperation among citizens and police may be 
particularly helpful to women, considering the significant negative associations among 
prison releases and women’s unsafe views of their neighborhood. Furthermore, both 
women and men are likely to benefit from engagement in community organizations given 
the findings for incarceration’s association with declines in men’s general and defensive 
neighboring, as well as declines in both women’s and men’s community solidarity and 
perceptions of voluntary associations. Reducing women’s unsafe views of the 
neighborhood and encouraging them to engage in community organizations may offer 
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opportunities to increase and strengthen their neighborhood social ties, which were found 
to mediate the relationship between prison admissions and women’s aggregate informal 
social control efforts. Therefore, these efforts provide a route to improving women’s 
informal social control efforts and potentially reducing neighborhood crime, as well as 
the further cycling of incarceration and subsequent community impacts. 
In addition, since the consequences of incarceration for community residents are 
vast and intertwined with confounding neighborhood factors, the strategies to overcome 
them must go beyond criminal justice interventions. These strategies must deal with all of 
the issues related to incarceration in order to be effective in enhancing residents’ forms of 
capital and strengthening informal social controls (Wildeman and Western, 2010). 
Therefore, the suggested policy implementations at this stage need to go beyond the 
services offered to partners and family members of the incarcerated, but should also be 
coupled with justice reinvestment efforts into education, healthcare, and the 
neighborhood economy. Prevention efforts at this level are expensive, but have lasting 
effects on reducing incarceration rates through crime reduction. One suggestion for 
funding such efforts is to re-invest savings from reduced incarceration rates back into the 
communities that need it most. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the impact of the decades-long trends in rising national incarceration rates 
concentrated among some of the most vulnerable communities and residents demands the 
attention of future research. The present study has provided one avenue for advancing a 
deeper understanding by highlighting the impacts that incarceration has to women’s and 
men’s individual and neighborhood-level forms of capital and social control, as well as 
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provided a gendered examination of these effects. Namely, findings reveal that women’s 
social capital significantly mediates the relationship between incarceration and social 
control. Furthermore, the impacts of incarceration extend to female and male community 
residents’ physical, human, and social capital in ways that are nearly wholly deleterious, 
with the exception of some positive impacts to women’s and men’s perceptions of social 
control and women’s property victimization associated with prison releases. In addition, 
this study has provided evidence that women and men significantly differ in their 
response to incarceration in terms of their perceptions of individual and neighborhood-
level social controls. Scholars should continue to develop a more advanced understanding 
of the gendered impacts of incarceration on community members in future research. 
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Figure 1: Jail and Prison Admissions by Brooklyn Neighborhood compared to 
Concentrations of Single Parent Households, Percent of Black Residents, and Percent 
Receiving Government (TANF) Assistance 
 
 
 
Source: Cadora, Eric. 2001. Criminal justice and health and human services: An 
exploration of overlapping needs, resources, and interests in Brooklyn neighborhoods. 
Paper presented to NPC.
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Figure 2: Summary of Theoretical Relationships present in Coercive Mobility Theory adapted from Rose and Clear (1998)  
 
  
      
               
            
 
 
 
Figure 3: Complete set of Proposed Theoretical Relationships within an expanded Gendered Theory of Coercive Mobility 
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Figure 4: Summary of Individual and Neighborhood-level Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Mediation Criteria 
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Figure 6: Prison Admission Trends, Baltimore Neighborhoods (1992-1994) 
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Figure 7: Prison Release Trends, Baltimore Neighborhoods (1992-1994) 
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Figure 8. Summary of Individual and Neighborhood-level Effects of Prison Admissions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Dotted arrows indicate that the relationship is non-significant. 
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Figure 9. Summary of Individual and Neighborhood-level Effects of Prison Releases: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Dotted arrows indicate that the relationship is non-significant. 
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Table 1. Neighborhood-level Descriptive Statistics of Key Study Variables by Gender 
  Aggregated Women Aggregated Men Aggregated Full Sample 
(n=30) Mean/% SD Min. Max. Mean/% SD Min. Max. Mean/% SD Min. Max. 
Potential Mediators  
    
  
   
  
  
 
Physical Capital 
    
  
   
  
   
Income 5.39 1.20 2.89 7.69 5.78 1.51 2.00 7.89 5.51 1.20 2.75 7.77 
Human Capital 
    
  
   
  
   
HS Completion 82.9% -- 38.5% 100% 82.7% -- 30.0% 100% 82.4%  -- 34.8% 100% 
Not in Workforce 13.7% -- 0.0% 60.0% 12.9% -- 0.0% 100% 11.8%  -- 0.0% 28.6% 
Well-being 2.86 0.24 2.33 3.36 3.03 0.31 2.30 3.83 2.91 0.21 2.32 3.32 
Property Victimization 27.0% -- 5.9% 81.8% 23.0% -- 0.0% 50.0% 25.2%  -- 8.0% 52.2% 
Unsafe Perception of the Neighborhood 0.59 0.07 0.41 0.75 0.44 0.15 0.17 1.00 0.53 0.07 0.39 0.65 
Social Capital 
    
  
   
  
   
Marriage 49.1% -- 12.5% 83.3% 58.8% -- 6.3% 100% 51.6%  -- 12.5% 83.3% 
Social Ties 7.23 3.35 2.71 17.38 8.78 5.63 2.75 24.80 7.78 3.33 3.00 16.40 
General Neighboring 0.59 0.08 0.44 0.73 0.58 0.12 0.32 0.83 0.58 0.07 0.42 0.71 
Defensive Neighboring 0.72 0.13 0.42 0.94 0.75 0.12 0.50 0.97 0.73 0.11 0.47 0.91 
Community Solidarity  2.95 0.29 1.97 3.40 2.83 0.29 2.22 3.28 2.90 0.25 2.16 3.33 
Presence of Voluntary Associations 3.00 0.94 0.94 5.13 2.69 0.78 1.00 3.67 2.87 0.70 1.16 4.17 
Dependent Variables 
    
  
   
  
   
Informal Social Control 0.56 0.13 0.23 0.79 0.57 0.14 0.21 1.00 0.56 0.08 0.41 0.74 
Reprimanding Neighborhood Children 49.2% -- 11.8% 100% 42.7% -- 0.0% 100% 47.0%  -- 8.0% 94.0% 
Initiating Formal Social Control 0.95 0.05 0.81 1.00 0.94 0.06 0.73 1.00 0.95 0.04 0.85 1.00 
Independent Variables 
    
  
   
  
   
Change in Prison Admission Rates (’92-’94) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.02 4.71 -16.84 7.24 
Change in Prison Release Rates (’92-’94) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.68 6.60 -10.47 24.58 
Concentrated disadvantage (1990 Census) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.80 -1.15 1.88 
Residential mobility (1990 Census) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.00 0.89 -1.64 2.58 
Bolded mean/% indicates that an independent samples t-test concluded that aggregated women and men are significantly different from one another; two-tailed, p<.10. 
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Table 2. Bivariate Correlations among Neighborhood-level Variables  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
1. Income  1                   
2. HS Comp. .628** 1 
                 
3. Not in Work.  -.512** -.468** 1 
                
4. Well-being .719** .705** -.388* 1 
               
5. Prop. Victim  .242 .324 -.180 .238 1 
              
6. Unsafe Neigh -.437* -.431* .318 -.292 .024 1 
       
 
     
7. Marriage  .716** .137 -.219 .368* -.199 -.230 1 
      
 
     
8. Social Ties .184 -.042 .207 .191 -.304 .145 .221 1 
     
 
     
9. Gen. Neigh. .242 .032 -.060 .093 .077 .080 .128 .150 1 
    
 
     
10. Def. Neigh. .536** .078 -.137 .183 -.270 -.167 .661** .323 .547** 1 
         
11. C Solidarity  .568** .161 -.125 .298 .047 -.216 .444* .278 .491** .560** 1 
        
12. V. Assoc. .231 .324 .147 .083 -.007 -.348 .062 .297 .091 .111 .279 1 
       
13. ISC -.029 -.382* -.001 -.317 -.076 .069 .247 .116 -.185 .009 .137 .011 1 
      
14. Rep. Child. -.592** -.490** .569** -.567** -.172 .354 -.440* .052 .267 -.188 -.133 .002 -.181 1      
15. FSC .449* .331 -.498** .216 .074 -.177 .176 .097 .130 .193 .377* .069 .306 -.319 1 
    
16. Admissions  -.083 -.004 -.204 -.096 -.209 -.260 -.138 -.285 -.257 -.187 -.156 -.195 -.162 .053 -.103 1 
   
17. Releases -.163 -.243 -.191 -.098 -.207 .334 -.022 -.071 .116 -.023 -.014 -.335 .015 .077 .145 .142 1 
  
18. R. Mobility  -.199 .044 -.065 .125 .286 .175 -.194 .003 -.006 -.146 -.318 -.339 -.043 -.195 -.224 -.389* -.118 1  
19. Con. Disad. -.755** -.563** .472** -.584** -.083 .432* -.627** -.033 .104 -.465** -.169 -.103 .042 .770** -.238 -.111 .074 .118 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). HS Comp. = high school completion, Not in Work = not in 
workforce, Prop. Victim = property victimization, Unsafe Neigh. = unsafe perception of the neighborhood, Gen. Neigh. = general neighboring, Def. Neigh. = defensive 
neighboring, C. Solidarity = community solidarity, V. Assoc. = presence of voluntary associations, ISC = informal social control, Rep. Child. = reprimanding neighborhood 
children, FSC = initiating formal social control, Admissions = change in prison admission rates from 1992-1994, Releases = change in prison release rates from 1992-1994, 
R. Mobility = residential mobility, Con. Disad. = concentrated disadvantage. 
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Table 3. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
  
Income HS Completion 
Not in 
Workforce Well-being 
Property 
Victimization 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
Neighborhood 
Females 
      
    
  
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.078 -.001 -.005 -.009 -.006 -.003 
 
(.034) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.003) 
Constant 5.388*** .829*** .137*** 2.856*** .270*** .587*** 
 
(.143) (.028) (.028) (.033) (.030) (.013) 
R2 .617 .291 .077 .502 .274 .206 
Males             
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.054 -.004 -.001 .002 -.002 -.005 
 
(.052) (.008) (.009) (.014) (.006) (.007) 
Constant 5.784*** .827*** .129*** 3.031*** .230*** .443*** 
 
(.220) (.032) (.038) (.058) (.026) (.029) 
R2 .434 .247 .202 .039 .075 .067 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -0.39 0.30 -0.37 -0.69 -0.44 0.26 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Social Capital by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
  
Marriage Social Ties General Neighboring 
Defensive 
Neighboring 
Community 
Solidarity 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associations 
Females 
          
 Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.015** -.331** -.002 -.007 -.023** -.071* 
 
(.006) (.134) (.004) (.005) (.011) (.038) 
Constant .491*** 7.227*** .592*** .722*** 2.950*** 2.999*** 
 
(.025) (.570) (.015) (.022) (.048) (.161) 
R2 .464 .222 .072 .197 .259 .210 
Males             
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.007 -.124 -.010* -.010** -.016 -.050 
 
(.009) (.252) (.005) (.004) (.012) (.031) 
Constant .587*** 8.776*** .582*** .751*** 2.830*** 2.687*** 
 
(.037) (1.074) (.021) (.018) (.052) (.133) 
R2 .382 .020 .147 .380 .125 .222 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -0.74 -0.72 1.33* 0.50 -0.44 -0.43 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
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Table 5. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Social Control by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
  
Informal Social 
Control 
Reprimanding 
Neighborhood 
Children 
Initiating Formal 
Social Control 
Females 
  
 
  
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.010* .005 .000 
 
(.006) (.007) (.002) 
Constant .560*** .492*** .951*** 
 
(.024) (.029) (.009) 
R2 .142 .657 .164 
Males       
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 .002 .002 -.006** 
 
(.006) (.010) (.003) 
Constant .575*** .427*** .943*** 
 
(.027) (.044) (.011) 
R2 .008 .309 .174 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -1.50* 0.25 1.67** 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
  
 
 
 
Table 6. Testing for Mediation: The Relationship between Possible Mediating Variables and Forms of Social 
Control (Neighborhood-level) 
 
Female Aggregated Potential Mediators Male Aggregated Potential Mediators 
 
Income Marriage Social Ties Community Solidarity 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associations 
General 
Neighboring 
Defensive 
Neighboring 
Women’s Informal Social Control 
Mediator .012 .257* .013* .163** .050* -.022 .031 
 
(.021) (.130) (.007) (.081) (.025) (.212) (.212) 
Constant .496*** .434*** .468*** .078 .411*** .573*** .537*** 
 
(.114) (.068) (.056) (.239) (.078) (.126) (.161) 
R2 .012 .122 .106 .127 .125 .000 .001 
Men's Initiation of Formal Social Control 
Mediator .019* .087 .006* .037 -.001 .029 .001 
 (.009) (.065) (.003) (.041) (.013) (.102) (.102) 
Constant .842*** .900*** .897*** .835*** .946*** .926*** .942*** 
 (.052) (.034) (.027) (.122) (.040) (.061) (.078) 
R2 .123 .061 .111 .027 .000 .003 .000 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Possible Mediators of the Relationship between Change in Prison Admission Rates and Forms of 
Social Control (Neighborhood-level) 
Women's Informal Social Control 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.010* -.008 -.004 -.007 -.007 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Potential Mediator(s): 
     
Presence of Voluntary Associations  
(female aggregated) 
  .037       
  (.028)       
Marriage       
(female aggregated) 
    .438***     
    (.164)     
Social Ties      
(female aggregated) 
      .010   
      (.008)   
Community Solidarity    
(female aggregated) 
        .155* 
        (.093) 
      
Constant .560*** .448*** .345*** .490*** .103 
(.024) (.088) (.083) (.063) (.277) 
R2 .142 .198 .332 .190 .227 
      
Men's Initiation of Formal Social Control 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.006** -.004 -.004  
(.003) (.003) (.003)  
Potential Mediator(s):     
Income       
(female aggregated) 
  .017    
  (.015)    
Social Ties      
(female aggregated) 
    .004  
    (.004)  
     
Constant .943*** .853*** .916***  
(.011) (.083) (.030)  
R2 .174 .211 .202  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
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Table 8. Change in Prison Release Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
  
Income HS Completion 
Not in 
Workforce Well-being 
Property 
Victimization 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
Neighborhood  
Females 
      
    
  
  
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.019 -.004 -.007 .004 -.003 .004* 
 
 
(.024) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.002) 
 Constant 5.422*** .836*** .148*** 2.849*** .274*** .581*** 
 
 
(.160) (.028) (.028) (.034) (.031) (.013) 
 R2 .547 .315 .141 .492 .265 .275 
 Males               
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.045 -.006 .011* -.005 -.005 .002 
 
 
(.034) (.005) (.006) (.009) (.004) (.005) 
 Constant 5.862*** .836*** .110*** 3.039*** .239*** .440*** 
 
 
(.224) (.033) (.037) (.060) (.026) (.030) 
 R2 .449 .273 .306 .049 .128 .058 
 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -0.62 0.33 -2.57*** 0.90 0.33 0.40 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. Models 
include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Change in Prison Release Rates on Social Capital by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
 
Marriage Social Ties General Neighboring 
Defensive 
Neighboring 
Community 
Solidarity 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associations 
Females 
      Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.001 -.004 .002 .000 -.005 -.055** 
 
(.004) (.099) (.002) (.004) (.008) (.025) 
Constant .493*** 7.242*** .589*** .722*** 2.959*** 3.093*** 
 
(.029) (.655) (.016) (.024) (.053) (.163) 
R2 .337 .039 .085 .139 .153 .246 
Males 
      Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .007 -.098 -.001 .000 .005 -.030 
 
(.006) (.167) (.003) (.003) (.008) (.021) 
Constant .576*** 8.944*** .583*** .751*** 2.823*** 2.738*** 
 
(.037) (1.108) (.023) (.020) (.056) (.139) 
R2 .399 .024 .024 .257 .077 .206 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -1.14 0.48 0.83 0.00 -0.91 -0.76 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
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Table 10. Change in Prison Release Rates on Social Control by Gender (Neighborhood-level) 
  Informal Social Control Reprimanding Neighborhood Children 
Initiating Formal Social 
Control 
Females 
  
 
  
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.004 -.002 .002 
 
(.004) (.005) (.001) 
Constant .567*** .495*** .948*** 
 
(.025) (.030) (.009) 
R2 .065 .654 .225 
Males     
 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .011*** -.001 -.001 
 
(.004) (.007) (.002) 
Constant .557*** .429*** .944*** 
 
(.024) (.045) (.012) 
R2 .263 .309 .032 
Equality of Coefficients - Clogg Test (z) -2.65*** -0.12 1.50* 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Testing for Mediation: The Relationship between Possible Mediating Variables 
and Men's Informal Social Control (Neighborhood-level) 
 
 
Female Aggregated Potential Mediators Male Aggregated Potential Mediators 
Unsafe Perception of 
Neighborhood 
Presence of Voluntary 
Associations Not in Workforce 
Mediator .109 -.063** .308*** 
 
(.353) (.025) (.102) 
Constant .511** .764*** .535*** 
 
(.209) (.079) (.026) 
R2 .003 .182 .245 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12. Possible Mediators of the Relationship between Change in Prison Release Rates and Men's Informal 
Social Control (Neighborhood-level) 
  Model 1 Model 4 Model 5 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .011*** .008** .007** 
(.004) (.004) (.003) 
Potential Mediator(s):    
Presence of Voluntary Associations                    
(female aggregated) 
  -.049*   
  (.028)   
Not in Workforce                                                
(male aggregated) 
    .303*** 
    (.113) 
    
Constant .557*** .709*** .523*** 
(.024) (.088) (.025) 
R2 .263 .347 .427 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
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Table 13. Individual-level Descriptive Statistics of Key Study Variables by Gender 
  
Women   
(n=426) 
Men 
(n=274) 
Range   
 
  Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Min. Max. 
Potential Mediators  
  
  
 
  
 Physical Capital 
  
  
 
  
 Income (total n=618) 5.35 2.50 5.84 2.49 0.00 8.00 
Human Capital 
  
  
 
  
 HS Completion 82.2% -- 83.6% -- 0.00 1.00 
Not in Workforce (total n=688) 9.6% -- 5.5% -- 0.00 1.00 
Well-being 2.84 0.70 3.00 0.66 1.00 4.00 
Property Victimization (total n=696) 25.2% -- 24.2% -- 0.00 1.00 
Unsafe Perception of the Neighborhood 0.58 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Social Capital 
  
  
 
  
 Marriage (total n=698) 48.7% -- 57.0% -- 0.00 1.00 
Social Ties 7.36 13.32 8.50 17.12 0.00 150.00 
General Neighboring 0.59 0.32 0.57 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Defensive Neighboring 0.72 0.34 0.74 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Community Solidarity  2.96 0.64 2.80 0.63 1.10 4.00 
Presence of Voluntary Associations 2.97 2.14 2.70 1.87 0.00 9.00 
Dependent Variables 
  
  
 
  
 Informal Social Control 0.56 0.36 0.56 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Reprimanding Neighborhood Children 50.4% -- 41.0% -- 0.00 1.00 
Initiating Formal Social Control 0.95 0.16 0.94 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Other Demographics 
  
  
 
  
 Age 52.35 16.64 50.41 16.30 20.00 94.00 
Race (% black) 39.0% -- 23.7% -- 0.00 1.00 
Homeowner 74.9% -- 75.6% -- 0.00 1.00 
Presence of Children within the Household 32.2% -- 20.4% -- 0.00 1.00 
Bolded mean/% indicates that an independent samples t-test concluded that women and men are significantly different from one another; 
two-tailed, p<.10. n=700; four cases were dropped from the full sample (n=704) due to missing presence of children within the household. 
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Table 14. Bivariate Correlations among Individual-level Variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Income  1               
2. HS Comp. .370** 1 
             
3. Not in Work.  -.083* -.005 1 
            
4. Well-being .235** .195** -.120** 1 
           
5. Victimization  .111** .125** -.035 -.009 1 
          
6. Unsafe Neigh -.076 -.063 .086* -.163** .063 1 
         
7. Marriage  .407** .107** .054 .063 -.027 -.076* 1 
        
8. Social Ties .143** .044 .023 .028 -.031 .053 .046 1 
       
9. Gen. Neigh. .184** .192** -.027 .134** .095* -.038 .115** .202** 1 
      
10. Def. Neigh. .168** .113** -.033 .109** -.031 -.043 .203** .192** .416** 1 
     
11. C Solidarity  .125** .043 -.007 .101** -.011 -.090* .060 .258** .462** .406** 1 
    
12. V. Assoc. .223** .214** .007 .034 .033 -.026 .104** .295** .261** .211** .285** 1 
   
13. ISC .082* .005 -.054 .002 -.049 -.113** .067 .037 .162** .144** .201** .031 1 
  
14. Rep. Child. -.019 -.030 .044 -.054 .031 .048 .048 .084* .257** .088* .106** .175** .072 1  
15. FSC .100* .019 .024 .019 -.064 .002 .056 .040 .119** .122** .214** .088* .199** .007 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). HS Comp. = high school completion, 
Not in Work = not in workforce, Prop. Victim = property victimization, Unsafe Neigh. = unsafe perception of the neighborhood, Gen. Neigh. = 
general neighboring, Def. Neigh. = defensive neighboring, C. Solidarity = community solidarity, V. Assoc. = presence of voluntary associations, ISC 
= informal social control, Rep. Child. = reprimanding neighborhood children. 
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Table 15. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender (Individual-level) 
  
Incomea HS Completionb Not in Workforceb Well-being
a
 
Property 
Victimizationb 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
the 
Neighborhooda 
Females 
  
 
     
Change in Admission Rate 
'92-'94 
-0.068* 0.993 0.982 -0.010 0.981 -0.004 
 (.038) (.930, 1.059) (.953, 1.014) (.007) (0.917,1.048) (.003) 
Intercept 4.366*** 3.441*** 0.175*** 2.803*** 0.414*** 0.616*** 
 
(.235) (2.114, 5.602) (.119, .258) (.066) (0.262,0.654) (.026) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 4.017 0.490 0.339 0.439 0.830 0.059 
Neighborhood-level 0.100** 4.053*** 12.467*** 0.000 0.204 0.000 
Males 
   
   
Change in Admission Rate 
'92-'94 
-0.046 1.106** 0.970 -0.002 0.985 -0.000 
 (.036) (1.019, 1.201) (.915, 1.029) (.008) (.945, 1.027) (.004) 
Intercept 3.928*** 3.322*** 0.277*** 2.996*** 0.301*** 0.419*** 
 
(.484) (2.196, 5.025) (.135, .569) (.101) (.172, .528) (.052) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 3.961 0.271 0.090 0.389 0.797 0.083 
Neighborhood-level 0.264*** 3.742*** 30.217*** 0.023*** 0.949* 0.003*** 
Equality of 
Coefficients 
Tests 
Clogg Test 
(z) 
-0.42 -- -- 0.01 -- -0.80 
Separate 
Model – 
Interaction 
Term 
-- 
1.019 1.010 
-- 
0.982 
-- 
 
(0.965, 1.076) (.0924, 1.104) 
 
(0.892, 1.082) 
 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions, concentrated disadvantage, 
and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence of children 
within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison admissions, concentrated disadvantage, residential 
mobility, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children within the 
household are left uncentered. n= 700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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Table 16. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Social Capital by Gender (Individual-
level) 
   
  
Marriageb Social Tiesa General Neighboringa 
Defensive 
Neighboringa 
Community 
Solidaritya 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associationsa 
Females 
  
 
     
Change in Admission Rate '92-
'94 
0.999 -0.194 0.002 -0.001 -0.016 -0.050** 
 (.946, 1.055) (.140) (.004) (.004) (.016) (.022) 
Intercept 0.522** 6.134*** 0.531*** 0.681*** 2.717*** 2.491*** 
 
(.282, .968) (1.386) (.036) (.037) (.080) (.291) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.850 167.866 0.087 0.096 0.351 3.859 
Neighborhood-level 1.520*** 0.053 0.001 0.004*** 0.029*** 0.409*** 
Males          
Change in Admission Rate '92-
'94 
0.981 -0.152 -0.008** -0.006* -0.015* -0.062*** 
 (.927, 1.037) (.161) (.003) (.004) (.010) (.022) 
Intercept 0.443*** 6.156*** 0.416*** 0.569*** 2.496*** 2.429*** 
 (.248, .792) (1.766) (.061) (.051) (.122) (.276) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.880 281.266 0.085 0.081 0.330 3.205 
Neighborhood-level 0.142** 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.018*** 0.036 
Equality 
of 
Coefficien
ts Tests 
Clogg Test (z) -- -0.20 2.00** 0.88 -0.05 0.03 
Separate Model 
– Interaction 
Term 
0.990 
-- -- -- -- -- 
(.0949, 1.033) 
     
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions, concentrated 
disadvantage, and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and 
presence children within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison admissions, concentrated 
disadvantage, residential mobility, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and 
presence of children within the household are left uncentered. n= 700 individuals nested within 30 
neighborhoods. 
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Table 17. Change in Prison Admission Rates on Social Control by Gender (Individual-level) 
  
Informal Social 
Controla 
Reprimanding 
Neighborhood 
Childrenb 
Initiating Formal 
Social Controla 
Females 
  
 
  
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -0.006 1.008 0.000 
 
(.005) (.950, 1.069) (.002) 
Intercept 0.573*** 0.722 0.947*** 
 
(.044) (.421, 1.238) (.018) 
Variance Components:    
Individual-level 0.123 0.851 0.027 
Neighborhood-level 0.001* 0.514** 0.000 
Males       
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 0.001 1.001 -0.006** 
 
(.003) (.945, 1.060) (.002) 
Intercept 0.579*** 0.376*** 0.942*** 
 
(.044) (.210, .674) (.029) 
Variance Components:    
Individual-level 0.135 0.756 0.029 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 1.292* 0.000 
Equality of 
Coefficient
s Tests 
Clogg Test (z) -1.20 -- 2.12** 
Separate Model – 
Interaction Term 
-- 1.024 -- 
 (0.954, 1.099)  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions, concentrated 
disadvantage, and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and 
presence children within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison admissions, concentrated 
disadvantage, residential mobility, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and 
presence of children within the household are left uncentered. n=700 individuals nested within 30 
neighborhoods. 
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Table 19. Possible Mediators of the Relationship between Change in Prison Admission Rates and Men's Initiation 
of Formal Social Control (Individual-level) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -0.006** -0.005** -0.006* 
 (.002) (.002) (.003) 
Intercept 0.942*** 0.943*** 0.942*** 
 (.029) (.028) (.030) 
Potential Neighborhood-level Mediator(s):     
 Social Ties   0.003 
 (female aggregated)   (.003) 
 Community Solidarity     -0.000 
(female aggregated)     (.040) 
 
  
  
 Variance Components:     
 Individual-level 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, 
homeowner, and presence children within the household at the individual-level. All variables are centered on their 
grand mean except black, homeowner, and presence of children within the household. n= 274 individuals nested 
within 30 neighborhoods. 
 
Table 18. Testing for Mediation: The Relationship between Possible Mediating Variables and Men's Initiation of 
Formal Social Control (Individual-level) 
 Female Aggregated Potential Mediators Male Aggregated Potential Mediators 
 
Marriage Social Ties Community Solidarity 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associations 
General 
Neighboring 
Defensive 
Neighboring 
Mediator 0.095 0.007** 0.039* -0.003 0.067 0.031 
 (.073) (.003) (.025) (.011) (.096) (.082) 
Intercept 0.944*** 0.949*** 0.950*** 0.945*** 0.949*** 0.946*** 
 (.029) (.027) (.031) (.029) (.028) (.030) 
Variance Components:   
 
  
 
    
Individual-level 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Neighborhood-level 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include a potential neighborhood-level mediator, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence children 
within the household at the individual-level. The potential mediator and age are centered on their grand mean, all 
other variables are uncentered. 
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Table 20. Change in Prison Release Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender (Individual-level) 
  
Incomea HS Completionb Not in Workforceb Well-being
a
 
Property 
Victimizationb 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
the 
Neighborhooda 
Females 
  
 
     
Change in Release Rate '92-
'94 
-0.011 0.984*** 0.982 0.004 0.972*** 0.004*** 
 (.014) (.972, .995) (.947, 1.018) (.007) (.953, .991) (.001) 
Intercept 4.349*** 3.421*** 0.181*** 2.792*** 0.399*** 0.609*** 
 (.251) (2.127, 
5.502) 
(.122, .268) (.061) (.249, .639) (.027) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 4.025 0.495 0.340 0.440 0.832 0.059 
Neighborhood-level 0.159*** 3.791*** 12.274*** 0.000 0.090 0.000 
Males          
Change in Release Rate '92-
'94 
-0.036 0.971 1.008 -0.010 0.990 -0.001 
 (.032) (.915, 1.029) (.966, 1.051) (.008) (.959, 1.023) (.004) 
Intercept 3.870*** 3.335*** 0.285*** 2.983*** 0.292*** 0.418*** 
 (.491) (2.103, 
5.290) 
(.139, .583) (.098) (.169, .505) (.051) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 3.943 0.271 0.091 0.390 0.801 0.083 
Neighborhood-level 0.301*** 3.812*** 35.193*** 0.018*** 0.845* 0.003*** 
Equality of 
Coefficien
ts Tests  
Clogg Test (z) 0.72 -- -- 0.22 -- 1.25* 
Separate Model – 
Interaction Term 
-- 
0.993 0.968 
-- 
0.987 
-- 
 
(.0967, 1.019) (0.914, 1.024) 
 
(0.945, 1.031) 
 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, and 
residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence children within the 
household at the individual-level. Change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and 
age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children within the household are left 
uncentered. n=700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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Table 21. Change in Prison Release Rates on Social Capital by Gender (Individual-level)    
  
Marriageb Social Tiesa General Neighboringa 
Defensive 
Neighboringa 
Community 
Solidaritya 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associationsa 
Females 
  
 
     
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 1.006 0.032 0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.044** 
 (.978, 1.034) (.062) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.020) 
Intercept 0.520** 5.986*** 0.528*** 0.679*** 2.715*** 2.504*** 
 (.280, .965) (1.300) (.035) (.036) (.082) (.298) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.850 168.397 0.087 0.096 0.352 3.855 
Neighborhood-level 1.514*** 0.062 0.000 0.004*** 0.032*** 0.379*** 
Males          
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 1.025 -0.143 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.030 
 (.982, 1.070) (.179) (.004) (.003) (.007) (.021) 
Intercept 0.442*** 5.918*** 0.412*** 0.563*** 2.499*** 2.361*** 
 (0.246, 0.794) (1.841) (.059) (.054) (.119) (.295) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.882 281.172 0.086 0.082 0.328 3.180 
Neighborhood-level 0.201** 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.024*** 0.112* 
Equality 
of 
Coefficien
ts Tests 
Clogg Test (z) -- 0.92 1.00 0.75 -0.88 -0.48 
Separate Model 
– Interaction 
Term 
0.980 
-- -- -- -- -- 
(.0940, 1.021) 
     
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, and 
residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence children within 
the household at the individual-level. Change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential 
mobility, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children within the 
household are left uncentered. n=700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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Table 22. Change in Prison Release Rates on Social Control by Gender (Individual-level) 
  
Informal Social 
Controla 
Reprimanding 
Neighborhood 
Childrenb 
Initiating Formal 
Social Controla 
Females 
  
 
  
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -0.003* 1.002 0.002* 
 
(.002) (.965, 1.040) (.001) 
Intercept 0.575*** 0.719 0.945*** 
 
(.044) (.417, 1.241) (.019) 
Variance Components:    
Individual-level 0.124 0.558** 0.027 
Neighborhood-level 0.000* 0.444** 0.000 
Males       
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 0.009*** 1.010 -0.002 
 
(.003) (.953, 1.070) (.001) 
Intercept 0.587*** 0.378*** 0.938*** 
 
(.039) (.211, .675) (.031) 
Variance Components:    
Individual-level 0.133 0.755 0.028 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 1.221* 0.001* 
Equality of 
Coefficients Tests 
Clogg Test (z) -3.33*** -- 2.86*** 
Separate Model – 
Interaction Term 
-- 0.976 -- 
 (0.899, 1.059)  
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aLinear regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with 
confidence intervals in parentheses. Models include change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, 
and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence children 
within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison releases, concentrated disadvantage, 
residential mobility, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children 
within the household are left uncentered. n=700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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Table 23. Testing for Mediation: The Relationship between Possible Mediating Variables and Women's Forms of 
Social Control (Individual-level) 
 
Female Aggregated Potential Mediators Male Aggregated Potential Mediators 
 
Unsafe Perception of the 
Neighborhood 
Presence of Voluntary 
Associations Not in Workforce  
                       Women’s Informal Social Control 
Mediator -0.160 0.038* -0.065 
 
(.197) (.022) (.052) 
Intercept 0.561*** 0.565*** 0.558*** 
 (.048) (.046) (.049) 
Variance Components:   
 
  
 Individual-level 0.124 0.123 0.124 
 Neighborhood-level 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 
             Women’s Initiation of Formal Social Control 
Mediator -0.183** -0.005 -0.001 
 
(.084) (.011) (.030) 
Intercept 0.947*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 
 (.019) (.020) (.019) 
Variance Components:    
 Individual-level 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 Neighborhood-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 
             Men’s Informal Social Control 
Mediator 0.054 -0.041** 0.232* 
 
(.230) (.019) (.144) 
Intercept 0.570*** 0.571*** 0.580*** 
 
(.037) (.040) (.039) 
Variance Components:      
 Individual-level 0.136 0.134 0.134 
 Neighborhood-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include a potential neighborhood-level mediator, as well as age, race, homeowner, and presence children 
within the household at the individual-level. The potential mediator and age are centered on their grand mean, all 
other variables are uncentered. 
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Table 24. Possible Mediators of the Relationship between Change in Prison Release Rates and Forms of Social 
Control (Individual-level) 
Women's Informal Social Control (n=426) 
  Model 1 Model 2  
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -0.003* -0.001  
 
(.002) (.002)  
Intercept 0.575*** 0.573***  
 
(.044) (.043)  
Potential Neighborhood-level Mediator(s):      
Presence of Voluntary Associations   0.038*  
(female aggregated)   (.023)  
 
     
Variance Components:      
Individual-level 0.124 0.124  
Neighborhood-level 0.000* 0.000*  
Women's Initiation of Formal Social Control (n=426)  
 
Model 1 Model 2  
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 0.002* 0.002***  
 
(.001) (.001)  
Intercept 0.945*** 0.947***  
 
(.019) (.018)  
Potential Neighborhood-level Mediator(s):      
Unsafe Perception of the Neighborhood   -0.214**  
(female aggregated)   (.102)  
 
     
Variance Components:      
Individual-level 0.027 0.027  
Neighborhood-level 0.000 0.000  
Men's Informal Social Control (n=274)  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 0.009*** 0.006* 0.008** 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) 
Intercept 0.587*** 0.594*** 0.590*** 
 
(.039) (.043) (.039) 
Potential Neighborhood-level Mediator(s):      
Presence of Voluntary Associations   -0.039*  
(female aggregated)   (.023)  
Not in Workforce     0.225 
(male aggregated)     (.150) 
 
     
Variance Components:      
Individual-level 0.133 0.132 0.132 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, race, 
homeowner, and presence children within the household at the individual-level. All variables are centered on their 
grand mean except black, homeowner, and presence of children within the household. 
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Appendix A. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Physical, Human, and Social Capital and Social 
Control by Gender, excluding "low male respondent neighborhoods" (Neighborhood-level) 
  
Income HS Completion 
Not in 
Workforce Well-being 
Property 
Victimization 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
Neighborhood 
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.036 -.003 -.003 .004 -.001 -.003 
 
(.050) (.008) (.005) (.012) (.006) (.005) 
Constant 5.846*** .825*** .089*** 3.010*** .245*** .432*** 
 
(.216) (.033) (.024) (.054) (.025) (.022) 
R2 .396 .218 .242 .044 .027 .074 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.011 -.011 -.006 -.024** .002 .001 
 
(.051) (.007) (.005) (.012) (.006) (.005) 
Constant 5.855*** .829*** .092*** 3.017*** .244*** .432*** 
 
(.219) (.032) (.023) (.050) (.025) (.022) 
R2 .384 .277 .276 .181 .032 .064 
 
Marriage Social Ties General Neigh. 
Defensive 
Neigh. 
Community 
Solidarity 
Presence of 
Vol. Assoc. 
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.006 -.141 -.010* -.010** -.019 -.053* 
 
(.008) (.265) (.005) (.004) (.012) (.030) 
Constant .574*** 8.751*** .581*** .748*** 2.825*** 2.729*** 
 
(.034) (1.157) (.022) (.019) (.054) (.130) 
R2 .465 .023 .162 .402 .148 .228 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .010 -.277 -.002 -.002 .003 -.039 
 
(.008) (.266) (.006) (.005) (.013) (.031) 
Constant .571*** 8.870*** .584*** .750*** 2.827*** 2.751*** 
 
(.033) (1.141) (.024) (.021) (.057) (.135) 
R2 .487 .054 .027 .264 .064 .179 
 
Informal 
Social 
Control 
Reprima-
nding 
Neighbo-
rhood 
Children 
Initiating 
Formal 
Social 
Control 
      
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 .001 -.001 -.005* 
   
 
(.005) (.009) (.003) 
   
Constant .554*** .432*** .942*** 
   
 
(.023) (.041) (.012) 
   
R2 .049 .305 .159 
   
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .009* -.005 -.001 
   
 
(.005) (.010) (.003) 
   
Constant .551*** .434*** .943*** 
   
 
(.021) (.041) (.013) 
   
R2 .153 .314 .023 
   
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, n=28. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in 
parentheses. Models include concentrated disadvantage and residential mobility. 
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 Appendix B. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender with 
Additional Controls (Neighborhood-level) 
  Income HS Completion 
Not in 
Workforce 
Well-
being 
Property 
Victimization 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
Neighborhood 
Females 
            
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.080** -.002 -.007 -.006 -.003 -.003 
 
(.035) (.006) (.007) (.008) (.005) (.003) 
Constant 5.033*** .692*** .115 2.955*** .148** .583*** 
 
(.456) (.084) (.088) (.099) (.070) (.041) 
R2 .629 .376 .107 .564 .621 .207 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.017 -.003 -.007 .004 -.001 .004* 
 
(.025) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.002) 
Constant 5.252*** .710*** .164* 2.945*** .158** .568*** 
 
(.514) (.086) (.088) (.102) (.072) (.041) 
R2 .556 .384 .163 .563 .617 .279 
Males             
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.057 -.004 .000 .004 -.002 -.003 
 
(.054) (.008) (.009) (.014) (.006) (.007) 
Constant 5.967*** .784*** .347*** 3.159*** .206** .538*** 
 
(.706) (.104) (.115) (.187) (.082) (.091) 
R2 .444 .255 .320 .065 .090 .115 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.051 -.005 .009 -.006 -.005 .001 
 
(.035) (.005) (.006) (.009) (.004) (.005) 
Constant 6.335*** .821*** .297*** 3.187*** .236*** .537*** 
 
(.715) (.106) (.113) (.191) (.083) (.094) 
R2 .464 .277 .387 .078 .141 .109 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, total crime rate per 100 residents, and neighborhood 
population per 1,000 residents. 
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Appendix C. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Social Capital by Gender with Additional Controls 
(Neighborhood-level) 
 
Marriage Social Ties General Neigh. 
Defensive 
Neigh. 
Community 
Solidarity 
Presence 
of Vol. 
Assoc. 
Females   
          
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.015** -.379*** -.002 -.008 -.023* -.081** 
 
(.006) (.134) (.004) (.005) (.012) (.038) 
Constant .564*** 4.950*** .534*** .766*** 2.995*** 2.155*** 
 
(.080) (1.740) (.048) (.065) (.155) (.489) 
R2 .487 .310 .136 .327 .262 .307 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.003 .013 .002 -.001 -.006 -.049* 
 
(.005) (.103) (.002) (.004) (.008) (.025) 
Constant .601*** 5.478*** .524*** .784*** 3.064*** 2.552*** 
 
(.091) (2.070) (.049) (.071) (.169) (.513) 
R2 .377 .082 .156 .252 .170 .284 
Males             
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.008 -.204 -.010** -.011*** -.017 -.061* 
 
(.007) (.251) (.005) (.003) (.013) (.031) 
Constant .791*** 8.728*** .670*** .820*** 2.958*** 2.165*** 
 
(.094) (3.251) (.061) (.039) (.164) (.406) 
R2 .609 .146 .310 .721 .187 .309 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .004 -.112 -.002 -.001 .003 -.026 
 
(.005) (.167) (.003) (.002) (.009) (.022) 
Constant .782*** 9.665*** .697*** .844*** 2.969*** 2.406*** 
 
(.098) (3.367) (.068) (.050) (.175) (.437) 
R2 .595 .139 .188 .557 .127 .246 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
Models include concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, total crime rate per 100 residents, and neighborhood 
population per 1,000 residents. 
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Appendix D. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Social Control by Gender with Additional 
Controls (Neighborhood-level) 
 
Informal Social 
Control 
Reprimanding 
Neighborhood 
Children 
Initiating Formal 
Social Control 
Females 
  
  
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -.012* .005 .000 
 
(.006) (.007) (.002) 
Constant .519*** .521*** .923*** 
 
(.082) (.103) (.031) 
R2 .178 .662 .275 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -.004 -.002 .002 
 
(.005) (.005) (.002) 
Constant .551*** .515*** .919*** 
 
(.087) (.104) (.030) 
R2 .074 .657 .305 
Males       
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 .002 -.003 -.006** 
 
(.006) (.010) (.003) 
Constant .611*** .285*** .924*** 
 
(.090) (.132) (.036) 
R2 .111 .501 .333 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 .010** -.009 .001 
 
(.004) (.007) (.002) 
Constant .582*** .311*** .931*** 
 
(.081) (.128) (.039) 
R2 .277 .534 .198 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
 Models include concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, total crime rate per 100 residents, 
neighborhood population per 1,000 residents, and lack of police response. 
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Appendix E. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Physical and Human Capital by Gender with Additional 
Controls (Individual-level) 
  
Incomea HS Completionb 
Not in 
Workforceb 
Well-
beinga 
Property 
Victimizationb 
Unsafe 
Perception of 
Neighborhooda 
Females 
            
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -0.072** 0.963* 0.986 -0.007 0.984 -0.004 
 
(.034) (.918, 1.011) (.947, 1.026) (.007) (.933. 1.038) (.003) 
Intercept 4.317*** 3.075*** 0.177*** 2.810*** 0.361*** 0.618*** 
 
(.234) (1.910, 4.951) (.117, .268) (.072) (.212, .613) (.027) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 4.020 0.484 0.328 0.438 0.881 0.059 
Neighborhood-level 0.079** 3.913*** 14.970*** 0.000 0.107 0.000 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -0.008 0.988 0.980 0.004 0.976* 0.004*** 
 
(.015) (.970, 1.006) (.941, 1.020) (.006) (.950, 1.004) (.001) 
Intercept 4.316*** 3.152*** 0.182*** 2.800*** 0.368*** 0.609*** 
 
(.245) (1.984, 5.009) (.120, .276) (.063) (.212, .642) (.028) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 4.031 0.487 0.322 0.438 0.873 0.059 
Neighborhood-level 0.141*** 3.882*** 16.804*** 0.000 0.108 0.000 
Males 
            
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -0.050 1.095** 0.976 -0.001 1.000 0.003 
 
(.040) (1.014, 1.183) (.935, 1.018) (.009) (.958, 1.044) (.004) 
Intercept 3.996*** 2.994*** 0.278*** 3.007*** 0.311*** 0.405*** 
 
(.427) (2.112, 4.244) (.149, .520) (.097) (.184, .524) (.050) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 3.981 0.270 0.090 0.389 0.790 0.084 
Neighborhood-level 0.172*** 3.630*** 30.758*** 0.021*** 0.829** 0.000** 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -0.036 0.977 1.016 -0.011 0.994 -0.001 
 
(.034) (.939, 1.017) (.980, 1.054) (.008) (.964, 1.026) (.004) 
Intercept 3.933*** 2.981*** 0.286*** 2.994*** 0.308*** 0.408*** 
 
(.446) (2.003, 4.436) (.148, .553) (.092) (.184, .516) (.049) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 3.950 0.269 0.090 0.390 0.791 0.083 
Neighborhood-level 0.229*** 3.684*** 35.781*** 0.015*** 0.823** 0.001** 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aOLS regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. bOver-
dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with confidence intervals in 
parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions/releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, 
population per 1,000 residents, and total crime rate per 100 residents at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, black, 
homeowner, and presence of children within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison admissions/releases, 
concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, population per 1,000 residents, total crime rate per 100, and age are 
centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children within the household are left uncentered. n= 
700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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 Appendix F. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Social Capital by Gender with Additional Controls 
(Individual-level) 
  
Marriageb Social Tiesa 
General 
Neighboringa 
Defensive 
Neighboringa 
Community 
Solidaritya 
Presence of 
Voluntary 
Associationsa 
Females 
            
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 1.011 -0.218 0.001 -0.002 -0.014 -0.060** 
 
(.957, 1.067) (.154) (.004) (.004) (.016) (.024) 
Intercept 0.560** 5.917*** 0.528*** 0.687*** 2.712*** 2.435*** 
 
(.310, 1.012) (1.515) (.037) (.038) (.078) (.286) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.844 167.556 0.087 0.096 0.352 3.860 
Neighborhood-level 1.452*** 0.049 0.000 0.003*** 0.026*** 0.333*** 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 1.002 0.051 0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.037* 
 
(.977, 1.027) (.068) (.002) (.003) (.005) (.023) 
Intercept 0.558** 5.736*** 0.521*** 0.685*** 2.712*** 2.460*** 
 
(.309, 1.010) (1.370) (.037) (.037) (.078) (.302) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.849 168.130 0.087 0.096 0.353 3.854 
Neighborhood-level 1.401*** 0.056 0.000 0.003*** 0.028*** 0.346*** 
Males             
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 0.977 -0.237 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.017* -0.076*** 
 
(.921, 1.037) (.164) (.003) (.003) (.010) (.020) 
Intercept 0.522** 7.159*** 0.442*** 0.595*** 2.513*** 2.479*** 
 
(.312, .873) (1.499) (.050) (.045) (.118) (.281) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.877 278.070 0.083 0.079 0.330 3.187 
Neighborhood-level 0.045*** 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.014** 0.002 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 1.014 -0.145 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.029 
 
(.974, 1.056) (.166) (.003) (.003) (.007) (.022) 
Intercept 0.512*** 6.792*** 0.432*** 0.586*** 2.512*** 2.370*** 
 
(0.302, 0.866) (1.601) (.051) (.049) (.116) (.298) 
Variance Components: 
      
Individual-level 0.877 278.513 0.084 0.080 0.328 3.180 
Neighborhood-level 0.045*** 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.022*** 0.091** 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aOLS regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with confidence intervals in 
parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions/releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, 
population per 1,000 residents, and total crime rate per 100 residents at the neighborhood-level, as well as age, black, 
homeowner, and presence of children within the household at the individual-level. Change in prison admissions/ 
releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, population per 1,000 residents, total crime rate per 100, and 
age are centered on their grand mean. Race, homeowner, and presence of children within the household are left 
uncentered. n= 700 individuals nested within 30 neighborhoods. 
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Appendix G. Change in Prison Admission and Release Rates on Social Control by Gender with Additional Controls 
(Individual-level) 
  
Informal Social  
Controla 
Reprimanding 
Neighborhood Childrenb 
Initiating Formal Social 
Controla 
Females 
      
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 -0.007 1.010 0.000 
 
(.006) (.951, 1.072) (.002) 
Intercept 0.572*** 0.734 0.942*** 
 
(.043) (.422, 1.278) (.017) 
Variance Components: 
   
Individual-level 0.124 0.854 0.027 
Neighborhood-level 0.000** 0.569*** 0.000 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 -0.003 1.002 0.002* 
 
(.004) (.962, 1.045) (.001) 
Intercept 0.574*** 0.731 0.940*** 
 
(.042) (.419, 1.277) (.018) 
Variance Components: 
   
Individual-level 0.124 0.854 0.027 
Neighborhood-level 0.000** 0.581*** 0.000 
Males       
Change in Admission Rate '92-'94 0.002 0.990 -0.007*** 
 
(.003) (.952, 1.029) (.002) 
Intercept 0.574*** 0.378*** 0.936*** 
 
(.041) (.193, .738) (.030) 
Variance Components: 
   
Individual-level 0.135 0.735 0.028 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 1.971*** 0.000 
Change in Release Rate '92-'94 0.008*** 0.974 -0.000 
 
(.003) (.930, 1.021) (.002) 
Intercept 0.583*** 0.382*** 0.930*** 
 
(.038) (.192, .764) (.031) 
Variance Components: 
   
Individual-level 0.133 0.739 0.028 
Neighborhood-level 0.000 2.139*** 0.000* 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. aOLS regression; fixed effects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
bOver-dispersed Bernoulli regression with error terms included; odds ratios are reported with confidence intervals in 
parentheses. Models include change in prison admissions/releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, 
population per 1,000 residents, total crime rate per 100 residents, and lack of police response at the neighborhood-
level, as well as age, black, homeowner, and presence of children within the household at the individual-level. 
Change in prison admissions/releases, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, population per 1,000 
residents, total crime rate per 100, lack of police response, and age are centered on their grand mean. Race, 
homeowner, and presence of children within the household are left uncentered. n= 700 individuals nested within 30 
neighborhoods. 
 
